White Character and Civilization, Compared to Chinese.
by Frank Jamger
Looking beyond IQ and crime.
The most frequently cited data on race differences are IQ and crime rates, of which we have clear empirical measures. East Asians usually rank higher than Whites on these two stats, though strangely enough people aren't lining up to move to east Asia. Intelligence and character extend well beyond these two stats, and we ought to look further into them. This essay examines deeper racial differences, particularly the ones that distinguish Whites and Chinese, that make Europe a more appealing destination than east Asia, and that have enabled Whites to surpass China on historical measures.
Outline:
The purpose of this essay.
My interest in the nature of ideas.
A word on the import of trust.
Two key differences between Whites and Chinese.
I. The evolutionary basis of White-Chinese differences in trust and explorativity: rural versus urban agricultural environments.
II. The higher trust and compassion of Whites engenders greater morality and freedom.
Introduction: The nature of morality.
II-1. Chinese are more apprehensive and timid; Whites are more outgoing and aggressive.
II-2. Whites' greater trust and honor enables freer communication and transactions; while cooperation among Chinese is problematic.
II-3. Compassion for the distressed is greater among Whites than Chinese.
II-4. Communication is more open and honest among Whites than Chinese.
II-5. Whites have greater moral drive than Chinese, in general.
A. Whites have greater moral drive, based on greater trust and empathy and lower outgroup discrimination.
B. Whites behave more morally than Chinese, in every respect.
C. Cultural norms of morality are based on genotypes.
II-6. Crime, abuse, and war: Whites are more aggressive, Chinese are more deceptive.
A. Whites commit more crimes of aggression; Chinese commit more crimes of deception.
B. Much exploitation and abuse by Chinese is not regarded as crime.
C. Whites fight more wars; Chinese have more rebellions.
D. Competition is the law of nature.
II-7. White families are voluntary unions; Chinese families are communist.
A. Chinese families are highly solidary because Chinese society is insecure; White families are freer.
B. Chinese families are tightly disciplined.
C. Chinese families have collective responsibilities.
II-8. White governments are representative cooperations; Chinese governments are despotisms.
Introduction.
A. White citizens are more independent.
B. Chinese rulers are more despotic.
C. Whites have had more power-sharing institutions; China has been autocratic.
D. Communist China is autocratic, just as were imperial regimes.
E. White governors are generally honorable; Chinese governors are generally corrupt.
F. Whites' representative governments are stronger and more effective than China's despotic regimes.
III-IV. Introduction: Whites are more explorative and creative than Chinese, while Chinese have higher memory-based intelligence.
A. Superior White explorativity and creativity; Superior Chinese memory and skill.
B. Whites have more discrete and abstract perception; Chinese have more concrete and detailed perception.
C. Creative/analytic and memory-based intelligence are broadly correlated, despite being inversely related at high levels.
III. The nature of intelligence, explorativity, and creativity.
III-1. The nature of memory-based intelligence.
A. Applications of memory-based intelligence.
B. Keen memory facilitates calculation, as well as recognition.
C. Keen memory facilitates manual skills, as well as mental ones.
III-2. The nature of creative/analytic intelligence.
A. Idea generation is based on explorativity and generation of new knowledge.
B. Idea generation requires abstract perception, in order to match knowledge with methods to obtain goals.
C. Matches are made of effects, as well as objects/actions; principles thereof being barely definite.
D. A creative mind considers a broad range of potential outcomes, as well as courses of action.
E. A creative mind wonders why when anomalous outcomes occur, and thereby refines principles.
F. A creative mind argues and composes similarly as it generates ideas and scrutinizes predictions.
III-3. Summary and comparison of memory-based and creative/analytic intelligence types.
A. Memory-based intelligence.
B. Creative/analytic Intelligence.
III-4. Intelligence tests and visuo-spatial ability.
A. Intelligence tests, including visuo-spatial tasks, measure memory-based intelligence, not creativity.
B. Explanation of the male-female visuo-spatial ability gap.
C. The difference between use of abstract principles to calculate, and abstract formulation and perception of principles to generate ideas.
IV. Evidence of intelligence types in Whites and Chinese.
Introduction.
IV-1. Exploration and recreation.
A. Whites are more explorative and interested in scientific discovery than are Chinese.
B. Whites are more active and recreational than Chinese, who are more task-focused.
IV-2. Storytelling, art, and fantasy.
A. Whites are more imaginative in literature and the arts.
B. Whites are more technologically imaginative.
IV-3. Tests of perception, categorization, and reasoning.
A. Tests indicate that Whites perceive more abstractly than Chinese.
B. Whites perceive objects more discretely and recognize them better in novel contexts; Chinese perceive scenes more concretely and memorize background details better.
C. Whites more actively focus upon objects and consider their properties.
D. Whites more associate objects according to their effects/function than their context.
E. Whites apply principles more robustly, even when implausible, thus considering more potentialities.
F. Whites consider and resolve contradictions more robustly.
IV-4. Language: Analytic clarity versus ornate form.
A. White language is more analytic and abstract; Chinese is more pictographic and concrete.
B. Chinese are more concerned with writing's form and context.
C. Chinese language and writing is more ambiguous.
IV-5. Expository and scientific writing.
A. Whites axiomatized principles into degrees of abstraction, while Chinese made superficial correlations.
B. Whites scrutinize and debate principles and assertions more robustly than do Chinese.
IV-6. Religion and superstition.
A. Chinese are more susceptible to superstitious claims, because they are less conscious of contradictions with natural principles.
B. Judeo-Christianity is a relatively plausible religion that generally accepts natural laws.
C. Chinese religions and superstitions are more extensive and difficult to swallow.
D. Superstition deeply permeates Chinese people's everyday activities.
E. Superstition even pervades Chinese medicine.
F. Chinese take superstitious luck far more seriously than do Whites.
IV-7. Gambling and carelessness.
A. Chinese gambling and superstition are intertwined.
B. Chinese are more reckless gamblers than Whites.
C. Chinese are more careless generally than Whites.
IV-8. Proficiency in memory and skill, and Chinese underachievement.
A. Chinese are more skilled than Whites at all tasks not requiring creativity or power athletics.
B. Explanation of the moderate Chinese performance on verbal tests: a need for creative interpretation of writing.
C. Chinese excellence in math and science is due to visuo-spatial ability, not creativity.
D. The Chinese ability set is comparable to that of autistic savants.
E. Chinese underachieve during careers, likely due to inferior creativity and judgement.
V. Whites have been more innovative than Chinese in all fields.
Introduction: Overview of Europe's ascension.
V-1. Due to its greater agricultural challenges, Europe did not urbanize until about 1000AD, allowing China a technological lead.
A. The real question of comparative history: How did China get a lead on Europe? The answer: agricultural advantage.
B. The oldest civilizations of the world are all based on floodplains, the ideal environments for agriculture.
C. China's large agricultural advantages over Europe.
D. China was well urbanized by about 1000BC.
E. Urbanization is a boon to technological progress.
F. The classical Greco-Roman world surpassed China despite being only a periphery of Europe, dependent on grain imports from Africa.
G. After the founding population of the Roman Empire intermixed into oblivion, it could not be held together.
H. Mainland Europe, barely changed by the Roman Empire, gradually developed its agricultural technology.
I. Europe urbanized at about 1000AD.
V-2. Europe's technological innovation has been far superior to China's.
A. China, which had connections with the old western world, achieved many early, basic inventions.
B. Much of China's best creative work was done in its ancient past, which indicates subsequent genetic change toward lower creativity.
C. Europe developed rapidly, surpassing China's general technological level by 1500.
D. The bases of Whites' technological superiority: creative utilization and creative design.
E. Basic devices are as good as the creative uses made of them; Whites developed and utilized key devices more robustly than did Chinese.
F. Whites surged ahead in technological fields based on creative design; China retained a lead in fields based on subtle knowledge and experience.
G. Review of Europe's technological prowess in 1500: 1. Architecture 2. Power machinery 3. Mechanical clocks 4. Movable type printing 5. Instrument-making 6. Weaponry 7. Mining 8. Ship-building.
H. White science and technology merged in Europe's Industrial Revolutions.
I. White science and technology created the modern world.
J. Despite enormous transfers and ongoing theft of White technology, China continues to lag.
V-3. Whites are also superior to the Chinese at scientific, institutional, and artistic innovation.
A-D: Science.
A. Whites scientifically investigated, analyzed, and classified the world much more than Chinese.
B. The White Scientific Revolution.
C. The Chinese scientific record has been paltry in comparison to Whites'.
D. Claims of Chinese scientific achievements are much exaggerated.
E-H: Government and education.
E. White governments are more representative, embedded, and stronger than Chinese.
F. Whites have led the world in governmental innovations.
G. Europe has long been superior to China in book production, education, and literacy.
H. China's despotic government was deficient in many respects, and declined over time.
I-K: Industry, trade, and finance.
I. White governments actively supported industry and trade, while China stifled it.
J. Whites have led the world in economic innovation and development.
K. Whites have long had superior industry, trade, wages, and GDP to China.
L-M: Artistic innovation.
L. Whites have had more eminent artists than Chinese.
M. Whites have made many major innovations in the arts.
V-4. Arguments.
Introduction: Anti-White propaganda with a familiar theme.
A. Argument: "China's superior trade balance with Europe in the 18th century, by which they obtained a lot of Europe's silver in trade for its commodities, shows that it was technologically/ industrially superior at this late point in time."
1. Europe was in fact economically superior to China in the 18th century, and imported from China mostly raw materials.
2. China restricted imports but wanted silver, a valuable commodity.
3. Europe's silver trade with China was just an aspect of its international trade dominance.
B. Argument: "Europe's industrial success was due to its privileged access in its colonies to raw materials such as cotton, sugar, and silver, to customers, and to its exploitation of slave labor."
1. Europe's development of resources into products was a consequence of its technology; its colonies were unnecessary and hardly worth the costs.
2. Colonies were only a small factor in Britain's industrial success, and Britain usually had to pay fair market value for the materials it imported.
3. Northern Europe which industrialized got little of the supposed "windfalls" of precious metals and slaves; China had plenty of cheap labor.
4. China possessed enormous domestic supplies of raw materials that Europe lacked, including cotton and sugar, and a bigger market.
5. China obtained a great bounty of de facto colonial acquisitions in the 17th-18th centuries.
C. Argument: "Europe's Industrial Revolution was due to the good fortune of Britain having a lot of coal located near industrial areas."
1. The Industrial Revolution, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, was not dependent on coal.
2. Britain's innovation drove its Industrial Revolution; the location of coal deposits hardly mattered.
3. China had more coal deposits than Britain and every opportunity to develop them.
D. Argument: "Britain's industrial success was due to its cheap energy and high wages that induced the replacement of human labor with machines."
1. Britain's industrial success was due to the innovation and skill of her people; its wages were high because its labor productivity was high.
2. The skill of British craftsmen was renowned throughout Europe, and they commanded higher wages everywhere.
3. Britons innovated irrespective of labor costs, and Britain's highest wages shifted to areas having more innovation and industry.
E. Argument: "China's decline was due to European opium trade and the Opium Wars, and the consequent drain of China's silver."
1. China's decline had been going on for centuries, the trade wars were short, and China was largely responsible for opium proliferation.
2. The amount and effects of China's silver drain due to opium are much exaggerated; China's real currency problem was its lousy monetary system.
3. Chinese government and military officials fully collaborated with opium trade and distribution, as well as domestic production.
4. Given the Chinese high demand and extensive collaboration, stopping the opium trade to China was impossible.
5. The Anglo-Chinese Wars were launched against China's unfair trade and negotiation policies, not its opium embargo.
6. The Anglo-Chinese Wars shocked the insular Chinese into engaging with the modern world.
The purpose of this essay.
The purpose of this essay is not to bash the Chinese people. It is, rather, to elucidate the qualities of the White people whom I love, and to thereby, hopefully, inspire some of us to support the Cause of averting our impending extinction. I don't think it is enough to just say Whites are a unique and worthy folk. Some specificity is needed. I could just say that Whites are "relatively" trusting, compassionate, moral, cooperative, creative, innovative, etc. But every people has these qualities to some extent or other, and the difference of degree I indicate has little meaning without some substantive comparison. I believe that the only way to really substantiate the White qualities I assert is to compare them with their counterparts in the one other race that has a comparable intelligence and historical record, the Chinese.
My interest in the nature of ideas.
I'm an introspective person. I've been contemplating how my mind works, as sort of a hobby, since I was in junior high at 13, and have been formulating principles thereof since I became a dedicated Spinozist at 15. That was more than ten years before I became racially aware. I'm well past 40 now. The principles of idea formation discussed in section III are my original work, though I would assume that others have published similar ideas. These principles (and others) have long resided in my head and in my numerous spiral notepads. I did not develop them ad hoc as a basis for my assertion that Whites are more creative than Chinese.
A word on the import of trust.
Addressing my compatriots in the movement to secure the existence of our people and a future for White children: I know that some of you will be put off by my emphasis on the trait of trust. Some of you think that trust is the worst trait we've got, the cause of all our troubles. But upon reflection trust can be seen to be the basis of all the moral sentiment that distinguishes our people and makes us worth saving. I'll explain. Of course people love their family. A mother rat has compassion for its babies, though probably not for anyone else. Of course people are considerate toward their ingroup of friends and acquaintances whom they know well. And of course people follow the rules/laws that their organization or government has prescribed, that they have agreed to. But these basic instincts, agreements, and civil actions do not reach the level of moral conduct. Moral conduct is selfless behavior, having an (opportunity-) cost to oneself, that a person undertakes for the well-being of someone he doesn't know, of people outside his ingroup, of his society or his posterity in general. To have moral sentiment, a person must have goodwill toward unfamiliar people. We make judgments on the merits of individuals we meet and learn about, on how deserving they are of our goodwill. But what determines our goodwill towards those we do not know, those who are unfamiliar? Trust. Our level of trust that they are 'one of us', that they are related. Our level of trust that they are trustworthy. Our level of trust that they are good, compassionate, moral people. Our level of trust that our goodwill is reciprocated by them, that our good deeds will ultimately rebound as everyone does their part to contribute to the well-being of our common society, our nation. Trust is the basis of moral sentiment and conduct.
As is frequently pointed out by those concerned for the plight of our dear folk, our most distinctive and precious trait—trust—has been perverted by our enemies, to induce us to trust the untrusting and untrustworthy aliens who seek to devour our fair nations. In our native environment of rural Europe, extending trust to a hardy man who offered his work or requested a helping hand was a good policy. Extending trust and moral sentiment to fellow Whites is the natural and proper attitude for us to have. But extending it to a similar degree to nonwhites is a grave folly. We must learn to draw this crucial distinction, or we and our trusting way of life will perish.
Two key differences between Whites and Chinese.
White and Chinese differences are based on two basic character traits: trust and explorativity. Whites are more aggressive and curious, and more socially outgoing and compassionate. Chinese are more timid and task-focused, and more socially solidary and in/out-group conscious. Whites are more trusting and empathetic, meaning they are more moral and cooperative, their societies are freer, and their governments are more representative and embedded in society. Chinese are less trusting and empathetic, meaning they are more selfish, their societies are more hierarchical, and their governments are more despotic and corrupt. Whites are more explorative and curious about their environs, making them more eager to explore, to play, and to consider and experiment with novel ideas. Chinese are more task-focused and have higher memory-based intelligence, making them better learners and more persistent and skilled at tasks having a definite objective. Whites' higher creativity leads to greater innovation in science and technology, including institutional and cultural. Chinese higher intelligence leads to superiority at all productive skills not requiring power athletics.
I. The evolutionary basis of White-Chinese differences in trust and explorativity: rural versus urban agricultural environments.
The disparity between Whites and Chinese on the traits of trust and explorativity arose from their differing environments: the cold, rugged, heavily forested lands of Europe and the warm, alluvial plains of China's great river deltas. Areas of fertile and level soil were scattered about in Europe,¹ while China's large alluvial plains where its dense population was concentrated were easily worked and extremely fertile.²
Europeans required more land to harvest sufficient food under their challenging conditions for agriculture.³ They pioneered independent homesteads and pastures, sowing crops during their short growing season and subsisting partly on animal husbandry and hunter-gathering. Chinese attained high-yield agriculture and high population densities precociously, and soon came to rely on large irrigation projects closely coordinated with neighbors under government management.⁴
Rural, independent Europeans had a relative abundance of natural resources such as land, forests, and wildlife.⁵ The challenge in Europe was to creatively develop these resources in their harsh environment, which included making compacts with distant neighbors to assist with labor and equipment needs. There was always more marginal land and more resources that could be worked for a living, so congestion and conflicts were limited.⁶ Strangers in these environs who made overtures were likely to be vigorous, fairly independent and trustworthy.
Urban, interdependent Chinese lived among a concentration of people who managed and fully developed available natural resources, leading to shortages of resources.⁷ The challenge in China was to obtain as large a share as possible of a finite pool of resources and goods.⁸ This was done by working one's small plot adeptly,⁹ by maintaining close relationships (alliances) with one's clan and governors, and/or by extracting levies as a governor.¹⁰ Strangers in these environs who made overtures were less likely to be independent and trustworthy, and more likely to be desperate.
Higher trust was favored in Europe because its more independent people were more trustworthy, and cooperative working relationships often had to be sought out and formed. In China, extended family and neighbors lived closeby, and work projects were often supervised by government. With China's more intensive conflict for scarcer resources, extending trust and compassion to a stranger, to anyone outside one's clan, was more risky and costly. As a defensive measure, Chinese developed solidary, authoritarian social groups based on extended family, with moral standards conditioned on ingroup/outgroup status.¹¹ Europeans developed a broader morality and cooperated more freely with society members at large.
Higher curiosity and explorativity was favored in Europe because it had a greater variety of accessible terrains and resources that could be developed in various ways. Chinese in their alluvial plains had fewer such opportunities and, with resource scarcity, greater need to conserve energy for essential, productive tasks. China's environment instead favored skill, efficiency, and persistence. Any innovations or advantages gained by Chinese initiative were quickly appropriated by clan and neighbors; while European homesteads succeeded or failed according to their own creativity. The explorativity of Europeans ranged from pioneering new lands, to experimenting with new materials and devices, to considering new, innovative ideas.
II. The higher trust and compassion of Whites engenders greater morality and freedom.
Introduction: The nature of morality.
I speak here of social-altruistic morality, not of personal-disciplinal morality whereby one makes short-term personal sacrifices for long term personal gain. Social morality is conduct undertaken for the best interests of one's society, rather than of oneself.
While of course there is disagreement on just what conduct is in a society's best interests, and anyone will behave 'morally' when their personal interests happen to coincide with society's, moral behavior is essentially (in)action taken for the benefit of others at some (opportunity-) cost to oneself, i.e. kindness or consideration that is not compelled and does not gain a direct reward. Conversely, immorality is (in)actions taken for the benefit of oneself at some (opportunity-) cost to others, offenses not necessarily egregious enough to constitute a crime. People behave morally for several reasons, all based on trust and acceptance. People can feel compassion for others, with an urge to avert or relieve their (potential) suffering and promote their well-being, a concern beyond their own family and ingroup. People can want the approval and love of others that moral conduct merits, and have an aversion to others' antipathy if acting immorally. And people can have an abstract expectation of reciprocity by society in general: a faith that good deeds will rebound as everyone ultimately does their part to contribute to the public good.
A moral people has much concern for their community and nation, and optimism for winning their approval and love. A moral people does not expect direct reciprocation for every kind and honest deed, nor a reward for every act of sacrifice for the national welfare, nor a payment for every contribution to society. A moral people respects all members of their society, trusting others and treating them fairly. They do not form solidary social groups having an 'us versus them' attitude, with lower standards of morality practiced toward those outside the group. They do not receive a 'free pass' for immoral conduct directed against members of society outside their ingroup. They do not selfishly exploit fellow community members who happen to be weaker or less well connected to those in power. And therefore, a moral people enjoys a community spirit and robust cooperation throughout society, without a need for strict governmental discipline that restricts freedom.
Of course, the last thing a moral people should do is accept immoral people into their society, who will only take advantage of their trusting and kindly sentiments, and thereby erode them.
II-1. Chinese are more apprehensive and timid; Whites are more outgoing and aggressive.
Chinese have a more timid, introverted personality type than Whites,¹ consistent with lower trust, that is evident even in infancy. White American babies are more aggressive and active than are Chinese American counterparts, who are more apprehensive and closely attached to their mother in unfamiliar situations.² Whites are more friendly and outgoing toward strangers, while Chinese are reluctant to talk to strangers and often engage in conversation through intermediaries.³ Whites tend to confront adversaries directly to resolve differences, sometimes through fights; whereas Chinese avoid confrontation as much as possible, often resolving disputes through intermediaries,⁴ and rarely fight physically even when a shouting match ensues.⁵ In contrast to Whites, Chinese have no tradition of vigorous sports and rarely play them.⁶ Chinese submit to authority more readily than do Whites,⁷ though they will revolt en masse when oppression becomes intolerable.⁸ The Chinese aversion to physical confrontation is likely a 'survival strategy' evolved in the context of China's high level of social conflict: those inclined to fight when offended could not last long.
II-2. Whites' greater trust and honor enables freer communication and transactions; while cooperation among Chinese is problematic.
There is much evidence that Whites have greater trust and honor than Chinese, beyond their more outgoing personality type. Whereas Whites' homes are relatively exposed to visitors, Chinese homes are usually enclosed in walls.¹ Whereas Whites are usually open to answer inquiries of visitors about their identity and the people and places of their town, Chinese are very reluctant to answer such questions.² Whereas White businesses are managed by any group of individuals with compatible talents who get together, Chinese businesses are mainly owned and managed by members of the same family, since outsiders are not trusted.³ In some cases when a Chinese outside the owning family was employed as a branch manager, his family was actually held hostage to ensure loyalty.⁴ Whereas Whites typically make deals through direct talks, Chinese typically negotiate via a third party mediator to ensure each side upholds his end.⁵ Chinese emperors actually assigned Europeans to collect their own custom fees at the border, since fellow Chinese were not trusted to do it.⁶ The greater trust and honor of Whites is evident in the much lower interest rates for loans they have had throughout history,⁷ and in the greater reliability of their currency and specie.⁸ While Whites readily form large, cooperative groups, Chinese society is very fractious.⁹
II-3. Compassion for the distressed is greater among Whites than Chinese.
Compassion, like trust, is hard to measure, but callousness is witnessed in China that is jarring to the sensibilities of Whites. Chinese regimes are often ruthless in their predations and impressments of their own people.¹ Chinese law enforcement is arbitrary and cruel, torturing plaintiffs as well as defendants, and sometimes killing whole families.² This in recent times, not only the distant past. Communist China is no exception.³
China's compassion deficiency extends far beyond the talons of government. When accidents occur with victims in distress, Whites usually intervene to help, but Chinese may intervene—if at all—only to take advantage of the chaos.⁴ Whites tend to be indulgent toward weak members of society, but in China unfortunate folk such as cripples and enslaved daughters-in-law are typically objects of scorn.⁵ Chinese girls for centuries were subjected to the horrific practice of foot-binding, that ended only recently.⁶ Most Whites are compassionate toward companion animals and concerned for the welfare of endangered species, while Chinese kill them, often in gratuitously cruel ways, for use as food, clothing, or ritual medicine.⁷ Whereas the majority of Whites allow their organs to be transplanted after death to save those in need, very few Chinese allow this.⁸ There is evidence that Chinese do not feel pain and discomfort as acutely as Whites do, perhaps a factor in their lack of sympathy.⁹
II-4. Communication is more open and honest among Whites than Chinese.
For Whites, speech is chiefly a means to inform and to exchange ideas; for Chinese, speech is merely a tool of manipulation, usually dishonest.¹ Visitors to China find that getting honest answers to inquiries is an exasperating challenge.² Chinese shopkeepers will make any claim to get a sale, and prices are always a matter of 'negotiation', i.e. of what pains one is willing to take to avoid getting ripped off.³ Contracts made by Chinese are often broken.⁴ Chinese are far more prolific than Whites at crimes of deception (section II-6.A). Even when caught red-handed, Chinese seldom admit to any wrongdoing, but rather "save face" by making up preposterous excuses.⁵ Chinese lies often come with a big smile and declarations of Confucian piety.⁶ A Chinese 'on his game' is effusively expressive: graciously cordial to elicit goodwill, tragically grief-stricken to elicit sympathy, or ragingly indignant to elicit guilt.⁷ They can switch from one of these moods to another on a dime, as circumstances suggest.⁸ Some Chinese lies are just an effort to avoid direct denial or refusal, without a real intention to deceive.⁹
II-5. Whites have greater moral drive than Chinese, in general.
A. Whites have greater moral drive, based on greater trust and empathy and lower outgroup discrimination.
While the wisdom of any particular morally-motivated course of action is open to doubt, Whites typically have greater moral drive than Chinese. In Whites' challenging but less densely-populated and less resource-scarce evolutionary environment, behaving altruistically to assist nonfamilial neighbors and engender goodwill had greater rewards and less risk than did such conduct in China's environment (section I).
Whites have a more trusting attitude toward strangers (section II-1-2), and more faith that others have a similar positive attitude as themselves and so will reciprocate acts of kindness. Whites have more sympathy for others' suffering (section II-3), greater perceived prospect of winning others' love, and more concern for their community and nation (and even—foolishly—for nonwhites).¹ Chinese, on the other hand, have less regard for those outside their ingroup and expect direct reciprocity for any gifts given or services rendered.² Chinese have double standards of morality: one standard for family/ingroup and a lower standard for others.³ Being inconsiderate to a stranger does not hurt a Chinese's standing with his ingroup;⁴ but a White who is callous to a stranger will likely receive the censure of family and friends, since they make but minimal distinction between ingroup and outgroup. Chinese society is very fractious, with minimal cooperation beyond that enforced by authority.⁵ Chinese have extreme contempt for foreigners, notwithstanding their affected grace and courtesies.⁶
B. Whites behave more morally than Chinese, in every respect.
Whites behave more morally than Chinese in every respect. Reviewed above are Whites' greater honor, compassion, and honesty. As reviewed, Whites are more considerate to strangers they encounter in public, being more friendly, respectful, and helpful. Chinese are pushy, rude and loud in their random public encounters.¹ Whites are more responsible about picking up after themselves and keeping public places clean. Chinese habitually litter, and their public eating facilities, toilets, streets, train stations, etc. are often filthy.² Chinese are the worst air and water polluters, and responsible for about 67% of the plastic waste dumped into the world's oceans.³ Chinese are also well known to be cheaters on school applications and exams.⁴ Whites also have greater patriotism.⁵ When a White nation is attacked, people of all its regions join together in patriotic defense, and military leaders are unified and loyal. When China is attacked, people of distant regions are indifferent and the military divided; regional generals selling their wares only at dear prices or colluding with the enemy.⁶ The greater regard for honor and duty of White officials is discussed in section II-8.E. What morals the Chinese have are the obligatory bonds of family, and conventions of etiquette carried out with guests and customers, usually for a definite purpose.
C. Cultural norms of morality are based on genotypes.
It may be objected that morals are mediated by cultural norms, and that Chinese living in White nations behave better than those in China. This is true, but cultural norms are themselves forged by genotypes. Cultural norms in White nations are shaped by their predominantly White genes. Chinese who move to a White nation quickly learn that among Whites they can't get away with the same shenanigans taken for granted in their homeland (not so blatantly, at least), and so they behave better. However, if the proportion of Chinese genes in a country passes the point at which Chinese dispositions determine cultural norms, Chinese moral culture and behavior will revert accordingly.
II-6. Crime, abuse, and war: Whites are more aggressive, Chinese are more deceptive.
A. White deviants commit more crimes of aggression; Chinese commit more crimes of deception.
Whites are more vigorous and aggressive than Chinese, and so, while Whites have low crime rates, they have more deviant individuals who commit aggressive sorts of crimes than do Chinese. Chinese are averse to physical confrontation (section II-1), but commit more crimes involving deception, such as corruption, counterfeiting, and fraud. Chinese regularly abuse their power (next section), and profusely engage in corruption (section II-8.E). Until very recently, paper currency and face-value coins were only sporadically used in China because of rampant overprinting and counterfeiting,¹ and precious metal coins were frequently debased and so had to be regularly 'chopped' to check for authenticity.² Chinese are virtuosi at all forms of scam artistry, posing as fake English and art students, fake tea house hosts, fake taxi drivers, fake monks, officials, doctors, policemen, school superintendents, etc., and utilizing fake bus stops or fake credit card machines, and the like.³ Chinese are infamous for knockoffs of White-created products, and only the Chinese are audacious enough to sell rats as beef, plastic as rice, and concocted fake eggs, walnuts, etc.⁴ China's fakes trade is an estimated 8% of its economy.⁵
B. Much exploitation and abuse by Chinese is not regarded as crime.
Chinese commit many offenses that aren't regarded as crime, since dominance relationships are sanctioned by Chinese ethics¹ and law.² What Whites call slavery, abuse, and exploitation, Chinese call governing, parenting, and managing. Each of these institutions in China is strictly hierarchical, with rulers having arbitrary power and subordinates having few if any rights. Chinese governments dictate to their subjects,³ Chinese patriarchs abuse or exploit their women and children,⁴ and Chinese bosses "squeeze" their employees,⁵ and these 'victims' can scarcely appeal to law enforcement. Chinese are also prolific at lesser moral offenses as discussed above, such as verbal assaults and slander, littering and polluting, duplicity and betrayal. Much of this devilry is just taken for granted as a matter of course in China.
C. Whites fight more wars; Chinese have more rebellions.
Whites launch more wars than do Chinese, while Chinese launch more mass revolts against their tyrannical governments. White soldiers will engage in battle aggressively, while Chinese armies are reluctant to take the field and often pursue unaggressive forms of resolution, such as deception, bribery, subversion, and mediation.¹ Some Chinese weapons were designed as much to make terrifying noise as to inflict damage.² Warfare between Whites tends to be more destructive, because White governments are better organized and stronger (section V-3.E-K) and have greater technological capabilities (section V-2.G.6). The high number of wars between White nations is partly due to the fact that upon a victory they do not aim to completely subjugate or vanquish the other, allowing them to return to fight another day; whereas victories among Asians typically result in total subjugation. Though Chinese as individuals rarely defy authority, when oppression becomes intolerable they rebel en masse, and have had sufficient reason to do so hundreds of times throughout their history—more than any other people.³
D. Competition is the law of nature.
Warfare is not necessarily immoral. Competition and struggle is the law of nature; a people must fight to secure resources. Aggression against one's own kind, to which one is bonded by kinship, citizenship, or friendly relations, is more evil than aggression against aliens, especially inherently hostile ones. Lower-achieving races will always be envious of more successful ones and wish to take what they have created. In an open martial contest, the more virtuous side prevails and humanity can thereby progress. All races have conquered or enslaved whom they could. Whites have been more magnanimous: ending slavery within their lands, freeing subject peoples whom they could have ruled forever, and providing unending aid and assistance to those they defeated. Wars launched by Whites have typically been confined to limited objectives and battles between soldiers on the field, and have ended with conciliatory peace treaties. Unfortunately, more degenerate warfare has occurred when an alien religion deluded some Whites into thinking that other Whites were evil "heretics", and when alien subversives deluded some Whites into thinking that other Whites were evil "Huns" or "Nazis".
II-7. White families are voluntary unions; Chinese families are communist.
A. Chinese families are highly solidary because Chinese society is insecure; White families are freer.
People who feel insecure, who live in fear, untrusting of the general populace, tend to form solidary social groups for protection. Such groups are authoritarian, having a strong leader to maintain order and strong bonds of mutual sharing and responsibilities. The traditional Chinese family is such a group.¹ It is relatively large, often including the families of adult sons and extending to a wider family—a clan, that may encompass a whole village.² The patriarch exerts dominance over his women and children throughout their lives, controlling their residence, work, and marriage.³ Traditional White families, especially those of northwest Europeans, are smaller and looser. Older children are relatively independent, free to choose their career, where they want to work, and whom they want to marry. They often choose to move out at a young age, to live alone, and to marry late or never. What portion of their property and income they share with their parents, siblings, and children, is up to them.
B. Chinese families are tightly disciplined.
A traditional Chinese family is typically as large as its plot of land will support,¹ and is hierarchical and tightly disciplined.² The patriarch is the dictator. He rules over his wife, and can have multiple wives, concubines and prostitutes.³ There is an age-based hierarchy among the brothers (often numbered), as well as any wives or concubines.⁴ Parents decide where their children will live, how they will work, and whom they will marry.⁵ Children are required by law to obey their parents and to fully support them throughout life.⁶ Penalties for disobedience are severe, including torture, imprisonment, and decapitation.⁷ If a son brings an accusation of parental wrongdoing to authorities, he will be severely punished by law even if his charge was true.⁸ Sons are not allowed to separate from parents without permission.⁹ Daughters are usually sold off (via betrothal gifts) as a bride at a young age to become the life-long work slave of her in-laws.¹⁰ The punishment for marrying without permission is typically 80 to 100 blows of the heavy bamboo.¹¹ Boys as well as girls can be hired out for work by parents, though girls are usually confined to the home.¹²
C. Chinese families have collective responsibilities.
Traditional Chinese families are generally treated and taxed as a unit by the state.¹ Families are sometimes punished as a whole, and members are sometimes substitutable for punishment.² Successful Chinese individuals, even if having left the home, are required to share property, income, and employment with 'less fortunate' members of the family—nepotism is prevalent.³ This means that a successful man may be deluged with relatives, and may try to conceal any wealth.⁴ Upon a death, periods of mourning and attendance of shrines are exactingly prescribed according to one's degree of relationship with the deceased.⁵ Punishments for crimes within families were regulated according to these same degrees of relationship.⁶ Notwithstanding all these bonds, Chinese families are not always cozy affairs. There is a reason for all those strict regulatory laws. Chinese families are often fractious and abusive, failing to keep their obligations except when pressed, as you might expect of people forced to live together, to submit and to yield to others.⁷
II-8. White governments are representative cooperations; Chinese governments are despotisms.
Introduction.
Chinese rulers are more despotic and less compassionate toward subjects than are White rulers. White citizens have more local autonomy, more representation in government, and more rights. Chinese government exerts wider control over economic, educational and religious activities, but often merely to restrict them. White government, being more embedded within its nation, is stronger and more effective in managing these activities. Chinese rule is more arbitrary and self-serving, while White rule is more grounded in law and dutiful.
A. White citizens are more independent.
White leaders throughout history have been more independent of central authority than Chinese leaders, more constrained by law toward their subordinates and subjects,¹ and more subject to the approval of legislative bodies representing their citizenry.² Early Germanic tribes were organized into voluntary 'brotherhoods' with an elected leader.³ Feudal fealty between Whites was a contract of mutual duties, which each had a right to nullify if the other proved unfaithful;⁴ while Chinese feudal fealty was absolute.⁵ Many European regions split apart completely into separate nations, while China merged into a single megastate ruled by an emperor. White nobles, clergy,⁶ and towns retained a degree of autonomy and rights,⁷ their leaders meeting in representative bodies that gradually evolved into modern parliaments. China has no such tradition.⁸ White citizens have rights to elect representatives, to voice their political views, to practice their religion, to be secure in their property, and to not be arrested and punished without due process. Chinese have no such rights.⁹
B. Chinese rulers are more despotic.
Before its present totalitarian Communist regime, China was ruled by emperors worshipped as the "Son of Heaven". Those blessed to be in the presence of the emperor, or even of a letter he had written, kowtowed: they bowed down touching their head to the ground nine times.¹ The elites bathed in luxury while the people languished.² The emperor and his officials were not constrained by a constitution and had few written laws they needed to bother about.³ Criminal laws provided exemptions and lighter punishments for higher ranking personages.⁴ Officials governed arbitrarily with a wide range of powers,⁵ punished dissent as they pleased,⁶ and seized property and conscripted labor and soldiery as they wished.⁷ Chinese people often concealed any wealth, to avoid confiscation.⁸ The ruling class installed Confucianism, an ethic of respect and obedience to superiors, as the dominant philosophy.⁹ Even Chinese pronouns were made to emphasize rank.¹⁰ Their system of control was so effective at keeping people in line that it lasted for thousands of years.
C. Whites have had more power-sharing institutions; China has been autocratic.
In Europe, there were multiple power centers, including kings, nobles, the church, parliaments, merchant-run cities, and industrial magnates, who continuously jostled for sway;¹ in China, anyone deemed a rival to the imperial dynasty was laid low. To reduce the hereditary power of landed noble families, an examination system based on Confucian dogma was created to admit state officials, who, swearing absolute loyalty to the imperial family, were removed from their home district and rotated about.² China's main folk religion was run by the state,³ and other religious institutions such as Buddhism were brought under state control and 'Confucianized', never obtaining the independent power that Christianity did in Europe.⁴ China's imperial schools and its astronomers-cum-astrologers were obliged to serve imperial propaganda;⁵ while universities in Europe had sufficient independence to seek objective truths.⁶ The Chinese state took control of most major industries,⁷ often restricted economic activity including international trade,⁸ and prevented businessmen from gaining the political sway they have had in White nations. While European businesses negotiated and cooperated as equals with government,⁹ Chinese businesses could operate only at the pleasure of officials and were often exploited.¹⁰
D. Communist China is autocratic, just as were imperial regimes.
China's present Communist regime is much like its past regimes, with a small elite class dictating to and exploiting the masses.¹ The imposition of Communism was a mass torture and murder operation.² Chinese people are permitted few rights; not even to a fair trial, free movement, or child-birth.³ While White citizens take for granted the right to criticize their government, in China this is hazardous to your health. You will soon find yourself being tortured in a "black jail" or doing hard labor in a slave camp.⁴ A popular spiritual meditation movement called Falun Gong is getting brutally persecuted, its practitioners even utilized for organ harvesting.⁵ China's regime strictly monitors and censors all forms of media, including the internet.⁶ Nor did China's long history of corruption skip a beat with the rise of Communism (next section).
E. White governors are generally honorable; Chinese governors are generally corrupt.
In White nations, government officials are generally honorable, while in China they are generally corrupt. Whites typically perform services to the public out of a sense of duty and make decisions fairly according to law, not expecting any quid pro quo from those served. Cases of corruption occur, but they are scandalous events. In China, graft and corruption are practically taken for granted, business as usual,¹ notwithstanding the government's perpetual anti-corruption sloganeering.²
The magnitude of the Chinese corruption harvest is staggering.³ Anything one needs service or approval for—a business license, a contract, a building permit, a job, a criminal investigation or trial, even a good doctor or school—requires furnishing bribes to the authorities beyond any official fees.⁴ Corruption in China is part of a broader system of "squeeze", whereby every worker takes a piece of the earnings of underlings while ceding a piece to superiors.⁵ Officials are often underpaid and expected to collect extra 'fees' to augment their income.⁶ The civil service examination system was corrupt as well; official degrees purchased as a license to 'hunt and fish' the people.⁷ Tax collection was often farmed out, the collectors charging what they pleased.⁸ Nepotism is prevalent.⁹ Corruption of course impairs efficiency; a network of hospices was abandoned by the Qing due to rampant fraud and corruption,¹⁰ and a postal relay system was restricted since local officials exploited it.¹¹ Aid supplies donated to China were often just sold to the highest bidder.¹² Today's Communist China is equally corrupt.¹³
F. Whites' representative governments are stronger and more effective than China's despotic regimes.
One might think that the despotic nature of Chinese government, with its emphasis on hierarchy and obedience, might mean greater organization and cooperation, but the reverse is actually true. Despotic governments tend to be weakest and least effective, while governments of a well represented, free citizenry tend to be strongest. A representative government is embedded within its nation, and citizens support its taxes and programs because they trust that it is working in their interests.¹ Willing cooperation by civic-minded patriots is more effective than forced 'cooperation' by exploited subjects. Despotic states are effective at obstruction and destruction, but not at creation.² China's regimes could only push so hard; Chinese history is an endless series of rebellions.³ China's imperial government actually grew weaker over time; by ~1800 it failed to provide even basic infrastructure and services.⁴ Since medieval times Europe has provided more welfare programs and relief to its poor, even as a portion of GDP.⁵ With White technology China is wealthier today, but allows its environment to be disastrously degraded.⁶
For many centuries, White governments have managed superior legal and judicial systems, superior military, superior infrastructure, superior financial systems, superior stimulation of industry and trade, superior education systems, and superior welfare programs (section V-3.E-K). White governments are a product of more trusting, cooperative White people.
III-IV. Introduction: Whites are more explorative and creative than Chinese, while Chinese have higher memory-based intelligence.
In section III, I will review the bases and characteristics of memory-based and creative/analytic intelligence. In section IV, I will review the evidence that Whites to a greater degree have characteristics of the latter, and Chinese of the former.
A. Superior White explorativity and creativity; Superior Chinese memory and skill.
Whites and Chinese developed different abilities based on the crucial difference in their environments: the greater general resource availability but more challenging agricultural conditions in Europe (section I). Whites became more curious and explorative, more proficient at acquiring and analyzing information and resources to develop them creatively; while Chinese became more proficient at skillfully utilizing the resources at hand to attain maximum efficiency, less 'wasteful' of energy on speculative pursuits. Whites are superior at discovering information, determining principles of cause-effect, forming creative ideas, and making sound judgments based on general knowledge; while Chinese are superior at learning known data and principles, applying them to calculation, and developing academic and motor skills.
B. Whites have more discrete and abstract perception; Chinese have more concrete and detailed perception.
A key difference between White and Chinese intelligence lies in how discretely and abstractly they perceive sensings and memory. Whites focus more on the objects in their environment, viewing them more discretely and perceiving their basic characteristics more abstractly. Chinese perceive scenes more concretely and fully, in greater detail, hence memorizing imagery more keenly. Whites perceive objects more discretely because they more actively consider (and do) various actions upon them and can thereby consider their application in alternative contexts; and more abstractly because they can thereby perceive their similarity (basic commonality) with other objects known to be useful in certain contexts. Chinese perceive and memorize situations more fully so that they will be able to more readily and precisely match an encountered situation to a reference situation in memory, finely distinguished from similar such memories, to more accurately predict an outcome and/or determine an optimum course of action to obtain a desired result.
C. Creative/analytic and memory-based intelligence are broadly correlated, despite being inversely related at high levels.
Of course, both Whites and Chinese can create ideas and develop skills, i.e. they both have creative/analytic and memory-based intelligence. Creativity depends upon good memory and memory-based skills, and so naturally these abilities are broadly correlated across races and individuals; the inverse relationship I point to existing only among relatively intelligent people. To illustrate by analogy: Agility and power-lifting abilities are broadly correlated across people, both of them based on general bodily strength and various fitness and health factors. But these abilities are inversely correlated among athletes who are good at both, varying on the factor of bulk of muscularity. Creativity and memory-based intelligence are also broadly correlated across people, both of them based on general memory strength and various mental faculties. But they are inversely correlated among smart people who are good at both, varying on the factor of abstractness of perception.
III. The nature of intelligence, explorativity, and creativity.
III-1. The nature of memory-based intelligence.
A. Applications of memory-based intelligence.
Memory-based intelligence utilizes keen memory of information already experienced or learned to determine actions to obtain a goal. Such memory includes data required for actions (e.g. a name, a number, a location); discriminating details of reference situations needed to predict a given situation accurately; exact scenarios in which certain, precise courses of action have yielded a goal; and retention of objects/data in 'working memory' that enables mental manipulation and combination and/or comparison of them. Keen memory is facilitated by persistent study and focus on tasks. While all intelligence is based on good memory, much intelligence is not creative. Visuo-spatial ability, the ability to mentally 'project' considered actions upon objects, can be a tool of creativity, but this depends on one's motives for such considerations. If one is simply following directions or performing routine tasks, for example, there is little creative about it.
B. Keen memory facilitates calculation, as well as recognition.
Memory-based intelligence is more than just accumulation of facts. Strong memory enables discernment of subtle changes and patterns, because memorized detail of antecedent phenomena can be better compared to subsequent phenomena (e.g. emotional cues of a human face, patterns of a matrices series). Strong memory can more precisely match a situation with a previously experienced reference situation in memory (RSM), thus distinguishing similar RSMs from one another to predict more accurately. Strong memory also enables compound, multi-stage calculations, in which preliminary results (e.g. the first rows of a long multiplication problem) are memorized to be operated upon in later stages, or objects/images are mentally modified/combined in progressive steps (e.g. of a geometric construction). Strong memory facilitates the learning and application not only of concrete facts, but also of definite abstract principles, such as visual diagrams illustrating relationships between mathematical or mechanical quantities.
C. Keen memory facilitates manual skills, as well as mental ones.
Strong memory facilitates the development of manual as well as academic skills. Internal, 'muscle memories' are retained as well as the external sensings associated with them. Optimizing manual skill requires memorizing exactly what actions in what bodily positions with what objects in what proximity, orientation, and trajectory, yielded exactly what effects. Situations in which a certain course of action obtained a desired outcome are memorized and aimed for. If such an optimum position is within reach, a calculation may be made of how to attain it, projecting one's bodily movements (and any trajectory of the target object), then making necessary adjustments of position and actions. Also, some materials worked upon have intricate properties (e.g. the fluctuating shape of wet mixtures, the delicate texture of plant fibers), requiring subtle recognitions and manipulations that a keen memory can discern.
III-2. The nature of creative/analytic intelligence.
A. Idea generation is based on explorativity and generation of new knowledge.
Creative intelligence is determination of new means to obtain goals, including material, sensory, and social ones. A creative innovation is a conjunction of a novel use of an object(s) (synthesis) with a component of a goal-obtaining method (analysis).
Creativity can be accomplished serendipitously when 'random' recreation, exploration, or examination of new places, objects or devices happens to discover or produce something of value. And the more knowledge one obtains via such 'recreative' behavior of the properties of things and the ways they can be manipulated and employed, the more likely such knowledge can be put to innovative use. Creative innovation is usually the result of an experiment based on an idea having a plausible, desired aim. An idea (a novel course of action) is generated by matching an object/action and its effects (on the front end) with the essence of a component of a known method to obtain a goal (on the back end), i.e. by considering a novel 'substitution' in such a method. The more actively and 'randomly' a mind considers acting upon objects, the more likely it is to make such a conjunction.
B. Idea generation requires abstract perception, in order to match knowledge with methods to obtain goals.
Identifying such a match of an object/action with a potential use is facilitated by considering each step of a goal-obtaining method (including the goal itself) discretely and determining its bare essence, in order to minimize the characteristics that need be matched by a possible substitution. This is presumably done by comparing the instances where the method was used successfully, to identify their commonality and trim out incidental detail, such as color, texture, location, and inessential parts. The more abstractly a method to a goal is considered, the more instances of its use can be incorporated as consistent with it, and so the more reduction of incidental detail via 'cancellation' can be done. The essence of a natural property or process, or of a method to obtain a goal, is formulated as a principle.
The more abstract a principle, the more incorporations (consistent particular instances) can be made of its cause (its antecedent), that would presumably yield its effect (its consequent). To generate novel ideas, a creative mind conceives abstract principles not only of methods to obtain goals, but also of methods to obtain each component or 'step' in such methods, and so on, ultimately analyzing phenomena in general. A creative mind then incorporates the principles of goal-obtaining methods as robustly as possible, i.e. it considers a maximum of possible substitutions (particular objects/actions) in them, that constitute potential alternative means to obtain the goals.
C. Matches are made of effects, as well as objects/actions; principles thereof being barely definite.
Ideas are generated not only by matching objects/actions of goal-obtaining methods, but also by matching their more abstract functions/effects. The properties/effects of a given material, tool, device, structure, or machine can be matched to similar properties/effects in a method to obtain a goal, even when the objects producing them are quite different. The commonality of such functions may be so complex and abstract that their principles can hardly be formulated definitely.
The simplest substitution ideas are of materials: different materials having similar properties that can be transformed into construction materials, tools, ceramics and cements, fibers (for cordage, textiles, and paper), adhesives, dyes, fuels, solvents, foods, etc. Various tools and devices can substitute for the functions of human hands, for holding, guiding, lifting and moving, pulling, pressing, mixing, tearing, etc. Various structural arrangements can support heavy weights, and various 'simple machine'/set-up designs can magnify and redirect applied forces. There are various ways that a surface can be marked, that a fire or explosion can be ignited or accelerated, that a projectile can be launched, that latent energy such as a spring or battery can be gradually released, etc. Some ideas substitute different forms of power: animal strength instead of human, water flow instead of animal, steam pressure instead of water, electric current instead of steam. Some brilliant innovations are based on devices previously used in an entirely different field.
D. A creative mind considers a broad range of potential outcomes, as well as courses of action.
An idea of technological innovation must be verified by actual experiment, but its plausibility can be 'checked mentally' by considering the conceived scenario abstractly and incorporating every known instance of it, i.e. every reference situation in memory (RSM), to 'see' if a) the desired consequent invariably follows and b) all apparently-necessary cause (the commonality of the RSMs) exists. General predictions, claimed events (outcomes), and supposed principles are checked similarly.
A considered idea's scenario, or any initial situation, must be considered abstractly in order to match it with the maximum range of applicable RSMs (and their principles), including those varying in details or aspects, to generate the full range of potential outcomes. Thus, more creative/analytic intelligence considers not only more possible interactions with available objects, but also more potential outcomes of situations in general, including less plausible/likely ones. While a concretely-perceiving mind tends to consider only what has previously occurred with the specific set of objects/circumstances in a given specific situation; an abstractly-perceiving mind tends to consider what has previously occurred with the types of objects and circumstances in a given type of situation. While a concretely-perceiving mind tends to be heavily influenced in its predictions by recent outcomes in immediate circumstances; an abstractly-perceiving mind is more conscious of long-term probabilities (including rare events). A creative mind is therefore more doubtful of predictions and cautious of pitfalls in a planned course of action.
E. A creative mind wonders why when anomalous outcomes occur, and thereby refines principles.
A creative mind applies principles to situations in order to predict them, just as it applies RSMs to them. In fact, determining the causal essence of an RSM—that which must be matched in order for its outcome to be effected—is facilitated by comparing multiple instances of this essence in order to identify their commonality, 'trimming out' incidental detail via cancellation, as discussed in section III-2.B. In other words, abstract perception and application of RSMs is tantamount to determination and application of principles.
When an anomalous, unexpected outcome occurs or is depicted, a concrete-perceiving mind tends to view it as a unique product of a unique situation (a unique set of circumstances), just one more RSM to file into the memory bank. But for an abstract-perceiver, an unexpected outcome has likely contradicted an assumed principle informed by a broad set of related phenomena, applicable to a range of similar situations. A creative mind doesn't just assume with "hindsight bias" that an anomalous event was destined; it wonders why it deviated from expectation and seeks to explain it: to identify the key difference between that situation and the antecedent of the assumed principle (and of the RSMs informing it) that it contradicted. For example, if a pretty young girl robs a bank at gunpoint, it would represent not just a bizarre crime having unique circumstances, but also a violation of the principle that girls have timid dispositions, requiring explanation and revision. If the anomalous event was only depicted (described), its veracity may be doubted. A creative mind often wonders why odd things happened, why its principles have been violated, and thereby scrutinizes and refines them.
F. A creative mind argues and composes similarly as it generates ideas and scrutinizes predictions.
Robustly generating principles, ideas, and RSMs is useful not only for innovation and prediction, but also for argument, advocacy, and creative writing. To argue for or against a claimed event/effect, one must, based on the given situation/antecedent, adduce applicable principles and/or reference data that support or contradict it, and/or identify lacked necessary cause for contrary claims. Arguments that pertain to what did, what (likely) will, or what could happen, are treated similarly. Moral arguments that pertain to benefits and harms allegedly done to people, and whether they've merited it by their own deeds, are treated similarly, as are inspirational arguments that persuade people they have qualities conducive to (causing) success. Legal arguments are treated similarly as well, except that they are based on legal principles and case decision precedents as reference. Fiction writing similarly generates imaginative but plausible ways that an exciting finale can be reached from a depicted situation, often limiting how much is revealed so that the outcome is uncertain, creating mystery and suspense.
III-3. Summary and comparison of memory-based and creative/analytic intelligence types.
A. Memory-based intelligence.
Memory-based intelligence (M-Int) is better able to learn information and techniques that are generally observed or taught, than is creative/analytic intelligence (C-Int). These include the application not only of concrete facts, but also of definite abstract principles, such as those of math and science.
M-Int calculates previously-experienced and accessible outcomes accurately, but tends to overlook less plausible and less well-attested ones. M-Int notices more fine points of change (patterns) in experienced phenomena, and so can detect more subtle principles. M-Int makes finer distinctions between RSMs, and so can more precisely predict familiar situations and optimize courses of action to obtain a goal. In other words, M-Int is better at developing skill than C-Int: manual, academic, and technical. Since M-Int perceives more concretely than C-Int, it considers a narrower range of potential outcomes, and so is more optimistic of expected outcomes, more credulous of depicted claims (e.g. superstitions), and more careless of potential mishaps. However, M-Int wastes less energy in speculation and worry, in pursuing or avoiding 'false leads'. M-Int is more proficient than C-Int when working in a familiar environment with controlled activities, such as a factory or a schoolroom.
B. Creative/analytic intelligence.
Creative/analytic intelligence (C-Int) is more explorative and curious. It seeks new sources of knowledge and experiments to find out the properties of things. C-Int is more interested in 'random' phenomena, asks why when unexpected outcomes occur, and tries to resolve general principles of nature and human behavior even in the absence of apparent utility.
C-Int perceives objects more discretely and abstractly, thereby considering more possible actions on them and more possible substitutions of them in methods to obtain a goal, i.e. it generates more ideas. C-Int similarly perceives general situations more abstractly, thereby considering (matching) more disparate reference situations in memory (RSMs) that may apply, and so considers more possible outcomes including less obvious/likely ones. C-Int considers data from more disparate and remote situations that indicate how a situation might result, e.g. the past behavior and tendencies of a human acter. C-Int therefore has better judgement in complex situations having multiple, distant causal factors.* C-Int generates and considers more arguments for and against an assertion. C-Int is more 'open-minded', more doubtful of conclusions, and skeptical of claims. C-Int is more proficient than M-Int when working in a novel environment with dynamic activities, such as a wilderness venture or a public debate forum.
III-4. Intelligence tests and visuo-spatial ability.
A. Intelligence tests, including visuo-spatial tasks, measure memory-based intelligence, not creativity.
Intelligence tests (ITs) have little to do with creativity, and mostly measure memory-based intelligence. Motivation to solve IT problems (to score well) is always a given, and the loci of the answers (the goals) are definite. The information needed to solve IT problems is either general knowledge one may have learned, or is supplied in the problem itself. In some cases, given items must be held in short-term memory to be mentally compared to other items or answer options, to detect similarities (e.g. the margins of puzzle pieces), differences, or patterns (e.g. changes in a matrices series). In visuo-spatial tasks, images must be held in 'working memory' to be mentally manipulated, combined, etc. The images to be 'projected' are supplied, as are the directions on how to project them, and usually the answer options to which the projections are to be compared. True creativity is, rather, based on one's inherent urge to 'randomly' consider actions upon and uses of objects, and to 'generally' analyze and incorporate means to obtain goals (section III-2.A-C). Even in so-called creativity tests, the materials and motivation supplied to perform the tasks obscure differences in subjects' actual creative drive.
B. Explanation of the male-female visuo-spatial ability gap.
The fact that females have better general memory than males but are inferior at visuo-spatial tasks, evinces that such ability has bases beyond general memory. Visual manipulations and motions are experienced through interacting with objects and watching others do so. Boys have a greater innate drive to perform and observe such activities than do girls. They like to pursue, manipulate, and assemble objects, to wrestle and fight, to compete in and watch sports, to play action-oriented video games, to engage in constructive work, etc. In addition to obtaining greater experience, boys likely have greater innate ability to develop visual memory for such action-related processes. The fine motor skills that females excel at do not involve dynamic visual transformations, and are likely based on females' keener perception and general memory.
C. The difference between use of abstract principles to calculate, and abstract formulation and perception of principles to generate ideas.
The use of abstract principles for prediction and calculation does not imply a creative disposition. The applications, for example, of basic laws of motion to predict a moving object crossing one's path, or of Euclid's laws of triangles to resolve the area of an odd-shaped window, are straightforward and may have as mundane a motivation as dodging a stone or collecting a paycheck. In a truly creative (original) inference, the process and motivation are not so straightforward; the match of an object with a principle's antecedent is not so plain, and the outcome not so obvious (section III-2.A-D). Creative ideation requires not merely knowledge and application of principles, but conscious consideration of principles abstracted from any given instance, some being hardly definite, for the purpose of incorporating their elements as expansively as possible. In contrast, autistic savants are known to perform complex mathematical and calendrical calculations (etc.) without formulation or conscious awareness of the principles they employ, hence without effort to generate creative ideas (section IV-8.D).
IV. Evidence of intelligence types in Whites and Chinese.
Introduction.
I have reviewed the nature of creative/analytic and memory-based intelligence, and the characteristics associated with each. I will now review the evidence that Whites have more characteristics of creative/analytic intelligence, and Chinese have more characteristics of memory-based intelligence. I will review the pursuits of exploration, recreation, and science; imagination in the creative arts; perception, categorization and reasoning tests; language, expository writing, and debate; religion and superstition; gambling and carelessness; and proficiency in manual and academic skills and intelligence tests.
IV-1. Exploration and recreation.
Logically, people who have active and searching bodies—who explore the world and engage in recreation—also have active and curious minds. And Whites are far more explorative and recreational than are Chinese.
A. Whites are more explorative and interested in scientific discovery than are Chinese.
Europeans have explored, mapped, and investigated the world far more than have Chinese.¹ Nearly all great explorers have been White; very few have been Chinese.² Chinese have had minimal curiosity about the rest of the world and have known far less of it than have Whites,³ even today.⁴ Scientific research and experimentation, a close cousin of exploration,⁵ has also been mainly the province of White men.⁶ Since ancient times, Whites have been eager to explore the outer and inner worlds with telescopes, microscopes, and a miscellany of other instruments they invented for the purpose; while the Chinese had little interest in these tools beyond making politically-based calendars.⁷ Architectural and mechanical forms of technology at which Europeans have excelled, such as their medieval mania for automated devices (e.g. clocks), are also partly recreational pursuits.⁸
B. Whites are more active and recreational than Chinese, who are more task-focused.
The greater restless energy of Whites is equally evident in their day to day recreational activities. Whites can't wait for school or work to end so that they can run around and play.¹ Chinese instinctively regard such recreation as wasteful of energy. Chinese are more focused and persistent in productive work, almost immune to boredom and distraction,² but lacking in alacrity and disinclined to physical exertion when no tangible gain is to be had.³ The more subdued nature of Chinese is evident even in infancy and childhood.⁴ Whites strive to sail every sea, climb every mountain, hike every continent, and excel in every sport. Chinese, on the contrary, have hardly any sporting tradition since ancient times.⁵ Chinese rarely participate in sports,⁶ and what spectator leagues they have are very recent and small. While many Japanese play in Major League Baseball, no Chinese ever has.⁷
IV-2. Storytelling, art, and fantasy.
A. Whites are more imaginative in literature and the arts.
A creative mind is naturally evinced by original and imaginative compositions (section III-2.F) and artistic creations. Such 'excursions' will seem wasteful to a mind intent on efficient production.
Whites have been more imaginative than Chinese in literature, religion, art, and music. Whereas Europe has a long history of mythological traditions, China has very little indigenous mythology and no great epics of fiction.¹ Chinese folk gods are portrayed to behave as humans.² The fantastical realms and characters of Indian Buddhism were dismissed or converted by the Chinese into 'historic' personages,³ and little interest was shown in the heavenly aspects of Christianity.⁴ Chinese philosophical writings are platitudinous,⁵ and Chinese literature in general is loaded with often-unattributed quotations (copy-pastes) of past writers, as well as allusions, cliches, and stereotypes.⁶ Chinese writing tends to be brief and economical.⁷ Chinese art likewise tends to be brief and efficient, typically drawing only the outlines of figures and natural scenes.⁸ Whereas European artists sought originality and developed many artistic styles, Chinese artists in painting as with literature usually closely imitated masters of the past.⁹ Chinese music is also much simpler than European; it is mostly monophonic,¹⁰ as opposed to the rich polyphonic melodies of White composers.¹¹
B. Whites are also more technologically imaginative.
Europe's imaginative literature extends to the realm of machines and technology. Since about 1200, White philosophers and artists have enthusiastically anticipated the potential of technological advance. They drew up fantastical blueprints of energy-harnessing machines, self-powered carriages, airplanes, and the like, long before their descendants developed the necessary technology. Beginning at about 1400, illustrated technological fantasy books were published in Germany, France, and Italy, called theatrum machinarum. Some of their machines eventually came into being.¹ No such tradition of speculative technology existed in China.²
IV-3. Tests of perception, categorization, and reasoning.
A. Tests indicate that Whites perceive more abstractly than Chinese.
Various experimental tests have been done comparing the perception of scenes, categorization of objects, and reasoning with principles by Whites and Chinese/Asians. The results show that Whites perceive objects more discretely, classify objects more according to abstract properties/functions, and incorporate principles more broadly (i.e. generate more specific instances of abstract categories), than do Chinese/Asians. Some of the test groups were Asian-Americans, who usually score intermediate between Whites and native Asians. This is claimed by egalitarian interpreters to indicate a cultural rather than genetic basis of difference, as they pretend to be ignorant of the fact that culture is itself largely a product of genetics.
B. Whites perceive objects more discretely and recognize them better in novel contexts; Chinese perceive scenes more concretely and memorize background details better.
Perception tests assess the degree to which a subject perceives and memorizes a foreground, focal object in a scene compared to the background context and details. Whites notice more changes in foreground objects, while Asians noticed more changes in background objects.¹ Asians are better able to recall background details than are Whites; Whites are better able to recognize the focal object when presented within a novel background than are Asians,² who evidently memorized it concretely together with its context. This is evidence that Whites perceive objects more discretely and are more apt to consider them in novel contexts, a basis of creativity (section III-2).
In tests showing a focal bar/line within a background frame, Whites are better able to judge the verticality of the bar despite changes in the orientation of the frame,³ and given a new frame, better able to reproduce the actual size of the original line; while Asians are better able to draw a new line of the same relative proportion to the new frame as in the original scene.⁴ This again indicates that Whites focus more on the object while Asians perceive and memorize it concretely together with its background. On Rorshchach ink-blot perception tests, Asians are more likely to 'interpret' the entire image; Whites are more likely to interpret a part of it.⁵ On Navon Figures tests, in which many copies of a small letter make up a large letter figure, Asians are more likely to perceive the composite letter first; Whites the small component letter.⁶ Presented with a 'face' collage composed of vegetables, Asians are more likely to perceive the full face; Whites the vegetable components.⁷ In all these tests, Whites perceive more discretely and analytically; Asians more concretely.
C. Whites more actively focus upon objects and consider their properties.
Physiological tests done in conjunction with such perception tests show that Whites' greater attention to foreground, focal objects is not just a matter of selective memory. Whites were found to look more quickly at the focal object and to fixate upon it longer, than do Asians.¹ A study using an MRI scan found that when looking upon scenes Whites activate more brain regions implicated in object processing than do Asians.² This is evidence that Whites' more discrete perception of objects is based on having a greater inclination to act upon them (focusing the senses being itself an action); a greater urge to act upon random objects being a basis of creativity (section III-2).
D. Whites more associate objects according to their effects/function than their context.
Grouping tests assess how subjects perceive relationships between items that they must group together by similarity. Whites are more likely to group items that have an abstract similarity of property or function (e.g. both fruits, or both cutting tools); while Asians are more likely to group items that happen to appear or interact together (e.g. cow with grass, or mother with baby).¹ This is evidence that Whites consider the abstract function of objects, as opposed to the contexts they have existed in; a basis of creativity (section III-2). In a similar grouping test, Whites are more likely than Asians to group objects according to their common shape (but differing material), rather than common material (but differing shape);² an object's shape being a better indicator of its function than its surface appearance.
E. Whites apply principles more robustly, even when implausible, thus considering more potentialities.
Reasoning tests show that Whites apply principles more robustly than do Asians. One type of test presented pairs of arguments and asked subjects which was more convincing. The arguments were simple deductive reasoning: applying a principle having an abstract category antecedent (e.g. All birds have ulnar arteries) to an instance of the category (Therefore all eagles have ulnar arteries). Whites were equally convinced by arguments when the instance was atypical of the category (e.g. penguins), while Asians were less convinced by such arguments.¹ On a more complex deductive reasoning test, Asians made more errors when the consequent seemed implausible for a given instance of the principle's category (e.g. Therefore cigarettes are good for health).² On a third reasoning test, Asians were less convinced by arguments indicating an undesirable outcome than were Whites (e.g. The price of dining out will increase).³
These results indicate that Whites are more apt to apply principles to objects and situations encountered, even when 1) the match with the antecedent is marginal, or 2) the consequent is contrary to what was expected, or 3) the consequent is undesired. Thus, Whites consider more potential effects (properties and uses) and outcomes of objects and situations, a basis of creativity (section III-2).
F. Whites consider and resolve contradictions more robustly.
Whites also proved to be more concerned about contradictions between principles and instances of them than did Asians. Whites prefer proverbs that do not contain contradictions, while Asians prefer proverbs that do.¹ When shown one or the other of a pair of contradictory propositions (principles), Whites consistently agreed with one and disagreed with the other; while Asians were likely to agree with both.² Whites were likewise more consistent when asked whether they agree or disagree with two contrary attributes about themselves; while Asians tended to affirm both.³ Whites tended to believe the more plausible of two contrary 'study results' more strongly after being shown the second one; while Asians afterwards tended to believe them both equally.⁴
These results indicate that Whites evaluate the meaning, implications and accuracy of supposed principles more robustly than do Asians, perceiving them more abstractly in order to incorporate their antecedents with all known instances including those having contrary consequents. Whites thereby perceive and resolve contradictions that don't concern Asians, an indication of greater creativity (section III-2.E).
IV-4. Language: Analytic clarity versus ornate form.
A. White language is more analytic and abstract; Chinese is more pictographic and concrete.
The languages of Whites and Chinese differ as expected based on Whites being more abstract- and Chinese being more concrete-perceivers. A concrete-perceiver is more inclined to see the actual context of language symbols beyond the discrete symbols themselves, and might therefore have greater difficulty 'seeing' the associated meaning. So, it's not surprising that Chinese characters are more pictographic than Whites', with many characters actually resembling their meanings.¹ In addition, many abstract concepts in Chinese are expressed in concrete terms; for example, the word meaning "contradiction" is composed of two characters meaning "axe" and "shield".² Whites compose descriptions more analytically, using definite abstract categories (genus) with definite abstract modifiers (differentia). Chinese on the other hand has more-specific variants of word types, i.e. nouns that are more like proper nouns (etc.).³
B. Chinese are more concerned with writing's form and context.
The greater focus of the Chinese on writing's context is evident in other ways. Chinese are more concerned than Whites with having orderly patterns (styles) that extend across lines of text. Chinese tend to write lines that are parallel in syllables and parts of speech (parallelism), and/or that alternate antonymous terms (antithesis).¹ Whites of course have a place for poetry, but stylization tends to permeate all Chinese writing and awareness of it is sometimes crucial for interpreting meaning.² The greater Chinese regard for economy and brevity in writing (section IV-2.A) may also be in part a concern for aesthetic form.³ Chinese greater concern for writing context and form is consistent with more concrete perception.
C. Chinese language and writing is more ambiguous.
Interpreting inexplicit writing with particular meanings is a similar process to incorporating an abstract principle with particular instances of it (section III-2.B). The writer himself knows what meaning he intends, but in order to verify that it will be clear to others, he must incorporate his writing as broadly as possible with potential meanings to detect ambiguity, and when necessary make clarifications that eliminate it. A writer who fails to consider possible alternative interpretations of his writing will cede ambiguity and misunderstandings.
Chinese writing tends to be more ambiguous than White writing. Chinese words themselves tend to be poorly defined, and Chinese writers even in technical fields seldom make glossaries.¹ Chinese words can represent any part of speech and they lack inflections indicating type of noun, tense and mood of verb, etc. Chinese also lacks strict grammar rules and equivalents of pronouns, prepositions, and conjunctions, that are so useful in White languages.² Other sources of ambiguity in Chinese writing are: concerns for aesthetic form (discussed above), frequent use of archaic idioms and allusions,³ lack of punctuation (until recently),⁴ and a relatively large number of words having multiple meanings.⁵ Some clarifying devices are available, but Chinese writers tend not to make use of them, apparently unconcerned about the ambiguity.⁶ The lower ambiguity of Whites' writing, its greater clarity through the use of genus–differentia and explicit grammar rules, indicates more robust interpretation, an indication of greater creativity.
IV-5. Expository and scientific writing.
A. Whites axiomatized principles into degrees of abstraction, while Chinese made superficial correlations.
The greater inclination of Whites to conceive abstract principles of phenomena is evident in the expository writings of eminent scholars. This is evidence of greater creativity (section III-2).
Both Whites and Chinese recorded phenomena they observed, but only Whites went further and synthesized data into systems of principles ordered from more general to more particular, i.e. only Whites axiomatized natural and social laws.¹ This contrast is evident in the fields of grammar,² of history,³ of philosophy and ethics,⁴ of law,⁵ of economics,⁶ of mathematics,⁷ of mechanics and physics,⁸ of astronomy,⁹ and of science in general.¹⁰ Chinese philosophy is largely anecdotal, and Chinese history and science are mostly piecemeal compilations of individual 'facts'. Chinese storytelling is similarly "loose, rambling, and episodic".¹¹ While Whites analyzed data to resolve essential causes and properties, such as the underlying principles of mechanics; Chinese "correlated" data into arbitrary numerical schemes, such as five item categories (e.g. of animals, organs, or emotions) whose items supposedly correlate with their mystical Five Elements of Wood, Fire, Earth, Metal, and Water.¹² Use of such hazy correlations by the Chinese persisted into modern times,¹³ and a deficiency in analysis is observed in modern Chinese students.¹⁴
B. Whites scrutinize and debate principles and assertions more robustly than do Chinese.
Chinese also do not scrutinize, test, argue, nor explain supposed principles and claims of jurisprudence, ethics, science, etc. nearly as much as do Whites. This evinces that Whites both conceive and incorporate principles more robustly, an indication of greater creativity (section III-2.D-F).
The Chinese never developed procedures for testing and debating propositions, i.e. the scientific method, as did Whites.¹ Formal debate has always been rare in China, hardly existing even in judicial proceedings.² The claims of China's venerable sages are accepted without question,³ and unquestioning acceptance of authoritative assertion continues today toward the gurus of Communism.⁴ China's civil service examinations were based on rote memory of Confucian literary classics.⁵ What few arguments are made in Chinese philosophy tend to be based on loose, superficial analogies, e.g. 'man's nature is indifferent to good and evil just as water is indifferent to the direction it may flow'.⁶ The Chinese showed little interest in logic,⁷ or the proofs of Euclidean geometry.⁸ The essays of modern Chinese students are likewise found to be deficient in orderly argument and explanation.⁹ Relatedly, Chinese students are weaker at discrimination and expression of uncertainty.¹⁰ It is no surprise that Chinese are underrepresented as lawyers and other creative speaking professions.¹¹
IV-6. Religion and superstition.
A. Chinese are more susceptible to superstitious claims, because they are less conscious of contradictions with natural principles.
In contradiction to scientific principles, i.e. natural laws, are beliefs in religion and superstition. When given a supernatural claim, an abstract-perceiver applies more abstract, general principles of natural laws to them and so is more aware of contradictions with them; whereas a concrete-perceiver is more likely to accept such claims as unique outcomes of unique situations including the posited supernatural power (section III-2.D-E). When considering claims of supernatural agency and benefits of appealing to such, an analytic thinker will consider natural laws inconsistent with them, i.e. reference situations of his knowledge and experience with abstractly-similar natural phenomena and the principles thereof. An unanalytic thinker, on the other hand, will be more inclined to optimistically (or pessimistically) accept the proffered claims. Unsurprisingly, Chinese have greater faith in religious/superstitious quackery than do Whites, notwithstanding the number of Whites deluded by Judeo-Christianity.
B. Judeo-Christianity is a relatively plausible religion that generally accepts natural laws.
For all the absurdity that may be found in the Bible, Judeo-Christianity (J-C) is a relatively plausible means of entreatment for magical benefaction. Yahweh is more or less just a single entity, invisible and detached from the physical world (and so not readily disproven), a father figure who supposedly created people in his own image and so has reason to care for them—at least those credulous enough to believe in him. Most White J-Cs believe that Yahweh doesn't violate natural laws; that he enforces these laws himself.¹ Much of the Biblical nonsense is of course ignored. The greater skepticism of Whites is countered by the greater imagination and grandiloquence of their magic men. Their evangelists are enrapturing and the Bible has intriguing tales.
Judeo-Christian organizations are larger than Chinese religious organizations, but this is because Chinese religion is far more diffused,² the Chinese government has persistently restricted them,³ and because J-C organizations are social, moral, charitable, and political enterprises with proselytic zeal, unlike the Chinese.⁴ The effort J-Cs invest in entreating Yahweh for magical benefaction and their expectation of such are difficult to measure, because their many reasons for 'church-going' are difficult to disentangle. The J-Cs I know aren't expecting a windfall from Yahweh any time soon, and don't bother asking for one. Nor do they live in fear of the Devil, nor are they eager to enter the pearly gates.
C. Chinese religions and superstitions are more extensive and difficult to swallow.
With Buddhism and Taoism, Chinese are promised similar goodies as Christians, such as an afterlife and small miracles.¹ The Chinese with their lack of concern for contradictions tend to mix Buddhism and Taoism together with Confucianism.² But Chinese religiosity extends far beyond the primary religions into a broad miscellany of superstitions.³ Chinese believe in many deities, such as the Jade Emperor and his vast retinue of local gods,⁴ a kitchen god for each home (who makes yearly reports on a family's conduct), door gods, a toilet god, and gods of wealth;⁵ along with deified people including family patriarchs, sages, martyrs, and founders of trade guilds.⁶ Those who passed imperial examinations were regarded as incarnations of star gods.⁷ Chinese worship goofy animal gods such as a monkey, a fox, a weasel, a hedgehog, a snake, and a rat.⁸ The Chinese are also animists, attributing personalities to natural entities such as the sun and moon, rain, mountains, and rivers.⁹ The Chinese countryside teems with temples where deities are given their due offerings.¹⁰
D. Superstition deeply permeates Chinese people's everyday activities.
Chinese are big on magical practices such as astrology and divination, fortune-telling, geomancy, magic medicine, and a wide variety of petty superstitions. Some Whites have believed in astrology, but the Chinese made it a government-run enterprise and carried it into modern times.¹ Chinese believe that unusual astronomical phenomena are signals (portents) from deities on how rulers are performing, and that natural disasters such as earthquakes and droughts are consequences of official misconduct.² China's calendars and almanacs are based on astrology, which Chinese use to check for marriage compatibility and auspicious times to have sex, conduct business, schedule burials, and so on.³ Fortune-telling is big business in China, coming in many forms beyond astrology, including face and palm reading and shaking of fortune sticks and bamboo blocks.⁴ Fortune-tellers are highly respected, and advise businessmen on important investment decisions.⁵ Another big business in China is geomancy (Feng Shui), which informs the Chinese where to site and how to arrange buildings, homes, and grave sites, to bring about a 'positive qi energy flow'.⁶ Building a home that faces north, or blocking the qi flow through the front yard, would bring ruin to your family.
E. Superstition even pervades Chinese medicine.
When someone gets sick, Judeo-Christian Whites may close their eyes and beg Yahweh to help, but that is the extent of their hopes for magical intervention. The Chinese, along with appeals to their gods, developed a whole system of quackery to handle the sick, called Traditional Chinese Medicine, which remains popular today. TCM is based on Yin-Yang, the Five Elements, Meridian channels that transport qi energy through the body, and other sorts of hocus pocus.¹ A TCM diagnosis is made by examining the face and tongue, parts of which 'correspond' to body organs via the qi channels, as well as pulse-points, odors, and other superficial signs.² Emotions similarly correspond to body parts.³ The prescription will be a random concoction of exotic plant and animal parts, nearly all of them ineffectual and some toxic.⁴ Acupuncture, also based on qi energy channels, gets a lot of positive Leftist press, but studies find it no more effective in reducing pain than placebo.⁵ Chinese tend to regard physical deformities and psychological problems as forms of supernatural punishment, and tend to fear and avoid afflicted persons.⁶
F. Chinese take superstitious luck far more seriously than do Whites.
While Whites have a few odd superstitions that only a handful take seriously, such as black cats and the number 13, superstitions and lucky charms are innumerable and taken very seriously in China.¹ Chinese take pains to get lucky #8's in personal numbers such as phone numbers, addresses, and license plates, and strive equally hard to avoid #4's. The Beijing Olympics opened on 8/8/08 at 8:08:08pm local time, and many airline route numbers with multiple 8's are reserved for China.² Lucky color red is seen everywhere.³ The word for fish sounds like the word for surplus, so fish are lucky.⁴ Since good luck enters a home or shop through the front door, Chinese sweep inward and remove the dirt out the back.⁵ Concerned about how dead relatives are making do, Chinese burn great quantities of 'ghost money' (Joss paper) to keep them in cash.⁶ Many Chinese still carefully avoid women believed to be witches.⁷ Ghosts are widely feared and precautions are taken to avoid them, such as not clipping your nails at night.⁸ There are so many taboos on sex (leading to miscarriages, birth defects, etc.) that only about a hundred days of the year are considered auspicious for it.⁹
IV-7. Gambling and carelessness.
Similarly as the Chinese optimistically ignore doubts with respect to superstition, they are optimistic with respect to gambling and careless regarding dangers involved with normal activities such as driving.
A. Chinese gambling and superstition are intertwined.
Chinese have an optimism for gambling that is similar their optimistic use of good luck charms; undoubtedly they go together. Similarly as Chinese tend to disregard general experiences that contradict superstitious claims, they tend to disregard general experiences with gambling that indicate their next venture will more likely than not be a losing one. Each new gambling venture is regarded a unique event; former misfortunes and principles of chance being inapplicable to it. Since their last losing outing, they have made new offerings to deities, have taken new auspicious actions or brought along new lucky charms, and have paid due attention to the present 'winning patterns' in the games. Whites are more inclined to regard such contextual details as irrelevant and are more conscious of the underlying laws of probability¹ (section III-2.D).
B. Chinese are more reckless gamblers than Whites.
For average players, gambling is a foolish, losing venture. The house has an advantage, and any opposing players are more skilled or better cheaters. The Chinese, strong believers in superstitious luck, not surprisingly are enthusiastic gamblers. Some of their superstitious beliefs in luck of course pertain to gambling.¹ They are passionate gamblers historically,² and studies show that Chinese-Americans have a 6-20% rate of pathological gambling against the national rate of 1-2%.³ Chinese are greatly overrepresented as clientele of casinos, and eagerly sought by them.⁴ The communist regime in China outlawed most forms of gambling, but nevertheless underground games as well as casinos in neighboring nations are a huge and booming business.⁵
C. Chinese are more careless generally than Whites.
Chinese are relatively careless with respect to hazards present in everyday activities, comparable to their carelessness with respect to gambling. Carelessness means having a lack of concern for possible if unlikely hazards, which have been experienced only rarely or via report. A concrete-perceiver is less likely to relate such rare incidents to his present situation/activity, being more focused on its particular details and its routine progression (section III-2.D). Note that carelessness is not the same as bravery demonstrated in dangerous activities such as mountain climbing and soldiering, wherein one may be very conscious of hazards and averting them as carefully as possible under difficult circumstances. And since Whites are more aggressive (section II-1) and have a greater explorative and recreative drive than Chinese (section IV-1), they will encounter more adventurous and dangerous situations.
Chinese carelessness has been detailed by astute authors who spent time in China. Ralph Townsend characterized the Chinese as "naturally" and "hopelessly" careless.¹ He reported that falling overboard off a boat is "not an infrequent occurrence among Chinese", and detailed their carelessness in handling sewage pails,² the slipshod condition of their buildings,³ and their sloppy manner of eating.⁴ Troy Parfitt encountered frequent reckless driving in his travels in China.⁵ Reckless driving there is in fact well attested,⁶ and the 'crazy Asian driver' stereotype is well established in the United States in spite of Chinese-Americans' general respect for law enforcement there.⁷ Parfitt also finds remarkable Chinese carelessness in creating road hazards,⁸ in handling fire,⁹ and in unsafe construction leading to industrial tragedies.¹⁰ He also bore witness to a careless Chinese attitude about smoking cigarettes;¹¹ it is admitted that 60% of even China's male doctors are smokers.¹² Arthur Smith in the late 19th century was amazed at Chinese "cheery hopefulness" under difficult circumstances, concluding "it is well for the Chinese that they are gifted with the capacity not to worry".¹³
IV-8. Proficiency in memory and skill, and Chinese underachievement.
A. Chinese are more skilled than Whites at all tasks not requiring creativity or power athletics.
Chinese have greater ability than Whites to develop skill at all tasks not dependent on creativity or power athletics. Chinese score higher than Whites on memory tests,¹ and are predominant among the world's top World Memory Championship competitors.² Not surprisingly, since for over a millennium the wealth and privileges attendant with Chinese officialdom depended on a strong rote memory for the Civil Service examinations.³ As discussed in section III-1, memory-based intelligence extends as well to academic and manual skills. Chinese are highly successful at math and science problem-solving competitions,⁴ and score higher than Whites on Performance-IQ and SAT-Math tests.⁵ They are likewise more successful at math and science scholarship and vocations.⁶ Chinese also excel at musical instrument-playing.⁷ Chinese excel at sports requiring precise technique and timing, such as table tennis and gymnastics. China's economic success in manufacturing products, including artistic ones, is likely also a consequence of high levels of skill.
B. Explanation of the moderate Chinese performance on verbal tests: a need for creative interpretation of writing.
It is curious that Chinese score only about as well as Whites on language-based tests such as verbal IQ and SATs,¹ in spite of their generally superior memory-based skill.² Given China's more hierarchical society (sections II-7-8), it is possible that ability to persuade via language proficiency was less important than among Whites. Females evidently have a superiority to males in language acquisition (though not in advanced verbal skills),³ unsurprising given their more communicative roles, and Whites could have a similar advantage to Chinese, though it should be attenuated at higher levels. A more likely source of difficulty for the Chinese lies in the need to creatively interpret writing to fully understand its meaning and intent, which is not always definite. Clever writers tend to write abstractly or to serve up only implicit hints of their true meanings, assuming the reader's creative interpretation. As discussed in section IV-4.C, robust interpretation of writing is similar to robust incorporation of principles. This need is diminished but not eliminated by the presence of (abstract?) multiple choice answers and source material for writing given on SATs.
C. Chinese excellence in math and science is due to visuo-spatial ability, not creativity.
Application of abstract mechanical and math principles is not necessarily creative, as explained in section III-4. Math/physics principles are definite, and in math/physics problems the required data as well as the locus of the unknown quantity (the goal) are givens.¹ If one has the requisite knowledge, the process of obtaining the goal-quantity from the given data is straightforward. Only in marginal cases might one possess a 'repertoire' of math techniques required for solution but need 'creative' trial and error to determine which, in what order, to employ. Higher math and science require memory of geometric diagrams illustrating relationships between quantities, and ability to mentally compare (and manipulate) and match these models with the data at hand. That is, higher math requires keen visuo-spatial ability (section III-1). Tests show that Chinese have superior visual-spatial ability to Whites,² likely based on a 'working memory' superiority and perhaps a greater proclivity for visual-based motor skills involving judgments of orientation and distance.
D. The Chinese ability set is comparable to that of autistic savants.
An interesting parallel of the Chinese ability set comes in the form of autistic savants, who in many respects represent extreme cases of it. While Chinese are task-focused in general, autistic savants are hyper-focused on certain subjects. The basis of autism seems to be that sensings are unfiltered, i.e. unabstracted, meaning that autists have concrete memory for what interests them but are irritated and confused by, or withdrawn from, what does not. Leading expert Darrold Treffert describes the memory/skill versus creativity trade-off for autistic savants similarly as I have described it for Chinese, except at a greater extreme: "In general, savants echo rather than create, and mimic rather than invent. This in no way detracts from the enormity of their skills... Nothing is absolute, and one can sometimes see some low levels of creativity in the savant. But in general, the trade-off is less inventiveness and creativity for remarkable literal recall, storage and retrieval, sometimes linked with a vast musical or mathematical lexicon, based on a unique kind of nonsymbolic, high-fidelity memory function".¹
Autistic savants are characterized by a strong, concrete memory² and excellent skills in their area(s) of interest, a deficiency in abstract reasoning³ and creativity,⁴ and poor social⁵ and language abilities.⁶ The language deficiency is partly due to overly concrete comprehension, i.e. a lack of creative interpretation.⁷ While their range of interests is limited,⁸ some have developed amazing numerical calculation,⁹ visual-spatial,¹⁰ and sculpting abilities.¹¹ Some calculate large prime numbers, determine and apply the principles of calendar progression,¹² and develop spatial skills "including the capacity to measure distances precisely without benefit of instruments, the ability to construct complex models or structures with painstaking accuracy, or the mastery of map-making and direction-finding".¹³ They are able to detect and apply rules/patterns of the data they memorize, without conscious awareness or formulation of these rules.¹⁴ Autistic savants are also known to be very careless of hazards.¹⁵ If you have read sections III-IV, this will all sound familiar.
E. Chinese underachieve during careers, likely due to inferior creativity and judgement.
Chinese (-Americans) do not succeed in 'the real world' in proportion to their high academic attainment, a phenomenon that in America anti-Whites call "the Bamboo ceiling". Ralph Townsend recognized a schism between Chinese technical aptitude and practical ability in the 1930s.¹ Asians are greatly underrepresented relative to their college degrees and professional employment² as college presidents,³ as law-firm partners⁴ and district court judges,⁵ as lab and branch directors at the NIH,⁶ and as corporate managers and executives in general,⁷ even in technical fields such as Silicon Valley companies.⁸ Of course, the anti-White media blames this on White "racism", in spite of the Marxist brainwashing of 'educated' Whites and the fanatical drive for "diversity" that pervades corporate America. These Asian shortcomings also get attributed to their timidity, which is probably a factor. But likely the main factor is an innate Chinese inferiority in creativity and judgment in complex situations, in the 'real world' of dynamic social/economic interactions with society, as outlined in section III, particularly III-3.
V. Whites have been more innovative than Chinese in all fields.
Introduction: Overview of Europe's ascension.
Technology in a broad sense means devices, techniques, and institutions that produce material, social, and aesthetic goods. Since the time Whites attained a sufficient agricultural yield in Europe's challenging environment to enable urbanization, their rate of technological advance has been far higher than China's. We will now review the record that Whites have been more innovative than Chinese in material technology, social/economic institutions, and artistic pursuits.
The earliest civilizations were all established on alluvial plains of great rivers—the Tigris–Euphrates, the Nile, the Indus, and the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers, because this is where high-yield agriculture with minimal technology is most feasible. This advantage allowed China a nearly two thousand year head start in urbanization against mainland (Nordic) Europe, enabling China to garner many basic technological 'firsts'. Europe above the Mediterranean littoral established cities of significant size only at around 1000 AD, thanks to some key agricultural developments such as the heavy plow and three-field crop rotation. Thereupon, Europe quickly learned what it could from other civilizations and within a few centuries advanced beyond them, particularly in technologies based on creative design, such as architecture, power machinery, mechanics, instrument-making, mining, weaponry, shipbuilding, and navigation. In these crucial fields, Europe surpassed China as if it were standing still, taking an overall lead between 1400 and 1500.
From about 1500, Europe had more advanced technology, greater industrial output and trade per capita, more sophisticated financial institutions, a larger labor market, higher wages, and higher literacy and book production, than did China. For several centuries longer China retained a lead in a some specialized handicrafts and some techniques based on long experience with the organic/chemical properties of specific materials, such as in agriculture and ceramics. But by the mid-18th century, the final Chinese advantages were swallowed up. Even prior to Europe's Industrial Revolution, she was acquiring mostly raw materials from China. Meanwhile, White science marched relentlessly forward, developing more advanced instruments of investigation and drawing all of nature, large and small, into its domain. In the mid-nineteenth century, White science penetrated even into the realm of chemicals and microscopic organisms, merging with technology to create the modern world.
V-1. Due to its greater agricultural challenges, Europe did not urbanize until about 1000AD, allowing China a technological lead.
A. The real question of comparative history: How did China get a lead on Europe? The answer: agricultural advantage.
When Marxist academia, with its anti-White bias, compares European and Chinese history, its focus is usually on the so-called Needham Question: 'Why did China, which led Europe technologically from the decline of the Roman Empire until about 1450, then fall behind and fail to develop modern science?'. Needham was a typical self-hating Lefty, a Sinophile, and his question assumes that Chinese are inherently as creative as Whites. The Needham Question is a quest for excuses for Chinese failure. Considering that Europe has been kicking China's butt for 600 years, the real question, if there is one, is: How did China ever get a lead on Europe? The answer, basically, is that technological advance depends largely on urbanization, which in turn depends on high-yield agriculture, and high-yield agriculture was more difficult to attain under the environmental conditions in Europe, especially north of the Mediterranean littoral, than on the fertile alluvial plains of China. Once mainland European farmers, with a little help from the outside, managed to produce yields sufficient to support major commercial centers, Europe rapidly caught and surpassed China.
B. The oldest civilizations of the world are all based on floodplains, the ideal environments for agriculture.
It is certainly no accident that the first civilizations were all based on floodplains of great rivers: Mesopotamia of the Tigris-Euphrates, Ancient Egypt of the Nile, Ancient India of the Indus, and ancient China of the Yellow and Yangtze rivers. Such floodplains deposit huge amounts of highly fertile, porous, easily worked soil onto flattened ground with water at hand—ideal conditions for agriculture. The insights and tools required to initiate high-yield agriculture on such land are minimal, and the notion of controlling river water's natural distribution via irrigation presents itself readily. China has had the largest and densest population on Earth for four millennia, because eastern China has the most arable environment on Earth.
C. China's large agricultural advantages over Europe.
China had many agricultural advantages over mainland Europe. Europe's long, harsh winters limited agriculture to one growing season, while warmer China could get two to three crops per year.¹ The great hardwood forests of Europe were difficult to clear, requiring heavy iron cutting tools.² Europe's soils are thick and clayey and typically have a thick mass of roots,³ which must be broken up and turned over to release nutrients from below, requiring a heavy iron plow drawn by oxen or horses.⁴ The light soil of China's loess (and of the Mediterranean littoral) could easily be worked with light tools.⁵ While China's alluvial soil was extremely fertile,⁶ the lower fertility of Europe's soil required that it be left fallow every other year and mixed with manure (requiring grazing land) in order to recover nutrients.⁷ China's river overflow provides nutrients,⁸ its blue-green algae sustains fertility,⁹ and it flattens land and kills weeds.¹⁰ Another advantage for China is that it receives heavy monsoon rains during the optimum growing season of Summer, while Europe receives much of its precipitation during Winter.¹¹ Rice grown in China had a 6-10 times greater yield-to-seed ratio than European wheat,¹² and only one acre of land was sufficient to support a family compared to twenty needed in Europe.¹³ Chinese agriculture was labor-intensive as well as productive; however, an average family, even double-cropping rice and wheat, needed only to work for about four months during the year.¹⁴
D. China was well urbanized by about 1000BC.
Because of its agricultural advantages, China produced a much higher population than did Europe,¹ and its early population was concentrated in a relatively small area on the North China Plain around the Yellow River.² By 1500BC, large towns and cities had formed from its thousands of villages, ruled by the Shang dynasty. They had palaces and courts, a written language and records, large public-works projects, and large-scale, specialized industries in metallurgy, ceramics, etc.³ China's urban society evolved over time, undergoing some revolutions and gradually becoming more sophisticated.⁴ This evolution culminated in China's "golden age of philosophy" at 600-200 BC,⁵ followed by its imperial era that lasted until the 20th century. By 0 AD, China had a population of about 60 million as against a few million Northwest European Whites, who would eventually drive Europe's technological ascension.
E. Urbanization is a boon to technological progress.
Of course, the urbanization generated by high-yield agriculture and dense population is a boon to technological progress.¹ In the first place, it means more tradable foodstuffs and other agricultural products, more workers and (wealthy) consumers, and therefore more commerce in general.² Craftsmen, artists, and merchants become freer to specialize in their particular fields, and, with capital, resources, and customers close at hand, enjoy lower transportation and other transaction costs, and economies of scale.³ Greater economic activity engenders greater organization in industry and government along with the creation of the infrastructure and tools needed to manage it: roads and bridges, buildings and machines, laws, record-keeping, finance (currency), mathematics, etc.⁴
F. The classical Greco-Roman world surpassed China despite being only a periphery of Europe, dependent on grain imports from Africa.
The Classical Greco-Roman world with a brilliant spurt of creativity surpassed China for a few centuries,¹ though it was mainly a Mediterranean civilization rather than a European one. Its empires were led by Indo-European conquerors from the north,² and fell apart after their relatively small leadership class dispersed and was eroded by integration and immigration.³ Rome's creative effort was directed primarily toward effective management of the empire: administration and law, engineering and architecture, language and literature.⁴ The Roman empire's capital and base in Italy depended heavily on grain imports from North Africa and control of Mediterranean trade in general.⁵ Mainland Europe was still mostly a wilderness, supplying the empire with some raw materials and 'human resources' in the form of stout soldiers.
G. After the founding population of the Roman Empire intermixed into oblivion, it could not be held together.
As its founding citizens were replaced by their former subjects and slaves,¹ Classical Rome's cultural vitality faded and it degenerated into something of an oriental despotism.² Money ran short and severe measures were implemented to collect it;³ inflation and debasement were rife;⁴ the middle class and small property owners were ruined by competition with slave labor;⁵ the ranks on the dole soared;⁶ political chaos and corruption became rampant as bureaucratic control deepened;⁷ and the plebs who did not turn to escapist religions⁸ had to be pacified with hedonistic 'bread and circuses'.⁹ The new 'Romans' had no stomach to defend the empire, and so this increasingly depended on recruitment of Germans.¹⁰ Germanic leaders such as Theodoric admired classical Roman culture and tried to save it,¹¹ but with the mixed population, with Byzantine in control of the wealthier east, with Judeo-Christians bent on destroying Rome's "pagan" works,¹² with Hun invaders and more Germanic tribes from the northern wilds seeking a place at the table, and with Islam on the warpath from the south, the quest was impossible.
H. Mainland Europe, barely changed by the Roman Empire, gradually developed its agricultural technology.
The Roman towns in mainland Europe, which were based on forced labor and exchange with the empire, gave only "a veneer of literate culture [that] covered a core of essentially Neolithic village life".¹ Mainland Europe's rural and pastoral mode of life "found the rule of Rome a passing intrusion".² Though the end of the Roman Empire meant a contraction of trade and production, little technology was lost.³ In the latter half of the first millennium, northern Europe adopted and/or developed some key agricultural technologies that enabled her eventually to urbanize.⁴ These included the heavy mouldboard plow that broke up and turned over the thickly rooted soil;⁵ increased and improved utilization of horse power, with the shoulder harness and padded collar and the horseshoe;⁶ improved field organization and coordination with the open fields system;⁷ and the three-field crop rotation system that improved soil fertility while reducing fallow time, and provided oats for horse feed and protein-rich legumes for people.⁸ These technologies were gradually implemented and optimized in Europe's environment over several centuries, replacing previous techniques and arrangements.⁹
I. Mainland Europe urbanized at about 1000AD.
Mainland Europe urbanized and began developing cities worthy of the name at around 1000AD.¹ Along with the implementation of the new agricultural technologies, much work was done to reclaim land for cultivation by clearing space in Europe's prodigious forests and draining its wetlands.² Farmers coordinated their work on increasingly large fields, sharing the necessary resources and tools.³ The horse population expanded as well, improving transportation and enabling larger villages,⁴ as well as providing power. The burgeoning of Europe was boosted also by the Medieval Warm Period of ~950-1250, which provided a break from the harsh winters and improved crop growth.⁵ Having long roamed free and independent, forging a living in Europe's rugged but rich environment, Whites were now well prepared genetically for creative pursuits in their new settled and commercial way of life.
V-2. European technological innovation has been far superior to China's.
A. China, which had connections with the old western world, achieved many early, basic inventions.
With its big head start on Europe in urbanization due to agricultural advantage, China achieved many invention "firsts".¹ Ancient China had westward connections with the old civilizations of India, the Near East, and the Mediterranean, as well as the peoples of the Eurasian Steppe, so the origins of some of its early technologies are unclear.² Chinese civilization was evidently kick-started by Indo-European leadership (or at least participation) in its initial dynasties, the Xia, Shang, and Zhou, who conquered and ruled the natives of the Yellow River region.³ Evidence of these Indo-European roots includes a nomadic culture based on horse-drawn vehicles and bronze metallurgy,⁴ and a close correspondence between many early Indo-European and Old Chinese words, particularly those related to wheels and wheeled-vehicles, domesticated animals, and philosophy and morality.⁵ These Whites likely developed China's written language (based on native symbols and signs),⁶ and brought to China its original technologies of bronze metallurgy, horse riding, and wheeled transport, as well as some weaponry and fabrics.⁷
B. Much of China's best creative work was done in its ancient past, which indicates subsequent genetic change toward lower creativity.
Much of China's best creative work was done in the ancient past and little of it during the last 600 years, indicating that the leading elements of its population dissipated and/or its average genotype changed over time, due to selective pressures. In section I, I discussed characteristics of China's environment that would tend to render the Chinese less explorative and creative, and more morally conservative.
Most of China's eminent philosophers lived in the last few centuries of first millennium BC,¹ and China's most scientifically promising schools of thought, the Mohists, Logicians, and Legalists, practically died out by 100 BC.² China's rate of technological and institutional innovation steadily declined after the Song era (960-1279).³ Algebra developed in north China around 1300 was soon forgotten,⁴ along with various technologies such as their astronomical water clock⁵ and ocean-going ships.⁶ Some of China's best art also came early, such as bronze castings of the Shang era (1600-1050BC),⁷ and ceramic figurines and large stone Buddhist sculptures of the T'ang (618-907).⁸ China's ancient education included various recreational arts and its civil service examinations originally included mathematics and law, but after the Song era its education became very formal and rigid, based on rote memory of literary classics.⁹ Several physical/martial sports were popular in early China at least among aristocrats, such as a kick-ball game, tug-of-war, and polo, that died out by the Song era.¹⁰ Physical sports have not been popular in China since.¹¹
There is also evidence that China has become increasingly morally restrictive, such as in its repression of women and individual freedom.¹²
C. Europe developed rapidly, surpassing China's general technological level by 1500.
Modern European cities and nation-states began taking shape during the 11th and 12th centuries.¹ As there was now a surplus to trade, commercial and banking systems developed.² Grand castles and Gothic cathedrals began to rise, such as Wartburg (1067), Canterbury (1180), and Chartres (1220). Venerable universities were founded, such as Bologna (1088), Oxford (1096), and Paris (1150). These at first translated the works of the Classical Greco-Roman world, but were aggressively curious and soon breaking new ground, e.g. in astronomy, optics, and medicine.³ By about 1200, Europe's economy "had absorbed most of what Islam and the Orient had to offer" and began to pull ahead,⁴ exporting high-grade woolens, metal utensils, and weapons to the east.⁵ In the 13th century, Europe's cities began to rival those of Asia,⁶ as did its technology, with the inventions of eyeglasses, mechanical clocks, and heavy cannon at around 1300.⁷ Between 1400 and 1500 European surpassed the Chinese general technological level, especially in technologies based on creative design.⁸
D. The bases of Whites' technological superiority: creative utilization and creative design.
Whites' superior technological creativity, based in Whites' greater explorative drive and creative/analytic intelligence (sections III-IV), manifests itself in two basic ways: 1) More extensive utilization and development of basic discoveries and inventions (synthesis), and 2) Superior design of apparatuses having variable structure that effectively yield a goal-type, such as large and sturdy buildings and fast and accurate projectiles (analysis).
E. Basic devices are as good as the creative uses made of them; Whites developed and utilized key devices more robustly than did Chinese.
Basic discoveries and inventions are only as good as the uses made of them. In some cases a discovery, such as a lodestone or gunpowder, must be adapted to some useful purpose(s) before it has any real value. A new device must be creatively modified, innovated, and perfected before its full potential can be realized for maximum applications in a maximum range of contexts. A discovery or device that appears in one nation might be discarded or lie dormant because its people know not what to make of it, while the same discovery/device stimulates a boom of innovations in another nation capable of exploiting it.¹ There are only so many basic discoveries and core inventions that could have been made prior to Europe's Scientific Revolution (~1600), and the old civilization of China had acquired or made most of them by the time Europe became an urban civilization. However, Europeans greatly increased the utility of many of them through creative adaptation, innovation, and precise crafting.²
In medieval Europe, watermill and windmill power, in conjunction with mechanical devices such as the compound crank, camshaft, screw threads, and gearing, was extended to a wide variety of productive uses, making Europe "the first great civilization not to be run primarily by human muscle power".³ Clocks were made self-powered and portable, improving the way Europeans ordered and measured their work.⁴ The compass was made into a compact, portable instrument that stimulated a revolution in navigation; it also spawned the science of magnetism that led to electrical power.⁵ The printing press was made into a versatile mass production machine that stimulated a communications revolution.⁶ Guns were made into effective and powerful weapons.⁷ Ships were made that mastered the tempestuous oceans, discovered the world, and facilitated transcontinental trade.⁸ Meanwhile, Chinese innovation with these devices and others stalled out or even regressed.⁹ Early Chinese savants had knowledge of optics, but Europeans utilized optics to invent eyeglasses and quickly developed them into telescopes and microscopes. These instruments opened up new realms of knowledge and technology to Europeans, while the Chinese after receiving them barely used them.¹⁰
F. Whites surged ahead in technological fields based on creative design; China retained a lead in fields based on subtle knowledge and experience.
Whites excel at technologies for which a broad range of creative designs can be applied to optimize the attainment of a certain goal type. Such goals include large and sturdy, yet elegant buildings (architecture), strong, efficient, and continuous application of force (power machinery and mechanics), precise and coordinated shaping and fitting of parts (metal craftsmanship and instrument-making), automated and regular keeping of time (clock-making), clear and expansive magnification of vision (visual instruments), fast and accurate propulsion of projectiles (weaponry), and deep and extensive excavation of earth and water (mining). In these key industrial fields, Europe surpassed China by 1500. They are each reviewed in the next section.
While Europe surged ahead in technological fields based on creative design, a Chinese superiority lingered for a while in fields based on long experience and skill with sophisticated manufacturing processes.¹ These processes were typically based on knowledge of complex molecular interactions, such as organic growth in agriculture and material mixtures in ceramics and metallurgy; and/or privileged access to key materials, such as China's native cotton, tea, and silkworm moths,² and more arable soil.³ The two principal fields in which China retained a lead were agriculture and ceramics. China also continued to lead in some aspects of metallurgy (i.e. 'cooking recipes' of metals and minerals),⁴ and of textiles (weaving high-end fabrics). But Europeans gradually discovered China's little 'trade secrets' or developed alternatives,⁵ and by 1770 on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, no really significant Chinese advantages remained. White science would soon thereafter penetrate deeply enough to allow creative design even in the organic and chemical technologies.
G. Review of Europe's technological prowess in 1500:
1. Architecture. The crowning achievement of medieval Europe was its magnificent architecture. From the 12th century on, Europe's great castles and cathedrals—Romanesque, Gothic, then Renaissance, soared to the skies, their towering walls glistening with exquisite sculptures and brilliant stained-glass windows.¹ Whites innovated weight-bearing structures such as cross-rib vaults and flying buttresses,² along with lifting machinery such as counterweighted pulley hoists.³ On the inside, chimneys, windows, plaster, and other methods were developed to counter the harsh winters.⁴ While the grand buildings of Whites in Europe and elsewhere stand in their majesty for long ages, they have no counterparts or rivals in China.⁵ Despite the ready availability of stone, China's venerable buildings were made mostly of ephemeral materials such as wood and mudbrick.⁶
2. Power machinery. Medieval Europeans developed power machinery, utilizing animal, water, wind, and fossil fuel energy sources, more extensively than any other civilization.¹ This machinery was based mainly in watermills and windmills. Early civilizations including Rome and China utilized the water wheel for various purposes, but medieval Europeans extended their use more creatively than anyone; for sawing, fulling, tanning, making paper and cordage, pumping water for mines and city supply, pumping air for ventilation and forge bellows, and for cutting, shaping, boring, rolling, and drawing metal.² These machines utilized devices such as complex gearing, camshafts, crankshafts that converted rotary to reciprocating motion,³ and flywheels.⁴ Europeans had superior machine design and construction, evident in their precision screw-based devices that China lacked, including Gutenberg's printing press.⁵ Whites also innovated more efficient and powerful overshot waterwheels,⁶ and pivoting, horizontal-axis windmills.⁷
3. Mechanical clocks. A keystone of European mechanical prowess was its invention of mechanical clocks in the late 13th century, which required brilliant design and precision-crafted machinery.¹ The clocks were often integrated with astronomical indicators, musical chimes, moving figurines, and other entertaining automations.² The first spring-driven watches controlled by stackfreed or fusee, came in the late fifteenth century.³ The proliferation of public and private mechanical clocks, including portable watches, revolutionized Whites' sense of order and their ability to coordinate activities.⁴ The Chinese never advanced beyond water clocks (which the Romans had), with their obvious shortcomings.⁵ In fact, the Chinese had discarded even their water clock technology by the time visiting Europeans amazed them with clocks and other mechanical devices in the 16th century.⁶
4. Movable type printing. Europe invented the printing press with movable type in 1430, likely independently of China.¹ Gutenberg's machine, based on a screw press and precision metal craftsmanship, was more flexible and efficient than that of the Chinese,² who used mainly a rubbing technique.³ In China, movable type was applied almost exclusively to government-funded projects,⁴ while Europe's printing press was a commercial success that greatly expanded book production and literacy.⁵
5. Instrument-making. By 1500, European metal craftsmen, including the mechanics, clock-makers, and gunsmiths discussed elsewhere, had no equal. Europeans developed precision crafting skills that applied to a broad range of devices.¹ Around 1300, Europe invented eyeglasses, correcting human vision and greatly increasing the effective lifespans of workers.² The first spectacles were concave and aided the far-sighted; shortly before 1500, the vision of smart, near-sighted people was revived as well with the development of concave lenses.³ Also around 1300, Europe developed the compass as a self-contained device, with a dry needle rotating on a vertical pin around a directional card.⁴ Europeans produced other cutting edge astronomical and navigational instruments, such as astrolabes, cross-staffs, and quadrants.⁵ White craftsmen would soon thereafter (~1600) invent microscopes and telescopes, opening up new worlds of discovery.⁶
6. Weaponry. European weaponry was the best in the world by 1500.¹ The Chinese, having discovered the secret of gunpowder centuries earlier, invented the first, crude firearms (hand cannon), but these were little more effective than tossed explosives.² Europeans developed both the first effective cannon in the early 14th century³ and the first effective hand-held guns in the late 15th, as the arquebus evolved into the matchlock musket.⁴ They improved gunpowder composition,⁵ firing mechanisms, casting techniques, and ballistic design, e.g. length-to-bore ratio, projectile fit, and rifling.⁶ The Chinese were thereafter obliged to imitate White gun technology, sometimes requiring the assistance of European technicians to manage the guns they obtained.⁷ European naval ships with their superior cannon and maneuverability quickly took control of the oceans.⁸ White military superiority was also due to excellence in training, discipline, and management.⁹
7. Mining. By 1500, Europeans—Germans in particular—led the world in mining technology. They developed gunpowder blasting, hauling systems including horse-operated treadmills for windlasses, railed transport systems, powerful pumps and vertical transmission of water power, and ventilation systems.¹ Georgius Agricola's famous treatise, De Re Metallica, published in 1556 after his death, detailed the German methods. Chinese mining, on the other hand, declined over time and as late as the 19th century relied completely on manual power.²
8. Ship-building. In the 15th century, Europeans made major ship design innovations and became the world's leading ocean voyagers. Prioritizing maneuverability and durability, Europeans designed full-rigged ships with carvel plank construction, called carracks and caravels, that could sail briskly under any weather conditions and endure long journeys far from home.¹ Europe also developed the finest navigational and cartographic technology.² Meanwhile, China was permanently shelving its own ocean-going fleet—even wiping out the records of it.³ Some claim that Chinese ships, prior to be being scrapped in 1435, were superior to European because they were larger⁴ and had some nice features. But the proof of the pudding is in the eating: how well did the ships carry out their principal purpose: to traverse the oceans and conduct far-reaching explorative, commercial, and military expeditions? Europeans rounded Africa in 1488, discovered America in 1492, and circled the globe in 1522. Thereafter, Whites dominated transoceanic trade and 'ruled the waves'.
H. White science and technology merged in Europe's Industrial Revolutions.
Europe's Scientific Revolution of the 17th century was followed by its Enlightenment of the 18th. Early European scientists, motivated primarily by explorative urges, pioneered our understanding of the world, even though for a long while their findings remained too limited to drive technological advance. A major theme of the Enlightenment was the belief that expansion of knowledge and application of science could ultimately solve humanity's problems.¹ During the 18th century, scientific and technical knowledge increased at such a rate, and was so widely disseminated (via books, journals, lectures, and letters),² that it began contributing to technological innovation at an accelerating pace.³ Scientific methods were increasingly applied to technology itself: experimentation, quantification with accurate measurement, modeling, mathematical analysis, and publication of results.⁴ Various fields of science and technology became increasingly integrated and mutually reinforcing.⁵ The upshot was Europe's Industrial Revolution(s) of the late 18th and 19th centuries, that created the modern world.⁶
China not only had inferior science, but less dissemination of what scientific and technical knowledge it did have.⁷ Kaozheng, an 18th century "evidentiary" movement that called for examining the original sources of China's ancient sages, was no Enlightenment.⁸
I. White science and technology created the modern world.
The modern world of marvelous technology, prosperity, and miracle medicine was created by White people. Pneumatics, mechanics, and metallurgy advances led to the steam engine, to steam-powered production and locomotion, and to the internal combustion engine. Electricity and magnetism led to electrical power, batteries, motors, lights, and radios. Chemistry advances led to synthetic fertilizers, cleaning agents, vitamins, and medicines. Whites greatly expanded transportation with inventions of the steamboat, the train, the bicycle, the automobile, and airplanes. Whites greatly expanded communications with inventions of the camera and photographs, the telegraph, the record player, the telephone, motion pictures, the television, and computers. Whites also invented canned foods and refrigerators for dining convenience, and air conditioners for comfort. Above all, Whites greatly expanded our potential to live long and healthy lives with inventions of cures for diseases, anesthetics, antibiotics, pain-relievers, x-rays and ultrasounds, electrocardiographs, blood transfusions, surgeries, and all the miracles of modern medicine that people now take for granted.
J. Despite enormous transfers and ongoing theft of White technology, China continues to lag.
Despite enormous and ongoing transfers of White technology to China since the mid-20th century, China continues to lag. In the 1950s, Communist Russia provided China "the most massive international transfer of technology in modern history",¹ and China still relies on Russia for technical military assistance.² China's modernization has depended almost entirely on transfers of White technology,³ and there are thousands of Western technical terms in their language.⁴ To compensate for its feeble research and development, the Chinese rampantly steal intellectual property from Whites,⁵ estimated to have cost American companies alone hundreds of billions of dollars and more than two million jobs.⁶ The Chinese state employs a broad array of tactics on a massive scale to expropriate White technology, including espionage, illegal transfers by front companies abroad, utilizing Chinese students and workers abroad, violating copyright,⁷ and extorting corporations that do business with China.⁸ Nevertheless, China's high-tech industry remains dominated by foreign-owned companies, Western or Western-supported.⁹ Despite its rampant copying and espionage,¹⁰ China's military remains deficient in key respects, particularly regarding long-range power projection, such as with submarines, aircraft carriers, jet planes, strategic airlift and stealth capabilities, and air defenses.¹¹
We see the 'skill versus creativity' intelligence difference that is outlined in this essay reflected in China's extensive and perpetual campaign to obtain White technology, and in the success of Asian-dominated tech companies in the western United States, and in China's ongoing trade surplus with the West. Asians' success in acquiring White technology is facilitated by 'elites' who make the lion's share of the profits managing these exchanges; exchanges that result in White underemployment and poverty. These 'elites' would do well to consider that the technological advance, quality of life, and security they enjoy is made possible by the ordinary White folk who sustain White nations. If Whites are to maintain the industry that makes a nation prosperous and independent, their top priority must be to prevent such 'elites' from collaborating with Asians to plunder White technology.
V-3. Whites are also superior to the Chinese at scientific, institutional, and artistic innovation.
A-D: Science.
A. Whites scientifically investigated, analyzed, and classified the world much more than Chinese.
Europeans vigorously explored the Earth and discovered its properties through experimentation, thus giving rise to modern science.¹ The Judeo-Christian church offered some opposition early, but quickly accommodated natural law as 'the working of God's will',² and by the fourteenth century European universities were pioneering natural science.³ Much more than the Chinese, Whites ascertained the laws of nature and axiomatized them to their fundamental causes.⁴ While the Chinese remained mired in superstitious nonsense such as the Five Elements, Whites developed the scientific method as a means for determining objective facts.⁵ The scientific method included deliberate experiments with accurate measurement and controls, quantification and mathematical analysis, and publication and formal debate of results. Whites also catalogued, classified and disseminated knowledge more extensively than did the Chinese, via science clubs, correspondence, lectures, books, and journals.⁶
B. The White Scientific Revolution.
From the 16th century, Whites alone launched the Scientific Revolution and created modern science. New branches of math were created as powerful tools of analysis, including logarithms by Napier, analytical geometry by Descartes, probability theory by Fermat and Pascal, and calculus by Newton and Leibniz. Astronomers led by Copernicus and Kepler advanced heliocentric theory, explaining the motion of celestial bodies in our solar system. In the Mechanical Revolution, physicists led by Galileo, Huygens, and Newton determined the principles governing how all forces and moving objects interact. They also discovered the underlying nature of light. The principles of pneumatics and hydraulics were revealed in the pioneering experiments of Torricelli, Guericke, Boyle, and Bernoulli. The mysterious forces of magnetism and electricity were gradually uncovered by pioneers such as Gilbert, Hawksbee, Ørsted, and Faraday. Agricola originated the classification of minerals, and Guettard devised the first geological maps. The science of chemistry, of the fundamental composition of matter, was founded by pioneers such as Boyle, Black, and Lavoisier. Biology was advanced by Leeuwenhoek, who discovered micro-organisms, and Linnaeus, who created our system of animal classification based on genera and species. Our understanding of human anatomy was greatly advanced by investigators led by Vesalius, Harvey, and Malpighi, preparing the way for modern medicine.
C. The Chinese scientific record has been paltry in comparison to Whites'.
The Chinese record in science is paltry in comparison to Whites'.¹ The Chinese had little ambition to explore,² and what they did discover they didn't resolve to essential principles.³ Chinese 'science' lacked all the elements of the scientific method described above.⁴ China occasionally produced savants, but they tended to be isolated in space and time.⁵ Scholastic institutions in China up to the 20th century were devoted mostly to preparation for civil service exams,⁶ focused mostly on moral literature.⁷ China has a long history of employing foreign astronomers, including Arabs and Indians, for its astrological calendar projects.⁸ In the early 17th century, Europeans sent expeditions to China that demonstrated Europe's scientific superiority, particularly by making more accurate astronomical predictions.⁹ They handed to China much of Europe's inventory of instruments and knowledge, but China made little use of it beyond its astrological purposes.¹⁰ Chinese science hasn't improved much in recent times. Ethnic Chinese have won only 8 of 328 Nobel Prizes in science; only one (Physiology 2015) in China itself, the other seven by Chinese-Americans working within White institutions.¹¹
D. Claims of Chinese scientific achievements are much exaggerated.
The fact that science has no definite objective gives anti-White propagandists latitude to exaggerate China's meager accomplishments.¹ They will dig up from a dusty vault a line of cryptic text by some old Chinese poet, and declare that it expresses profound scientific insight. Thus, a line by Zhu Xi advising students "to go to all things under heaven" proves that the Chinese investigated natural laws.² A few remarks about the use of levers become "the whole theory of equilibria as stated by Archimedes".³ Intersecting lines on the Chinese abacus show that they nearly scooped Descartes on analytic geometry.⁴ Liebniz dabbled in Chinese philosophy, so this means that Chinese 'correlative thinking' and vague concepts like "li" and "tao" inspired Whites to create modern physics.⁵ A Chinese weather vane becomes "perhaps the oldest of all pointer-reading devices, the importance of which in the philosophy of the natural sciences requires no emphasis".⁶ Bellows and a vessel containing boiling water that when plunged into a well made a "sound like thunder", demonstrate that the Chinese "understood atmospheric pressure".⁷ China's primitive knowledge of magnetism (much inferior to Europe's by 1600) means that they almost beat Europe to electricity.⁸ And so on.
E-H: Government and education.
E. White governments are more representative, embedded, and stronger than Chinese.
White governments became increasingly more representative, more embedded in society, more informed, more organized, and more effective at promoting their nations' well-being than Chinese counterparts. Historically, states that are more representative and less despotic, that allow more rights and freedoms, and thereby enjoy more support from their people, are also stronger: able to collect more taxes and get more constructive work done.¹ White states have been much more representative than Chinese (section II-8). White nations evolved as power-sharing arrangements between citizens and rulers, with intermediary organs of power having their own systems of law.² People had individual rights, as did professionals organized into guilds, intellectuals organized into universities, clergy organized into churches and monasteries, villagers organized into communes, and businessmen organized into towns and cities. Each was a semi-independent corporation having a negotiated relationship with the central government. Citizens big and small obtained a voice in their government via legislative bodies, whose approval a ruler must obtain to implement policies.
F. Whites have led the world in governmental innovations.
Whites have led the world in governmental innovations, in areas such as: devising individual and corporate rights, and separation of powers with multiple systems of law;¹ instituting an independent judiciary and trial by jury; developing a regulated, professional bureaucracy;² collecting necessary information on resources, people, and the economy;³ standardizing currency, measures, and language;⁴ establishing an education system including universities and primary schools;⁵ creating a national bank and national bonds;⁶ providing relief to the poor;⁷ building public infrastructure including transportation systems;⁸ supporting economic and industrial development;⁹ and protecting the environment and wilderness areas. China, on the other hand, has made barely any institutional innovations since at least as far back as the start of the Qing dynasty (1644).¹⁰
G. Europe has long been superior to China in book production, education, and literacy.
Better government goes hand in hand with a better citizenry. Europe's production of books, already accelerating in the century prior to Gutenberg's printing press of 1440, was vastly greater (roughly 20-40 times) than China's from the late medieval period on.¹ While China's state-run academies were devoted to memorizing classical literature in preparation for civil service exams,² European universities were independent and students since medieval times could learn practical subjects such as law, accounting, and medicine.³ Europe had 70 universities by 1500, and almost 150 by 1700.⁴ Mass-produced newspapers took off in Europe in the early 17th century;⁵ they did not appear in China until the 1840s, based on British models.⁶ By 1800, northwest Europe was over 50% literate, while China was only about 15% literate then and only 20% literate as late as 1950.⁷ Public education got underway in Europe in the late 18th century;⁸ China did not reach northwest Europe's 1830 primary school enrollment levels until 1960.⁹ European artisans were also more literate than Chinese; they signed their works more, wrote more technical literature,¹⁰ and eventually joined with European scientists to create the Industrial Revolution.¹¹
H. China's despotic government was deficient in many respects, and declined over time.
While White governments became better organized and more effective over time, China's imperial government was deficient in many respects and actually declined. China's regime was arbitrarily powerful and could crush anyone it targeted, but lacked the embedded strength possessed by White states.¹ Its tax revenue was largely drained by corruption; the amount that reached the central government being relatively meager.² It lacked a national bank and national bonds.³ China had a relatively small cadre of overworked, often underqualified officials (mandarins) who had a wide range of responsibilities, often farmed out.⁴ Their rule was largely arbitrary, and often based on kinship, personal relationships, and bribes.⁵ China lacked individual rights and formal property laws.⁶ It lacked standardized weights and measures, and had "a very weak statistical ‘basis’".⁷ From the late 18th century, China's infrastructure deteriorated, including its transportation system of roads and canals and its granaries and big irrigation projects; the Chinese government failing to provide even basic policing.⁸
I-K: Industry, trade, and finance.
I. White governments actively supported industry and trade, while China stifled it.
White governments cooperated with businessmen to actively promote industry and trade, while China often stifled it. They developed stable banking and currency, commercial law, quality standards, transportation infrastructure, and education programs. They gave tax breaks or subsidies to vital industries, and when necessary protected them with import tariffs.¹ They provided incentives for inventors and entrepreneurs, including patent laws, grants, prizes, and pensions.² They promoted free trade within their nations,³ and supported international traders with favorable laws, charters for overseas companies, and strong naval forces.⁴ The Chinese government did not provide such institutional supports. It took over major industries and impeded business concerns as rivals to their power, restricting international trade and key industries such as ship-building and mining. Businessmen were "squeezed" and occasionally looted.⁵
J. Whites have led the world in economic innovation and development.
Whites have led the world in economic innovations, including in the governmental areas already reviewed. Europe pioneered double-entry bookkeeping, shareholding and the stock exchange, joint liability, and insurance companies.¹ Europe developed a sound currency and monetized tax revenue and salaries,² while China lacked paper currency (especially, government-issued) and a reliable coinage;³ its taxes and salaries often being paid in bulky copper, grain, or land.⁴ Europe developed a robust money market with low interest rates, in part due to Whites' high level of trust. European interest rates decreased throughout the medieval period, reaching 10-12% by 1250, 5-6% by 1450, and 3-5% by 1600. Chinese interest rates were much higher at 30-50% during the medieval period and still about 12% in the 18th century.⁵
Europe developed a capitalist economy with large industrial corporations and a highly developed labor market.⁶ In China, businesses were usually family-owned,⁷ large commercial transactions usually depended upon personal relationships,⁸ and most manufacturing took place in households.⁹ Already in the medieval period, almost half of northwest Europeans participated in the labor market as wage earners, as against about 1-2% in China.¹⁰ Farmland in Europe was increasingly managed on an industrial scale,¹¹ while Chinese families typically eked out a sustenance on ever diminishing plots.¹² Europe rapidly overtook China in extent of urbanization, about 2-3 times higher by 1800.¹³
K. Whites have long had superior industry, trade, wages, and GDP to China.
White business and industry dominated international trade by the 18th century, and reaped the benefits.¹ Due to its technological prowess, Europe has long had higher labor productivity and real wages than China,² with a comparative advantage in 'high-tech', capital-intensive products since the late medieval period.³ Whites' superior industry has enabled them to develop and/or purchase raw materials overseas, transport them home, create value-added products, and then finally sell them on the world market at lower prices than competitors.⁴ Whites controlled international trade and global bullion/specie flows, making arbitrage profits (e.g. with silver/gold) and purchasing anything desired at lowest prices to supply their business and industry.⁵ China lacked capitalist organization of its production processes, its manufacturing largely restricted to households.⁶ From the mid-18th century, China exported to Europe mostly raw or semi-manufactured materials, such as tea and raw silk.⁷ Europe has had higher GDP per capita than China since about 1500, and this gap grew large by the mid-18th century, even prior to the Industrial Revolution.⁸ Europe's governments collected far more in taxes.⁹ Even when White technology and capital were transferred across the globe in the late 19th century, Whites retained a competitive edge due to higher labor productivity.¹⁰
L-M: Artistic innovation.
L. Whites have had more eminent artists than Chinese.
Although the value of artistic innovations cannot be measured as definitively as that of technological, scientific, and institutional innovations, the record of White excellence is clear. A basic way to gauge the accomplishment of artists is to examine how much notoriety they have received in the pertinent historical literature of their civilizations. By carefully reviewing such literature and applying statistical methods, Charles Murray compiled separate inventories of "significant figures" in the arts for White ("The West"), Chinese, and other civilizations. For the Visual Arts, he identified 479 eminent White artists against only 111 Chinese; for Literature, it was 835 against just 83; and for Music there were 522 eminent White musicians against none identified in China.¹ Murray explained that using a separate inventory for China inflated the number of Chinese significant figures relative to Whites, because they had to compete for notoriety only with fellow Chinese;² and that the number of anonymous Chinese artists was counterbalanced by the number of anonymous White ones.³
M. Whites have made many major innovations in the arts.
Whites have made many revolutionary innovations in the arts. Whites developed oil-based painting techniques, creating vivid colors and giving the artist more time to work.¹ Whites developed linear and spatial perspective techniques in painting, using geometry and light/shadow shading to create the impression of depth.² Whites produced architectural and sculptural works of majestic scale, realistically recreating the human form. In literature, the Classical Greeks pioneered the the epic and the tragedy,³ and medieval Whites developed and prolifically composed the novel.⁴ The Classical Greeks also pioneered the theatrical drama.⁵ Whites invented many brilliant new musical instruments, including the organ, piano, harpsichord, violin, clarinet, saxophone, and valved trumpet.⁶ Whites created polyphonic music with large orchestras and other forms of ensemble, developing counterpoint and harmony to create symphonies, operas, etc. unparalleled by anything in China. Whites also devised a codified system of musical notation, to record all the notes, pacing, and rests in these compositions, along with methods of conduction.⁷
V-4. Arguments.
Introduction: Anti-White propaganda with a familiar theme.
Whites' superior creativity, technology, industry, and prosperity doesn't sit well with those who hate White people and want us to be race-mixed into extinction. Some of them are quite clever, and like a cabal of cunning defense lawyers they have cooked up impressive-sounding, dishonest arguments denying the clear historical superiorities of Whites outlined in this section.
The primary strategy of anti-White propagandists is to claim that Europe did not surpass China technologically and economically until the early-mid 19th century, when Europe had begun to impose its will on China, so that they can blame the surpassment on White 'bullying' of China and other countries. This is the familiar 'White oppression and theft made everyone else poor' narrative. As if nonwhites had benevolent government and prosperity and were cozy kittens with their neighbors before Whites came along. It is of course perfectly clear that European impositions on its rivals including China were the consequence, and not the cause, of White technological and economic superiority.
A secondary strategy of anti-Whites is to claim that Whites got lucky. China had lots of coal in various places, but Europe was lucky that a patch of its coal happened to lie in Great Britain, near one of Europe's (many) industrial areas. Europe was lucky that Britain was severely short of wood (it wasn't) and so was forced to develop coal energy, and lucky that Britain had high labor costs (it didn't) and so was forced to invent the steam engine. The fact that Britain had the world's finest metal craftsmen and mechanical engineers and the most proficient industry to begin with had nothing to do with it.
In this final section I shall sort through and refute this nonsense in detail, relying largely on the fine work of Peer Vries, Ricardo Duchesne, and Joel Mokyr.
A. Argument: "China's superior trade balance with Europe in the 18th century, by which they obtained a lot of Europe's silver in trade for its commodities, shows that it was technologically/ industrially superior at this late point in time."
1. Europe was in fact economically superior to China in the 18th century, and imported from China mostly raw materials.
In the first place, the fact is that by the 18th century Europe was superior to China in every important economic respect. Europe had long been superior in the crucial metal craftsmanship and power machinery technologies, as reviewed in section V-2. China retained an advantage only in some specialized manufactures, such as porcelain and silk textiles, that represented only a small portion of China's exports to Europe. These final advantages disappeared in the early to mid 1700's,¹ and by the start of the Industrial Revolution (~1770) China exported to Europe mostly agricultural or raw materials that Europe could not grow or find at home: predominantly tea, and also raw silk, rhubarb, and various metals and drugs.² Europe had long had a large superiority in education, in science, in labor productivity (wages), and in GDP per capita.³
2. China restricted imports but wanted silver, a valuable commodity.
Whereas Europeans were open to other cultures and ideas from around the world, China deliberately closed itself off, restricting foreign influences and external trade.¹ Europeans were happy to purchase foreign products while the Chinese were not, an attitude that left China backward and ultimately provoked trade wars.² One thing that the Chinese dearly wanted from Europeans was silver. Silver was not just a means of payment, but a useful commodity.³ It had of course aesthetic value for artistic and decorative purposes. As China lacked a stable paper currency,⁴ silver also served as a vital medium of exchange for its tax collection and settlement of large transactions. Chinese especially desired silver coinage finely minted by European craftsmen.⁵ The amount of silver traded to China by Europe has, however, been greatly exaggerated by those who like to represent this trade as a European weakness.⁶
3. Europe's silver trade with China was just an aspect of its international trade dominance.
Europe's trade of silver to China was just an aspect of its international trade dominance. European businessmen controlled and managed international trade, and by deciding what goods to buy and sell and where to buy and sell them, they made the lion's share of the profits. Trading silver to China made them a lot of money. Much of the silver Europe traded to China was exchanged for gold in order to profit from arbitrage, taking advantage of the greater demand for silver in Chinese versus European markets.¹ European trade dominance was enabled by its proactive governments, its economic innovations, its superior ships, and its powerful navies.²
B. Argument: "Europe's industrial success was due to its privileged access in its colonies to raw materials such as cotton, sugar, and silver, to customers, and to its exploitation of slave labor."
1. Europe's development of resources into products was a consequence of its technology; its colonies were unnecessary and hardly worth the costs.
In fact, Europe's Industrial Revolution was due to its advanced industrial technology; Europe's development of raw materials from overseas into value-added products was a consequence of this revolution, not a cause of it. Raw resources could be 'exploited' only because Whites were able to purchase or produce them overseas, transport them home, and then—in spite of all these costs—manufacture them into valuable products at a profit. Europe's utilization of transoceanic resources was not a 'lucky windfall', but rather the result of technological prowess, planning, organization, investment, and development of infrastructure.¹ The principal innovations that generated the Industrial Revolution—the steam engine, coke-smelted iron, and the mechanization of fabric spinning—were independent of colonial trade.² The costs of maintaining the colonies were so enormous that some economic historians even believe that they exceeded the benefits.³ Switzerland and Germany industrialized early without any significant colonies, while Spain and Portugal failed to do so despite having enormous colonies.⁴
2. Colonies were only a small factor in Britain's industrial success, and Britain usually had to pay fair market value for the materials it imported.
Europe's industrial leader Britain did not depend on colonies for its industrialization and trade. Britain had to pay fair market value for most of the resources it imported (even from colonies),¹ and most of its agricultural imports were bought from Europe.² It bought most of its cotton from the United States, which became independent in 1776 and made Britain pay dear.³ Britain's so-called "ghost acreages", which were mostly in Europe, amounted to only a tiny fraction of its GDP in 1800, and this produce had to be paid for via exports.⁴ Only 4% of Britain's caloric intake came from colonial sugar, and this was mostly replaced during the 19th century by European beet sugar.⁵ Britain (and Western Europe) did possess the agricultural wherewithal to feed herself, but deliberately chose to invest in her specialty of manufacturing, instead.⁶ Northeastern Europe could have supplied Britain's timber needs, instead of Canada, and at a lower price.⁷ In 1800, commerce beyond Europe added less than 10% to Britain's total foreign trade.⁸ As late as the 1820's, 58% of Britain's piece-goods and over 65% of her cotton manufactures exported went to Europe.⁹
3. Northern Europe which industrialized got little of the supposed "windfalls" of precious metals and slaves; China had plenty of cheap labor.
Northern Europe, which industrialized first, got little of the supposed "windfalls" of precious metals and slaves from America and Africa. Most precious metals and slaves were acquired (at much expense), used, and/or sold by Spain, Portugal, and the Islamic world, and this 'bounty' scarcely did anything for their industrialization or long-term prosperity.¹ At its height during the late 18th century, bullion mining brought to Western Europe each year about a single day's unskilled wages per person.² Slave trade profits were small, amounting to only a few tenths of a percent of Britain's GDP.³ The 'indirect benefits' of trade related to slave labor are greatly exaggerated, and its costs are ignored.⁴ Slave labor was no free lunch: slaves had to be bought, managed, and cared for, and they did not work enthusiastically. In this era, many "free" workers were practically slaves and were paid less than subsistence wages, and so they were hardly more costly than slaves. Cheap labor was no advantage for Europe, as there was an abundance of it in China.⁵ Claims are also made about poor slaves constituting "perversely large markets", but in fact slave populations produced much of their subsistence goods themselves.⁶
4. China possessed enormous domestic supplies of raw materials that Europe lacked, including cotton and sugar, and a bigger market.
All the 'advantageous access' to resources that anti-Whites claim Europe had in the 18-19th centuries, was in fact possessed to an equal or greater degree by China, who nevertheless lagged behind and did not create an industrial revolution. China had extremely fertile agriculture (section V-1) with enormous domestic production of cotton and sugar, both of which 'lucky' Europe had to purchase and import entirely from overseas.¹ China also possessed large amounts of metals, minerals, and coal.² Post-1500, China annexed enormous tracts of neighboring lands to its empire and colonized internal 'frontier lands' inhabited mainly by non-Han natives. These territories were rich with resources (see next section). There were also plenty of rich lands overseas accessible to China. China had a huge, unified state within a vast continent and a much bigger market than Europe, including Europe's colonies.³ The Chinese simply did not develop their available resources and markets to the extent that Europeans did.⁴
5. China obtained a great bounty of de facto colonial acquisitions in the 17th-18th centuries.
China obtained a great bounty of resources in de facto colonies during the 17th-18th centuries,¹ while Europe was developing its own colonies. During the Qing era, the Chinese acquired the islands of Taiwan and Hainan and penetrated deeply into their massive tropical territories to the south and west, much to the displeasure of the native inhabitants. The take from these regions included lumber, coal, precious metals, and agricultural goods such as spices and sugarcane.² China frequently smashed native rebellions to retain control.³ China also acquired the vast regions of Outer China rich in precious metals and minerals, i.e. Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia, nearly doubling its size.⁴ China's Manchu overlords also brought in Manchuria, about twice the size of France. Manchuria was an untamed realm of highly fertile farmlands and vast woodlands. It was a major producer of soybeans and fertilizer for the Yangzi delta. Manchuria also contained precious metals such as gold, copper, lead, and tin; as well as rich coal deposits, the subject of the next section.⁵
C. Argument: "Europe's Industrial Revolution was due to the good fortune of Britain having a lot of coal located near industrial areas."
1. The Industrial Revolution, in Britain and elsewhere in Europe, was not dependent on coal.
In fact, Europe's Industrial Revolution led by Britain was the culmination of over a century of excellence in mechanical science, metallurgy, craftsmanship, and industrial technology. Britain and Europe had been innovative in a wide variety of technologies, many having nothing to do with coal; such as agriculture, food canning, textiles, ceramics, canal construction, shipbuilding, and watchmaking.¹ Up until 1860, half of Britain's productivity growth came from non-mechanized sectors of the economy, and steam power represented less than half of her motive power. Much of Britain's Industrial Revolution was powered by water wheels, including her famous cotton mills that drove her textiles industry.² Other European nations were highly innovative and industrial, as well.³ The Industrial Revolution in France was based largely on her advances in water power technology, such as the breast-wheel, curved vanes, and the hydraulic and axial turbines.⁴ Other White nations industrialized early despite lacking coal, including Holland, Switzerland, Denmark, and New England in the United States.⁵
2. Britain's innovation drove its Industrial Revolution; the location of coal deposits hardly mattered.
Britain's innovation would have driven its Industrial Revolution regardless of the location of coal deposits.¹ Unlike China, Britain had been developing coal as an energy source for a long time.² The lower cost of coal in Britain was due not just to location, but to advances in mining and transportation.³ If coal deposits had been farther away from her current industrial areas, Britain could have transported or imported it, as for example the Netherlands imported British coal at only a little higher price and successfully ran her industry. As it was, Britain had to import all of the cotton for its successful textiles industry, much of its wood, and quality iron ores from Sweden and Spain.⁴ Or, Britain could have built an industry nearer the coal. Britain could also have developed water power further, as France did,⁵ or used wood for fuel instead of coal. Clark and Jacks (2007) calculated that Britain could have completely substituted Baltic timber for coal to fuel its industry at a cost of only about 4% of GDP as late as the 1860's.⁶
3. China had more coal deposits than Britain and every opportunity to develop them.
China had far more coal reserves than Britain and the same opportunity to develop coal as an energy source. China currently ranks third worldwide in verified coal reserves with 114 billion tonnes, while Britain ranks twentieth with 3 billion.¹ In the mid 18th century, He Qizhong, an imperial censor, reported abundant coal resources in the northeast province of Liaoning, located fairly close to seaports. He advised that this bounty be exploited to relieve the shortage of firewood, but nothing came of it.² In the early 19th century, China's coal-rich northern province of Shanxi was home to the famous Shanxi bankers; it was a fairly wealthy, capital-rich region. But, China did not develop industry there.³ China not only lacked Europe's mechanical and industrial technology; its mining operations and transportation infrastructure were in sorry shape.⁴ China's regime even prohibited new mines from opening and wanted some of the existing ones shut down.⁵
D. Argument: "Britain's industrial success was due to its cheap energy and high wages that induced the replacement of human labor with machines."
1. Britain's industrial success was due to the innovation and skill of her people; its wages were high because its labor productivity was high.
This argument is basically the coal argument that was refuted in the previous section, with the added claim that Britain had expensive labor that was somehow an extra, fortuitous advantage. The accomplishments of British mechanical scientists, engineers, innovators, and craftsmen—their abilities renowned throughout Europe since long before the Industrial Revolution¹—are dismissed as an incidental byproduct of Britain's "unique wage and price structure". In fact, Britain's industrial success and high-wage labor were co-effects of her creative people and technological prowess.² Britain made a wide variety of technological innovations, many unrelated to coal and not labor-saving.³ Britain's labor wasn't really expensive, despite its high wages, because its very high labor productivity more than compensated.⁴ The evidence shows that industrial innovation led to high(est) wages, rather than vice versa.⁵ Labor-saving innovations can undercut even cheap-labor manufacturing, which is why industrialization is sought as the key to prosperity everywhere. And expensive labor is actually a competitive disadvantage for industry, which is why capital and industry often move across borders.⁶
2. The skill of British craftsmen was renowned throughout Europe, and they commanded higher wages everywhere.
Britain's craftsmen, her engineers, mechanics, artisans, metalworkers, instrument makers, etc., were widely recognized as the best in Europe in the 18th century.¹ British craftsmen were often able to take inventions made by Continental Europeans and improve their practical value through superior design and construction. This is why the Industrial Revolution was spearheaded by Britain, though all of northwestern Europe greatly contributed.² British workers had higher productivity in general than others, and not only in the mechanized industries. Thus, their wages were high and remained so despite Britain's rapidly increasing population; but their labor was not expensive.³ British workers commanded higher wages wherever they went in Europe. If wages were actually higher per work unit in Britain, then French workers would have migrated to Britain to earn them; instead, just the opposite happened. British workers migrated to France where they could earn twice the wages as locals doing the same job, despite British laws that barred such movement to protect its advantage.⁴
3. Britons innovated irrespective of labor costs, and Britain's highest wages shifted to areas having more innovation and industry.
Britons innovated prolifically regardless of the labor costs of a technology or a region, and innovation and industry led to higher wages, rather than vice versa. Britons innovated across a wide variety of fields, many of which were neither mechanized nor labor-saving.¹ Some innovations just replaced one type of non-human power (horses or watermills) with another (coal).² Studies of patents and macroeconomic trends have found that only a minority of British innovations were labor-saving; some were fuel-saving and some created entirely new products.³ Innovators have a range of motivations, from hope for profit and awards to fame and personal satisfaction; seldom do they carefully appraise economic conditions.⁴ Key innovations in the steam engine took place in tin or copper mines in Cornwall, where wages were relatively low and coal relatively expensive.⁵ Industry such as clock-making had been growing in relatively low-wage northern British towns such as Lancashire since before coal became a significant power source (while the south reaped more trade profits and had higher wages), and this industrialization shifted Britain's highest wages north.⁶
E. Argument: "China's decline was due to European opium trade and the Opium Wars, and the consequent drain of China's silver."
1. China's decline had been going on for centuries, the trade wars were short, and China was largely responsible for opium proliferation.
In fact, China's stagnation and decline had been going on since long before the so-called Opium Wars, the Anglo-Chinese Wars of 1840-60. By the late 18th century China trailed Europe in every economic respect (section V-4.A.1), and China's government and infrastructure were crumbling (section II-8.F). China's heyday had long since passed (section V-2.B). Because China was in such sorry shape, Britain was able to quickly whip this colossal state with a few expeditionary troops half a world away from home. The first trade war (1839-42) cost China 30 million taels; a tenth as much as its late 18th century military campaigns; also a tenth as much as its suppressions of domestic rebellions between 1850 and 1868.¹ China's 19th century trade deficits, silver drain, and foreign debts including war indemnities and reparations, were tiny compared to what Britain and other European nations successfully coped with on a regular basis.² Narcotics importers caused various problems in China, as they do today in the U.S., but cannot be blamed for a regress of Chinese civilization. And the Chinese demand for opium and their distribution (and domestic production) of it throughout the country were largely responsible.³
2. The amount and effects of China's silver drain due to opium are much exaggerated; China's real currency problem was its lousy monetary system.
The amount and negative effects of China's silver drain due to opium trade have been greatly exaggerated.¹ China's entire silver loss amounted to perhaps a third of a gram to one gram per year per person.² Most of the silver that British opium traders obtained was promptly traded back for Chinese commodities such as tea.³ China's supply shrank in part because silver was hoarded and hidden by the Chinese people to avoid confiscation.⁴ And China's silver ingots (sycee) were traded at a discount for the more reliable foreign-minted silver coins.⁵ The chief problem with China's currency, acknowledged by some Chinese bureaucrats, was the limited and unreliable nature of China's money; due to lack of standards, debasement, counterfeiting, and lack of trust in government.⁶ The Chinese state was also foolish enough to close some silver mines and impose duties on silver imports.⁷
3. Chinese government and military officials fully collaborated with opium trade and distribution, as well as domestic production.
China, including its emperors and officials, had been using opium for centuries, and official bans did not reduce its demand.¹ The Chinese not only bought and abused the opium, but did all the distribution and selling within China, with the collaboration of a host of Chinese civilian and military officials.² The Chinese also produced a lot of opium domestically despite the bans,³ though they preferred the taste and quality of Indian opium supplied mainly by the British. The Chinese eventually succeeded in ending the British/Indian competition by falsely committing to end their own production, thus leaving the field open for their depredations.⁴ Chinese officials and militias brutally forced great numbers of Chinese to cultivate opium for plunder, sometimes using official bans and fines as tools of extortion.⁵ Chinese soldiers were paid in opium plots or directly in opium.⁶ The Chinese government meanwhile proclaimed to the world that it was doing everything possible to halt the trade.⁷
4. Given the Chinese high demand and extensive collaboration, stopping the opium trade to China was impossible.
Given the extensive collaboration of Chinese officials, denying the Chinese demand for opium was impossible; it was just a question of who would do the selling.¹ Opium was in fact legal in much of the world, much used and traded at the time.² In order to avoid the problems of underground trade, legalization was increasingly advocated by Chinese bureaucrats, international observers, and Christian missionaries.³ In the Malay country and the Dutch East Indies, sale of opium was legalized only for Chinese residents, because it was understood that trying to prevent them from obtaining it was not worth the trouble.⁴ When legalization was agreed to after the Second Anglo-Chinese War (1860), Chinese consumption of opium did not increase, according to a study of export rates and prices.⁵ A big reduction in Chinese opium abuse was achieved in the mid-20th century via the draconian tactics of the Communists, but today China is once again experiencing an opioid epidemic.⁶
5. The Anglo-Chinese Wars were launched against China's unfair trade and negotiation policies, not its opium embargo.
The aims of the British and other European governments in their wars against China were not opium profits, but trading rights in general, respectful treatment for diplomats, and legal safeguards for European citizens in China.¹ The British government and people didn't care much for the drug smugglers and tended to sympathize with China in this regard.² Just as they do today, the Chinese played hardball with foreign traders, wanting to sell but not to buy. Europe's diplomats and trade representatives were confined to a certain area and treated according to China's ancient tribute system, required to give tribute gifts and to kowtow before the emperor.³ European citizens in China were occasionally abused or killed by China's arbitrary and cruel legal system.⁴ Europe's demands imposed in the treatises pertained to these issues and not to opium; though China was pressured to legalize it after the second war, largely in the interests of law and order.⁵ However, legalization evidently did not increase China's opium consumption.⁶
6. The Anglo-Chinese Wars shocked the insular Chinese into engaging with the modern world.
Survival of the fittest and struggle for territory are laws of nature that men disobey at their peril. This remains true even when in times of affluence utopians dream of international brotherhood. A wealthy, arrogant people who get over-civilized and drop their guard will get their comeuppance. China got theirs. There is no way to fully justify the spankings Europe gave them. They weren't nice. The strong took advantage of the weak. However, China herself and all other great nations have taken advantage of weak neighbors and aggressed them as far as their capabilities permitted. From China's standpoint, at least the European incursions shocked them into realizing that they weren't so superior as they thought, and catalyzed them to engage with and learn from the modern, White-created world.
Sources:
Note on the sources: As my purpose is to inform and elucidate, I prepared citations for most of the sources of this essay; they are indicated below by the "-----"s. I will not post them publically, out of concern for a possible copyright flagging. But I invite anyone interested to contact me with an email address, at twitter.com/FrankJ1232, gab.ai/FrankJ1232, or marshaelwood@artlover.com. The text file is 1.8MB.
➜ I.:
1. • "-----" [Jones 87:226]
2. • "-----" [Jones 87:212] • "-----" [Landes 98:23] • "-----" [Stover 76:86] • On the great fertility of China's alluvial plains, see section V-1.A-D and its sources.
3. • See section V-1.B-C and its sources. • "-----" [Ferguson 11:26] • "-----" [Vries 13:181]
4. • ----- [Landes 98:23-8]. • "-----" [Jones 87:10] • "-----" [McClellan 06:36-7]
5. • "-----" [Gies 94:41] • "-----" [Wenke 80:304] • "-----" [Jones 87:227] • "-----" [Jones 87:8-9]
6. • "-----" [Jones 87:10]
7. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:135] • "-----" [Jones 87:212-3] • "-----" [Elvin 73:306]
8. • "-----" [Qian 85:109] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:47-8] • "-----" [Landes 98:32]
9. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:31] • "-----" [Vries 03:28] ; "-----" [31] ; "-----" [57]
10. • See section II-8.B-C and its sources. • ----- [Stover 76:108-14]: ----- • "-----" [Elvin 73:258-60]
11. • See section II-5.A and its sources. • "-----" [Bond 91:36]
➜ II-1.:
1. • "-----" [Bond 86:143] • "-----" [Bond 91:36-7] • "-----" [Townsend 33:114]
2. • See the citations above. • "-----" [Bond 91:11]
3. • "-----" [Bond 91:52] • Intermediaries are regularly used even for marriage arrangements: "-----" [Dawson 78:142] • "-----" [Smith 94:250-1]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/in-out-groups/
4. • "-----" [Bond 91:54-5] ; "-----" [65] ; "-----" [66] • On the Chinese military's tendency to resolve disputes with a minimum of actual fighting, see section II-6.C and its sources.
5. • "-----" [Bond 91:66] • ----- [Smith 94:219-22].
6. • See section IV-I.B and its sources. • "-----" [Bodde 91:292] ; "-----" [307-8] • "-----" [Townsend 33:104]
7. • -----: "-----" [Townsend 33:227] • -----: "-----" [Parfitt 12:98] • "-----" [Bodde 91:189-90]
8. • See section II-6.C and its sources.
➜ II-2.:
1. • "-----" [Smith 94:244] • "-----" [Dawson 78:139]
2. • -----the prevalent refusal of Chinese to answer his simple inquiries, in [Parfitt 12:36,81,100-2,196,221]. "-----" [196] • ----- [Smith 94:250-3,208-9]
3. • "-----" [Bond 91:75-6] • "-----" [Elvin 73:295] • "-----" [Townsend 33:13-4]
4. • "-----" [Elvin 73:297]
5. • See [Elvin 73:295] citation, above. • "-----" [Smith 94:254-5]
6. • "-----" [Townsend 33:211]
7. • On Europe's interest rates being much lower than China's since Medieval times, see section IV-3.J and its sources. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:28] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:198-9] • -----: "-----" [Smith 94:255-6]
8. • See section II-6.A and its sources. • "-----" [Vries 15:262]
9. • See section II-5.A and its sources.
➜ II-3.:
1. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:70] • On the incredibly brutal 20th-century impressment and treatment of Chinese soldiers and laborers, even women, see [Townsend 33:53-6]. On the merciless exploitation and plundering of Chinese citizens by officials, see [Townsend 33:227-8,232,238-9]. • On the the brutal, mass-compulsion of Chinese farmers to grow opium (on pain of death) in the 19th-20th centuries, see section V-4.E.3 and its sources. • Twentieth-century nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, rival of the Communists, was also a ruthless mass-murderer: [Parfitt 12:59,157-60,327-33]
2. • On the arbitrary and hellish cruelties of 19th-20th century Chinese law enforcement, see [Townsend 33:58-61,109-12,190-1]. • See [Smith 94:210-5,229-35]; "-----" [234-5] • More on Chinese punishing whole families for the crimes of individual members in section II-7.C and its sources. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:120] • "-----" [Dawson 78:162] • Chinese law enforcement remains arbitrary and brutal today, with tortuous interrogations and punishments, tiny prison cells in brutal "Black Jails", and slave labor. Video selection:
World's Most Brutal Prison is in China.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lz0bb15kTkE
"Black" Jails in China.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAPWF3BH8mE
Slavery thrives in Chinese prisons.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yumfVvJFUw8
China's Black Jails Still Exist: Amnesty International.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxYF8VwZLnE
Breaking footage : China's Brutal Labor Camps, Part 1.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqsY9eB1HD4
Stretch Torture Method Alive in China.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lR-vhNf_FKE
Is This What Justice Is in China?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqK5Hrn-4Fk
China's Gestapo: the 6-10 Office.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5N6il1oQm_w
• Prisoners also get their organs extracted; see section II-8.D and its sources.
3. • On the fiendish cruelties committed by the Chinese Communists, see [Parfitt 12:155-6,161-70,214-5]. • See also: [Epoch 12], [Akbar 10], [Edwards 10].
4. • The Chinese evince a stunning callousness toward people afflicted with accidents and misfortunes. "-----" [Townsend 33:51] ; "-----" [54-5] ; "-----" [56-7] ; "-----" [64-5] • "-----" [Smith 94:207-8] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:160] ; "-----" [62-3] • A couple of recent examples given here.:
Bystanders’ Neglect of Injured Toddler Sets Off Soul-Searching on Web Sites in China.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/19/world/asia/toddlers-accident-sets-off-soul-searching-in-china.html
5. • "-----" [Bond 91:93] • ----- in [Smith 94:196-204].
6. • The terrible cruelty of "foot-binding" (bone-breaking) young girls, which ended only in the 20th century, is fairly well known. A video:
Living History: Bound Feet Women of China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6vVb2V9xt0o
• "-----" [Townsend 33:61-3] • "-----" [Engelen 05:337-8] • "-----" [Vri2 27]
7. • A few articles on the well-known Chinese cruelty to animals:
“Boiled Alive Cat” Prepared, Served In Guangzhou Restaurants
http://www.chinasmack.com/2010/pictures/boiled-alive-cat-prepared-served-in-guangzhou-restaurants.html
End the cruelty: Join our campaign to end sick Chinese festival where they skin and boil dogs ALIVE for food
https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/1205737/end-the-cruelty-join-our-campaign-to-end-sick-chinese-festival-where-they-skin-and-boil-dogs-alive-for-food/
Inside the Disturbing World of Bear-Bile Farming
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/160505-asiatic-bear-bile-trade-laos/
Dog and cat fur and leather trade – a horror beyond belief
http://www.galgoamigo.com/dog-and-cat-fur-and-leather-trade.html
Horrific animal cruelty that shames China: Wild mob kill dogs just for WALKING into a city
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/441130/Animal-cruelty-in-China-exposed-as-dogs-killed-in-street-by-laughing-mob-including-police
• The Chinese are responsible for most of the world's demand of endangered animal parts, putting these precious animals in severe danger of extinction. China's recent proclamations of 'official bans' on imports such as ivory are worthless, especially as over 90% of the trade is 'underground'. Articles:
Traditional Chinese Medical Authorities Are Unable to Stop the Booming Trade in Rare Animal Parts
http://time.com/4578166/traditional-chinese-medicine-tcm-conservation-animals-tiger-pangolin/
From tiger paws to bear testicles, the bizarre animal parts on sale in China's 'medicine markets' where the more endangered a species is, the more healing qualities it is believed to have
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3021541/From-crocodile-jaws-bear-testicles-bizarre-animal-parts-sale-China-s-medicine-markets-endangered-species-healing-qualities-believed-have.html
China defends use of wild animals in traditional medicine
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-endangered-idUSKCN0ZI0GB
How China, Asia Fuel Poaching of Endangered Animals
https://www.seeker.com/how-china-asia-fuel-poaching-of-endangered-animals-1838662798.html
An alarming map of the global ivory trade that killed 17,000 elephants in one year
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/03/15/an-alarming-map-of-the-global-ivory-trade-that-killed-17000-elephants-in-one-year/
China’s Ban On The Ivory Trade Is Simply Not Enough
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rachael-willis-/chinas-ban-on-the-ivory-trade_b_14243416.html
8. • China has a severe shortage of voluntary organ donors. The regime occasionally releases exaggerated (though still very low) figures, but sometimes the truth gets out: "-----" Source:
China's Secret Holocaust Part 1 [0:55-1:10]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5pojQ12lRI
9. • It is possible that lower sympathy in Chinese is partly due to lower sensitivity to pain; "-----" [Townsend 33:67-70] • "-----" [Smith 94:94-6]
➜ II-4.:
1. • On this key point, that lying is a matter of course for Chinese, I must cite Townsend and others at length: "-----" [Townsend 33:6-8] ; "-----" [88-9] ; "-----" [92] ; "-----" [95] ; More on the amazing dishonesty of Chinese in [Townsend 33:6-8,88-100]. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:118] ; "-----" [181] ; "-----" [224] ; "-----" [287] ; "-----" [299] • No author on this, but still interesting: "People in China lie all the time about this and that. Teenagers lie about their age to get jobs. Workers lie when they are negotiating so they can a better job."
http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat4/sub18/item116.html
2. • See section II-1 and its sources on Chinese being reluctant to talk to strangers. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:196]
3. • Discussion and several examples of this are given by Townsend and Troy Parfitt in [Townsend 33:5,19-22,49,90-1] and [Parfitt 12:88,102,137-42,148]: • "-----" [Townsend 33:19-20] ; "-----" [49] ; "-----" [21-2] ; "-----" [90-1] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:88] ; "-----" [102] ; "-----" [137-8]
4. This well-known fact is usually admitted to only with rationalizations, such as: • "-----" [Nisbett 03:196-7] and: • "-----" [Bond 91:87] • "-----" [Townsend 33:98-100] ; "-----" [49]
5. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:103] ; "-----" [154] • "-----". [Smith 94:18] • Bo Yang was an honest Chinese man: "-----" [Yang 84]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/cult-of-face/
6. • "-----" [Towsend 33:123-4]; See also [157-8,229-30,242]. ; "-----" [95] • "-----" [Smith 94:283-4]
7. • "-----" [Towsend 33:22] ; "-----" [192] ; "-----" [313-5] ; "-----" [241] • "-----" [Smith 94:16]
8. • "-----" [Townsend 33:101-2] ; "-----" [73-4]
9. • "-----" [Towsend 33:94-5]
➜ II-5.A.:
1. • This is evident, for one thing, in the massive number and size of (international) charity organizations in White nations, and the amount of foreign aid they give. Proving higher levels of charitable giving empirically can hardly be done because of the many complicating factors, such as differing wealth/poverty of countries and differing levels of taxation (and charitable deduction policies) and welfare spending by governments. Survey 'data' is almost worthless due to differing honesty levels. But proof is hardly necessary given how obsessed Whites are with taking care of the world, and the lack of such sentiment in others. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:123]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/in-out-groups/
• "-----" [Townsend 33:208-9] • Whites' greater concern for their community and nation is evident in their greater patriotism. When White nations are attacked, the whole nation comes together to organize in defense. When China is attacked, its every warlord for himself. See the next section and its sources.
2. • "-----" [Townsend 33:316] • "-----" [Smith 94:276-7] • Among Chinese, it's improper to even receive help or make a request without acknowledging one's obligation to somehow repay it in the future: "-----" [Bond 91:60]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/guanxi/
3. • The greater Chinese reluctance to be friendly toward strangers (section II-1) and to help strangers in distress (section II-3) evinces a lower regard for outgroup; see these sections and their sources. • "-----" [Bond 91:56-7] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:123-4] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:247-8] • No author on this, but still interesting: "Chinese tend to be very formal and have an us versus them attitude towards outsiders. Their formality persists until one is allowed on the inside of their group, which is something that usually takes place over time and requires following established protocol and recognizing hierarchies and showing proper respect to achieve."
http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat4/sub18/item116.html
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/in-out-groups/
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/chinese-etiquette-tips/
• "-----" [Smith 94:208]
4. • "-----" [Townsend 33:23]
5. • "-----" [Qian 85:23] ; "-----" [27] ; "-----" [31] ; "-----" [90] • "-----" [Dawson 78:30] • "-----" [Yang 84] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:247-8] • "-----" [Bond 91:84] ; "-----" [54-5] • "-----" [Townsend 33:13-4] ; "-----" [194] ; "-----" [48] ; "-----" [242-3] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:169-70] ; "-----" [170] ; "-----" [224] ; "-----" [387] • Taiwan is largely run by gangsters, and its legislature has big brawls [Parfitt 12:343,372-3]
6. • "-----" [Cohen 10:3] • "-----" [Basalla 88:175] • Up till its defeat in the Anglo-Chinese Wars of the late 19th century, the Chinese regarded all foreigners as so inferior that they could not negotiate with China except in accordance with its humiliating tribute system, e.g. requiring them to kowtow before the emperor. See section V-4.E.5 and its sources. • ----- [Townsend 33:29-30] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:274-6] • "-----" [Townsend 33:260-2] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:261-2]
➜ II-5.B.:
1. • "-----" [Bond 91:56-7] • Parfitt goes into much detail on his perpetual encounters with Chinese rudeness, including loud, inconsiderate speech, pushy walking, and obstructive standing in [Parfitt 12:61,79,90,145,188-9,211-2,241,251,282] ; "-----" [61] ; "-----" [188-9] • "-----" [Yang 84]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/chinese-etiquette-tips/
; "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/in-out-groups/
• Various webpages on Chinese rudeness:
Mobile Savagery: China Meets An Unprepared World
https://theawl.com/mobile-savagery-china-meets-an-unprepared-world-65c923def411
How Chinese Tourists Usurped the Ugly Americans
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/05/how-ugly-chinese-tourists-became-new-ugly-americans/314773/
Wooing, and Also Resenting, Chinese Tourists
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/business/chinese-tourists-spend-and-offend-freely.html
Why are Chinese tourists so rude? A few insights
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1251239/why-are-chinese-tourists-so-rude
Why Won’t the Chinese Line Up?
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/frank-h-wu/why-wont-the-chinese-line_b_5387959.html
• The same Chinese who are reluctant to answer inquiries by visitors who need help (section II-1-2 and sources), are prompt to ask visitors personal questions: ; "-----" [Townsend 33:107-8]
; "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/chinese-etiquette-tips/
2. • "-----" [Yang 84] • A Canadian traveller in China, Troy Parfitt, describes in appalling detail the filthy, unkept conditions of contemporary China; in Chinese neighborhoods [Parfitt 12: 52,77,119-20,150-1,154,179,196,211,227-8,267]; restaurants [85,75,251]; transportation facilities [61,79,85,118,145,282-3]; recreational areas [76]; hospitals [277-8]; and toilets [86,220,267,277,283,386]; "-----" [61] • "-----" [Townsend 33:74-7] ; "-----" [45] ; "-----" [312] • "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/in-out-groups/
; "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/chinese-etiquette-tips/
3. • Parfitt reviews some of the staggering facts of Chinese pollution in this video, such as only 1% of urban residents breath air considered safe, 700,000 deaths per year from air pollution, 80% of cities have no sewage treatment facilities, 43% of their river water isn't fit for human contact and 75% unfit for fishing, etc.
China's Staggering Pollution Problems.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QyrIY4W3oJM
• Other videos on the world's pollution king:
101 East - China's dirty secrets
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pLwVycO7V-k
China's "Cancer Villages" Acknowledged by Government Report
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DpvH4ShAwsY
Age of China: "Cancer Villages"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jTlc-Xiszjw
China's 'cancer villages' reveal dark side of economic boom
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2tmLTsFyAY
10 Images Show China's Doomsday Air Pollution
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SEwNyJUYg7w
• China tops world for air pollution and carbon emissions, officials admit.
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2051914/china-tops-world-air-pollution-and-carbon-emissions
• Lefties love to berate White people about ocean polution, but of course Whites do hardly any of it: "-----"
Asia’s rivers send more plastic into the ocean than all other continents combined
https://qz.com/1004589/80-of-plastic-in-the-ocean-can-be-traced-back-to-asias-rivers-led-by-china-indonesia-myanmar-a-study-by-netherland-based-the-ocean-cleanup-found/
4. • Some websites will do:
How an industry helps Chinese students cheat their way into and through U.S. colleges
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/college-cheating-iowa/
How a Chinese company bought access to admissions officers at top U.S. colleges
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/college-charity/
How top U.S. colleges hooked up with controversial Chinese companies
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/college-charities/
How Asian test-prep companies swiftly exposed the brand-new SAT
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/college-sat-two/
SAT Scores of Asian Students Cancelled Over Cheating
https://blogs.voanews.com/student-union/2017/02/27/sat-scores-of-asian-students-cancelled-over-cheating/
Why do Chinese students think it’s OK to cheat?
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1974986/why-do-chinese-students-think-its-ok-cheat
New Analysis: Foreign Students Five Times As Likely To Cheat In College
http://dailycaller.com/2016/06/05/students-from-china-are-cheating-like-crazy-in-college/
Chinese students found cheating to get into U.S. colleges
http://money.cnn.com/2014/07/01/pf/college/chinese-students-cheating/index.html
A Q and A about cheating among Chinese students
http://www.davisenterprise.com/local-news/ucd/a-q-and-a-about-cheating-among-chinese-students/
Truth and Lies and Cheating in China
http://www.hackwriters.com/Teachingchina.htm
Chinese school uses ‘newspaper hats’ to stop cheating: It’s hilarious, but effective!
http://indianexpress.com/article/trending/bizarre/chinese-school-uses-newspaper-hats-to-stop-cheating-its-hilarious-but-effective-4457513/
Asian Immigrants and What No One Mentions Aloud [high school cheating, etc]
https://educationrealist.wordpress.com/2013/10/08/asian-immigrants-and-what-no-one-mentions-aloud/
5. • See the note 1 sources of the last section. Chinese racial pride and zenophobia, their contempt for foreigners (discussed in the last section), is of course not the same as self-sacrificing patriotism for country. • "-----" [Dawson 78:89-91] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:270]
6. • "-----" [Vries 15:411] • "-----" [Townsend 33:200-7] ; "-----" [206] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:134-5]
➜ II-6.A.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 15:258] ; "-----" [262] ; "-----" [256] ; "-----" [258] ; "-----" [259-60] ; "-----" [261] • "-----" [Polachek 92:104-5] • Arthur Smith wrote late in the 19th century: "-----" [Smith 94:255] • Ralph Townsend in 1930: "-----" [Townsend 33:37]
https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/eastern-asia/china/cons-scams-and-counterfeit-money
• Today: "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/avoiding-scams/
2. • "-----" [Polachek 92:104-5] • -----: "-----" [Smith 94:255] • -----: "-----" [Townsend 33:37-8]
3. • "-----" [Smith 94:280-1] • Articles:
Avoiding common tourist scams in China, by China Mike.
http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/avoiding-scams/
Common scams in China - How to avoid them
https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/eastern-asia/china/cons-scams-and-counterfeit-money
Top Ten Scams in Beijing
http://www.chinahighlights.com/beijing/article-top-10-scams.htm
22 Most Common Tourist Scams in China
http://travelscams.org/asia/common-tourist-scams-china/
4. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:75] • Videos:
5 Fake Foods in China That Are Totally Disgusting
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eb20RAip3l0
Fake food scandal continues to rock China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jgHOI4U5xxM
Food safety in China: Noodle factory's dirty secrets
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KRcfzL23kUM
Rat MEAT Sold As Lamb In China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pXMIgHEXkyw
Toxic Fake Food Items Produced in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H322IqmT5ws
Beware of fake eggs from China - Boycott made in China products
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGvnsrSqZic
China_ Faking It -101 East (fake antiques/art)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I-DXKEHkcZk
5. • "China's fakes trade is an estimated 8% of its booming economy." [5:30]; Faking clothing brands, golf clubs, sports equipment, etc.
PRC- People's Republic of Counterfeit - The Fake Trade Part A 2/4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E617D33UQgQ
➜ II-6.B.:
1. • Confucianism, the prevalent ethics system in China, is largely about respecting hierarchies: ruler to subject, father to son, husband to wife, and elder to younger. See section II-8.B and its sources. • "-----" [Dawson 78:163]
2. • Many laws and punishments in China were/are based on the relative status of offender and victim, with higher status advantaged and lower status disadvantaged. See [Bodde 91:197-8]; [Fairbank 76:121-2]; [Dawson 78:163] • Chinese officials had various legal privileges and were exempt from various criminal laws; [Dawson 78:50-1]; [Fairbank 57:245-6].
3. • On the Chinese state's despotic power and exploitation and its citizens' lack of rights, see section II-8.B-D and its sources. • On the pervasive corruption in China, that demanded payment for any and all government services rendered, see section II-8.E and its sources. • On China's brutal, state oppressions, see section II-3 and its sources. • "-----" [Smith 94:285]
4. • Family patriarchs had nearly absolute power over the labor and lives of their women and children, and a daughter-in-law is more a work slave to her in-laws than a wife to her husband; see section II-7.B and its sources. • Girls were routinely dealt the horrible torture of foot binding; see section II-3 and its sources. • Beyond foot-binding, daughters (-in-law), often sold as child-brides, are often treated brutally and their only recourse is suicide. Read [Smith 94:198-204] for unsavory details. • The beauty of women is greatly subordinated, with severe restrictions on sex (and women considered dirty after menstruation, etc.), largely to minimize her power. See [Bodde 91:271-81]; [Nakamura 64:261-3]; [Bond 91:62-3]. ; "-----" [Bodde 91:275] • "-----" [Engelen 05:335]
5. • "-----" [Bond 91:72] ; "-----" [85] ; "-----" [79-80] ; "-----" [82-3] • "-----" [Townsend 33:5] • "-----" [Smith 94:282] • Workers in China are ruthlessly exploited, with no rights, few safety regulations, endless work hours, and few breaks. Some videos:
Santa's Workshop - Inside China's Slave Labour Toy Factories
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yF8jUDzz5bE
China Factories, Brutal Conditions Described
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQPrbwWWUD4
Inside Look at Sweatshop in China Where Children Work 20 Hour Days
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ev4Gyvz8AhQ
Sweatshops in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wmEkdkQlMM
➜ II-6.C.:
1. • Bodde explains that China's expansion was due more to gradual emigration and contradictory agricultural systems, than to aggressive warfare [Bodde 91:250-2]; "-----" [252] • Even when Chinese loudly berate each other, it seldom leads to a physical fight; see section II-1 and its sources. • Townsend discusses the timidity (to put it mildly) of Chinese military and soldiers in [Townsend 33:103-5,215-6,285]; "-----" [216] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:70] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:130]
2. • See the Parfitt citation in the last note. • "-----" [Landes 06:19] ; "-----" [Landes 98:53]
3. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:138] • "-----" [Qian 85:90] ; "-----" [31] • "-----" [Deng 03:36-8] • "-----" [Chen 90:5] • "-----" [Bryant 06:425] • Today: "-----" [Parfitt 12:170]
➜ II-7.A.:
1. • "-----" [Bond 91:56] ; "-----" [6-7] ; "-----" [36-7] • "-----" [Dawson 78:139]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/chinese-etiquette-tips/
2. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:24-5]
3. • See next paragraph and its sources.
➜ II-7.B.:
1. • "-----" [Dawson 78:138]
2. • "-----" [Dawson 78:140] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:265-6] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:21-2] ; "-----" [23] ; "-----" [23-4]
3. • See the citations in the previous note. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:262] • "-----" [Dawson 78:147] ; "-----" [269-70] ; "-----" [145-6] ; "-----" [146] • See the note below on daughter-in-laws.
4. • See the [Dawson 78:140] citation, above. ; "-----" [139] • "-----" [Engelen 05:308]
5. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:24-5] • "-----" [Zanden 09a:108] • "-----" [Engelen 05:222-3] ; "-----" [285] ; "-----" [308]
6. • "-----" [Bond 91:6]
7. • "-----" [Dawson 78:140] ; "-----" [163] • Chinese parents could appeal to local Mandarins to exact severe punishment on disobediant offspring; "-----" [Engelen 05:220-2] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:121-2]
8. • "-----" [Bodde 91:196]
9. • "-----" [Engelen 05:224]
10. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:22] • "-----" [Bodde 91:275] • "-----" [Dawson 78:143] ; "-----" [144] • "-----" [Engelen 05:272-3] • "-----" [Townsend 33:106] • "-----" [Smith 94:201-2]
11. • See the [Engelen 05:222-3] citation, above.
12. • "-----
" [Engelen 05:225-6] ; "-----" [306] ; "-----" [308-9]
➜ II-7.C.:
1. • "-----" [Dawson 78:137] ; "-----" [140] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:21]
2. • "-----" [Dawson 78:114] ; "-----" [140] ; "-----" [163] • "-----" [Townsend 33:109-10] • "-----" [Smith 94:234-5]
3. • "-----" [Bond 91:6] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:116] • "-----" [Townsend 33:119] See also the Townsend citations below.
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/guanxi/
4. • "-----" [Townsend 33:117-8]
5. • "-----" [Dawson 78:152-3] • "-----" [Bodde 91:198]
6. • See the previous sources.
7. • "-----" [Bond 91:6-7] • "-----" [Townsend 33:119] • "-----" [Smith 94:199] ; "-----" [172] ; "-----" [202]
➜ II-8.A.:
1. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:47-8] ; "-----" [63] ; "-----" [65-6] ; "-----" [Zanden 08:17-8] • "-----
" [Duchesne 11a:226]
2. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:482-3] • "-----" [Zanden 09a:295-6] • "-----" [Huff 11:306] • "-----" [Vries 15:414]
3. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:390]
4. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:466-70]
5. • "-----" [Haas 56:84-5]
6. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:275-6] • "-----" [Bodde 91:189-90] • "-----" [Huff 11:308+note25]
7. • "-----" [Landes 98:36-7] • "-----" [Zanden 08:18-20] • "-----" [Vries 13:380] • See the [Bekar 02:13-4] citation in section II-8.C, below. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:227-8]
8. • Chinese feality was absolute (above), Chinese nobles were fully at the mercy of the emperor (section II-8.B), and the examination system to admit officials was created in part to limit their power (section II-8.C) • On the lack of independence of Chinese religions, see section II-8.C and its sources. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:213] ; See the [Nakamura 64:214] citation, below.
9. • See the [Duchesne 11a:226] citation, above. • "-----" [Huff 11:5] • "-----" [Bodde 91:200] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:214] • "-----" [Chen 12:49] ; "-----" [58] • "-----" [Gupta 10:15-6] • "-----" [Vries 03:29-30] • "-----" [Townsend 33:237] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:170]
➜ II-8.B.:
1. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:271] • "-----" [Dawson 78:13] • "-----" [Jones 87:209] • "-----" [Landes 98:35] ; "-----" [335-6] ; "-----" [Landes 06:7-8]
2. • "-----" [Jones 87:3-5] • "-----" [Bodde 91:254] • "-----" [Fairbank 57:245]
3. • "-----" [Haas 56:84-5] • "-----" [Bond 91:58] • "-----" [Qian 85:115-6] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:136] ; "-----" [114] • "-----" [Vries 15:275]
4. • Chinese officials had various legal privileges and were exempt from various criminal laws. See [Dawson 78:50-1] and [Fairbank 57:245-6]; "-----" [246]
5. • See the sources on China's lack of written laws, above. • "-----" [Ni 05:2] ; "-----" [6-7] • "-----" [Smith 94:230] • "-----" [Dawson 78:194] • "-----" [Bond 91:85] ; "-----" [86]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/guanxi/
6. • See section II-3 and its sources. • "-----" [Dawson 78:45] ; "-----" [162] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:120] • "-----" [Townsend 33:111-2] ; "-----" [59-60]
7. • On Chinese government's brutal predations of its people, including military impressments, see section II-3 and its sources. • "-----" [Jones 87:165] ; "-----" [206] ; "-----" [10] • "-----" [Landes 06:37] • "-----" [Townsend 33:232] ; In [Townsend 33:11-2], -----.
8. • "-----" [Chen 12:58] • "-----" [Gelber 06:3-4] • "-----" [Townsend 33:118]
9. • "-----" [Qian 85:24] ; "-----" [106] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:265] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:133]
10. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:265-6]
➜ II-8.C.:
1. • "-----"
[Zanden 09a:47-9] • "-----" [Ferguson 11:39-41] • "-----" [Mokyr 05b:11] ; "-----" [Mokyr 06:24-5] • "-----" [Bryant 06:415-6]
2. • "-----*" [Dawson 78:33-4] * In fact, the civil service examinations remained often corrupt; see section II-8.E and its sources. • "-----" [Lin 08:14] • "-----" [Qian 85:107] • "-----" [Vries 15:271] • "-----" [Stover 76:132-3]
3. • "-----" [Dawson 78:52-3]
4. • "-----" [Dawson 78:164] ; "-----" [123-4] ; "-----" [167] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:273] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:132] • "-----" [Bodde 91:155]
5. • "-----" [McClellan 06:129-30] • "-----" [Huff 11:164] • "-----" [Bekar 02:21] • On China's civil service examinations being devoted to Confucian literature, see section IV-5.B and its sources. On Confucianism being an ethic of respect and obediance to superiors, see the previous section and its sources. • "-----" [Bodde 91:190-1] • "-----" [Qian 85:110] • More on Chinese astronomy being mainly astrology in section IV-6.D and its sources.
6. • "-----" [Bekar 02:13-4] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:276-7] ; Duchesne reviews the historical literature that shows medieval Christian scholars were okay with Greek-derived principles of reason and logic and the pursuit of understanding scientific natural laws in [Duchesne 14:64-71]. • "-----" [Gies 94:164]
7. • See the [Fairbank 76:136] and [Landes 06:7-8] citations in the last section's sources. • "-----
" [McClellan 06:123-4] • "-----" [Dawson 78:193-4]
8. • "-----" [Mo 04:6] ; "-----" [19] ; "-----
" [25-6] • "-----" [Landes 06:6] • "-----" [Vries 13:349] ; "-----" [Vries 15:353]
9. • "-----" [Vries 13:342] • "-----" [Vries 15:351]
10. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:48-9] • "-----" [Vries 15:234] ; "-----" [356] • "-----" [Maddison 05:62] • "-----" [McClellan 06:121] • "-----" [Chen 12:56]
➜ II-8.D.:
1. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:296-7] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:268]
2. • For gory details on the horrors of the imposition of Chinese Communism, see [Parfitt 12:161-70,214-5], [Epoch 12], [Akbar 10], [Edwards 10].
3. • Videos on China's well-known lack of rights and brutality:
Human Rights Violations in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWLvrErGKRY
What Are China's Human Rights Violations?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oo6wspVVjAA
China's human rights record - in 60 seconds
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=btbDzSGVxO8
TRT World - World in Focus: Human rights: China’s great challenge
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q5H4ORXW34A
The Most Dangerous Job in China [a human rights lawyer]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwdHyE8Xo3w
China's Darkside: what the mainstream media won't cover [home seizures, police brutality]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4As-dVqbQI
Is This What Justice Is in China?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RqK5Hrn-4Fk
China's Gestapo: the 6-10 Office
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5N6il1oQm_w
; Forced abortions:
Stop Forced Abortion -- China's One Child Policy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JjtuBcJUsjY
Forced Abortion To Meet China's One Child Policy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_dGjB4suxY
• Chinese are not even free to move about: "-----" [Parfitt 12:149-150] ; "-----" [170]
• There are of course few protections for workers. Some videos:
Santa's Workshop - Inside China's Slave Labour Toy Factories
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yF8jUDzz5bE
China Factories, Brutal Conditions Described
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yQPrbwWWUD4
Inside Look at Sweatshop in China Where Children Work 20 Hour Days
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ev4Gyvz8AhQ
Sweatshops in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wmEkdkQlMM
4. • Torture and enslavement without trial:
"Black" Jails in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAPWF3BH8mE
China's Black Jails Still Exist: Amnesty International
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AxYF8VwZLnE
Stretch Torture Method Alive in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lR-vhNf_FKE
World's Most Brutal Prison is in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lz0bb15kTkE
Breaking footage : China's Brutal Labor Camps, Part 1
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zqsY9eB1HD4
Slavery thrives in Chinese prisons
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yumfVvJFUw8
China's Labor Camp Secret
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W8sGJwsUFw4
"Utterly Destroyed" by Chinese Jail - Chinese Dissident Gao Zhisheng
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0lWsMze7m9k
5. • Articles:
China’s long history of harvesting organs from living political foes
http://nypost.com/2014/08/09/chinas-long-history-of-harvesting-organs-from-living-political-prisoners/
Report: China still harvesting organs from prisoners at a massive scale
http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/23/asia/china-organ-harvesting/index.html
The reality of human organ harvesting in China
http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/real-life/true-stories/the-reality-of-human-organ-harvesting-in-china/news-story/14d3aa5751c39d6639a1cc5b39f223b7
• Videos:
Stop Forced Live Organ Harvesting in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t9H_eessuvU
China's Secret Holocaust Part 1 [organ harvesting of political prisoners]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l5pojQ12lRI
China's Secret Holocaust Part 2
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYHKHNk7VLg
China's Secret Holocaust Part 3
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QElHH0vDWpU
China: Human Rights Violation [torturing Falon Gong]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zbDSOmTWU7U
6. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:72-3] • Videos on the well-known Chinese censorship:
Censorship in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7-1qrW6hFFc
China's Internet Censorship Explained
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Po9qrFyZOM8
How Strict Are China’s Censorship Laws?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJ0WVNrdWU0
China to Build Knockoff, Censored Wikipedia
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aE9yrREHZeE
Spread Rumors, Go to Jail Says New Chinese Law
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DJToPFW1bGg
➜ II-8.E.:
1. • "-----" [Bond 91:86] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:115-6] ; "-----" [116-7] • "-----" [Stover 76:114] ; "-----" [132-3] ; "-----" [136] • "-----" [Vries 15:156]; See the [Park 97] study of Chinese corruption. • "-----" [Vries 03:37] ; "-----" [Vries 15:97] ; "-----" [155-6] • "-----" [Townsend 33:25] • "-----" [Sng 14:34] • Chinese military leaders are usually happy to switch sides for the right price; see section II-5.B and its sources. • Chinese officials naturally collaborated very closely with illegal drug traders; see section V-4.E.3 and its sources. • On the prevalence of corruption in contemporary Communist China, see below.
2. • "-----" [Bond 91:86] • See the sources below in the on how corruption thrives in Communist China despite its politically-based 'anti-corruption campaigns'. • "-----" [Ni 05:9]
3. • "-----
" [Chen 12:55-6] • "-----" [Vries 03:37] ; "-----" [Vries 15:153-5] • "-----" [Ni 03:8-9] • "-----" [Sng 14:14]
4. • "-----" [Dawson 78:49-50] • "-----" [Townsend 33:231-2] • "-----"
https://www.npr.org/2017/10/24/559889548/a-look-at-how-chinas-anti-corruption-campaign-has-affected-ordinary-citizens
5. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:116] • "-----" [Stover 76:112] • See section II-6.B and its sources ([Townsend 33:5] and [Smith 94:282]).
6. • "-----" [Ni 05:6-7] • "-----" [Chen 12:55] • "-----" [Stover 76:113]
7. • "-----" [Fairbank 57:267] • "-----" [Vries 15:271] ; "-----
" [273] • "-----" [Bodde 91:219-20] • "-----" [Dawson 78:256-7] • "-----" [Fairbank 76:45-6]
8. • "-----" [Chen 12:55-6] • See the [Townsend 33:232] citation in section II-8.B.
9. • See section II-7.C and its sources.
10. • "-----" [Vries 15:197]
11. • "-----" [Sng 14:40]
12. • See the [Townsend 33:64-5] and [Parfitt 12:160] citations in the sources of section II-3. • "-----" [Smith 94:192]
13. • Prevalent corruption in China continues today. 'Anti-corruption campaigns' are thinly veiled political purges. Most officials convicted of corruption get their jobs back. Articles:
Why Corruption Is Here To Stay In China
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-corruption_us_58c866b2e4b01c029d7731ea
Growth and Corruption in China
https://www.chinacenter.net/2012/china_currents/11-2/growth-and-corruption-in-china/
What China's Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Really About
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/04/xi-jinping-china-corruption-political-culture/389787/
How Deng Xiaoping Helped Create a Corrupt China
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/opinion/bao-tong-how-deng-xiaoping-helped-create-a-corrupt-china.html
Crackdown in China: Worse and Worse
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/04/21/crackdown-in-china-worse-and-worse/
Understanding Chinese President Xi’s anti-corruption campaign
http://theconversation.com/understanding-chinese-president-xis-anti-corruption-campaign-86396
• Videos:
How Corrupt Is China?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v98rhzyXcGw
China's Killer Corruption Problem | China Uncensored
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xCxiDv7G3Co
Corruption in China - part 2 [Most officials convicted of corruption get their jobs back]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o_09r4Tge2Q
China: so corrupt even the police are protesting
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OT4v3m99IEA
Pattberg: Corruption in China
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUK_TcODci4
140,000 Chinese Officials Investigated for Corruption in 2011
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MHHgvG7tTNI
• "-----" [Parfitt 12:182] ; "-----" [372-3]
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/chinese-culture/understanding-chinese-mind/guanxi/
➜ II-8.F.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 13:378-9] ; "-----" [403] ; "-----" [Vries 15:225-6] ; "-----" [414] ; "-----" [Vries 03:29-30] ; "-----" [37-8]
2. • "-----" [Jones 87:206-7] • The Chinese regime's propensity to impede and restrict people's organizations and activities is reviewed in section II-8.C and its sources.
3. • See section II-6.C and its sources.
4. • "-----
" [Sng 14:5-6] ; "-----" [30-8] • "-----
" [Vries 15:96-7] ; "-----" [141] ; "-----" [Vries 03:37-8] ; "-----" [Vries 13:405] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:234] • "-----" [Jones 87:209]
5. • Vries briefly reviews European welfare policies ~1600-1900 and counters ridiculous propaganda that China provided more poor relief than Europe, in [Vries 15:193-204]. ; "-----" [195-7]
6. • See section II-5.B and its sources.
➜ III.:
Sourcing note: Section III is mostly my original work, based on years of thought on the subject. I occassionally come across writings that 'corroborate' of some of my ideas that I could append as "sources", but this would be misleading. I prefer to let my ideas in this theory section stand on their own.
➜ III-3.B.:
*Note: In considering RSMs that less-fully match a situation, C-Int basically assumes that less of the detail observed in phenomena is necessary cause that must exist in order for the outcome (or at least a basic aspect of it) to occur. A converse way of looking at this is that concretely-perceiving M-Int, which narrows its RSM search to stronger matches, regards more of the contextual detail in observed phenomena to be causative, i.e. as necessary cause that must exist in order for the outcome to occur. Thus, when a generally similar situation is experienced in the future, that associated contextual detail in the RSM prevents it from matching the new, similar situation, and so that outcome is not considered as a possibility. This greater assumption of contextual causation by M-Int accounts for the observation by [Nisbett 03:112-5;129-30] that Asians regard more "situational factors" as causal/relevant, while Whites are more likely to regard personality traits and dispositions (i.e. principles of abstractly-similar past behavior) as causal. It is also for this reason that Asians feel less surprised by anomalous outcomes (section III-2.E), i.e. that Asians have much greater 'hindsight bias' with regard to situations having an outcome contrary to what was expected [Nisbett 03:131-3]: they assume that unique contextual detail of the situation was causative of its unique outcome, and that therefore no other RSMs are applicable to it and so its unusual outcome should have been expected. If you read Nisbett, be aware that the data he provides is merely grist for the steady diet of anti-White propaganda he cooks up, playing down/hyping up every White/Asian superiority to the max.
➜ IV-1.A.:
1. • "-----" [Duchesne 04:188] ; After recounting how vigorously the Classical Greeks explored and mapped the known world, he writes: "-----" [192-3] ; Ricardo Duchesne also wrote a general study of Whites' historical preeminence in exploration, including the Hellenes, Norsemen, the Age of Discovery Europeans, and modern explorers: A Civilization of Explorers (2012). [Duchesne 12] ; "-----" [72] ; "-----" [73] ; "-----
" [79] • "-----" [Landes 98:96] • "-----" [Bodde 91:251]
2. • "-----" [Duchesne 12:69] ; "-----" [89]
3. • "-----" [Vries 15:359-61] • "-----" [Qian 85:73]
4. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:46] ; "-----" [63] ; "-----" [113]
5. • "-----" [White 62:133-4] • "-----" [Gimpel 76:127;127-146] • "-----" [McClellan 06:270-1] • "-----" [Landes 98:284] • "-----" [Basalla 88:69-71]
6. • On Whites' preeminence in science and China's shortcomings, see section V-3.A-D and its sources. • On China's failure to develop the scientific method and scientific principles, see section IV-5.A-B and its sources. • White science has been superior to Chinese since the classic Greeks: "-----" [Qian 85:47] • "-----" [Huff 11:151-2] ; "-----" [186;176-86]
7. • "-----" [Huff 11:4-5] ; "-----" [19] ; "-----" [106-8] ; "-----" [109] ; "-----" [112-3] ; "-----" [Huff 11:205-7] • "-----" [Mokyr 09:78]
8. • On Europe's glorious architecture, largely an aesthetic pursuit, see section V-2.G.1 and its sources. • Development of sophisticated power machinery was a subject of vivid imagination by Europeans. See section IV-2.B and its sources. • "-----" [Cipolla 80:180-1] • "-----" [White 62:124-6]
➜ IV-1.B.:
1. • "-----" [Townsend 33:114] • "-----" [Smith 94:92-3]
2. • "-----" [Townsend 33:19] ; "-----" [113-4] ; "-----" [224] • "-----" [Smith 94:92] ; "-----" [154]
3. • "-----" [Townsend 33:225-6] • "-----" [Smith 94:44-6]
4. • See section II-1 and its sources. • See the [Smith 94:92] citation, above.
5. • "-----" [Bodde 91:292] ; "-----" [307-8] • "-----" [Townsend 33:104]
6. • "-----" [Parfitt 12:76] • "-----" [Townsend 33:104] • See the [Smith 94:92-3] citation, above.
7. • The only two players born in China who have ever played in MLB are White: Harry Kingman and Austin Brice.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Major_League_Baseball_players_from_China
➜ IV-2.A.:
1. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:180] ; "-----" [235] • "-----" [Bodde 91:287]
2. • "-----" [Dawson 78:168-9] • "-----
" [Nakamura 64:235-6] • "-----" [Townsend 33:150-1]
3. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:196;201-2] ; "-----" [236] ; "-----
" [239-40]
4. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:244]
5. • "-----" [Townsend 33:189-90] • A review of the writings and ideas of leading Chinese philosophers, such as Confucius, evinces that they are simplistic compared to the writings and ideas of the great White philosophers. No groundbreaking Chinese work has been written in the past 2,000 years.
6. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:204-5] • "-----" [Bodde 91:74-85] • This prevalent plagiarism continues today: "-----" [Kanazawa 06:4-5] • "-----" [Dawson 78:80] ; "-----" [248]
7. • "-----" [Dawson 78:235-6] • "-----" [Bodde 91:34-5]
8. • "-----" [Dawson 78:201] ; "-----" [208] ; "-----" [210-1] ; "-----" [214-5]
9. • "-----" [Dawson 78:219] ; "-----" [231]
10. • "-----" [Penyeh 98:3] In other words, there are a few marginal exceptions to China's simple music among China's minority nationalities.
11. • See section V-3.M and its sources.
➜ IV-2.B.:
1. • See in section IV-1.A the sources on science being a close cousin of exploration. • "-----" [Basalla 88:67-9] ; "-----" [71-2] ; "-----" [75-7] • "-----" [Gimpel 76:142]
2. • "-----" [Basalla 88:77]
➜ IV-3.B.:
1. • [Nisbett 03:93-5]; [Masuda 06].
2. • [Nisbett 03:89-92]; [Masuda 01]; [Chua 05].
3. • [Nisbett 03:101-2]
4. • [Kitayama 03]
5. • [Bond 91:23]
6. • [McKone 10]
7. • [Rozin 16]
➜ IV-3.C.:
1. • "-----" [Chua 05]
2. • "-----" [Gutchess 06]
➜ IV-3.D.:
1. • [Bond 91:23-4]; [Bond 86:53]; [Nisbett 03:140-1].
2. • [Nisbett 03:81-2]
➜ IV-3.E.:
1. • [Nisbett 03:168-9]
2. • [Nisbett 03:169-71]
3. • [Nisbett 03:171-3]
➜ IV-3.F.:
1. • [Nisbett 03:173-4]
2. • [Nisbett 03:186-7]
3. • [Nisbett 03:186]
4. • [Nisbett 03:180-3]
➜ IV-4.A.:
1. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:177-8]
2. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:179-80] • "-----" [Bodde 91:106-7]
3. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:178-9] ; "-----" [185-6]
➜ IV-4.B.:
1. • "-----" [Bodde 91:91] ; Detailed discussion by Bodde of parallelism and antithesis and their consequences on pages [42-54].
2. • "-----" [Bodde 91:45]
3. • "-----" [Dawson 78:235-6] • "-----" [Qian 85:59]
➜ IV-4.C.:
1. • "-----" [Hannas 03:216-7] • "-----" [Qian 85:67] • "-----" [Bodde 91:96]
2. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:177] ; "-----" [186-8] ; "-----" [189] • "-----" [Dawson 78:235-6] • "-----" [Bodde 91:32-4]
3. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:204-5] • "-----" [Bodde 91:74-6] ; "-----" [85] • "-----" [Qian 85:59]
4. • "-----" [Bodde 91:91] • On the lack of quotation marks, see the [Bodde 91:74-6] citation, above. • On the lack of punctuation and capitalization, see the [Qian 85:59] citation, above.
5. • "-----" [Bodde 91:37-9] ; "-----" [94]
6. • "-----" [Hannas 03:112] ; "-----" [216-7] • "-----" [Bodde 91:34-5]
➜ IV-5.A.:
1. • "-----" [Qian 85:65-6] ; "-----" [102] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:189] ; "-----" [196] ; "-----" [217] • "-----" [Bodde 91:85-6] ; "-----" [92] ; "-----" [96] ; "-----" [361] • "-----" [Hannas 03:104-5]
2. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:189] • "-----" [Hannas 03:104]
3. • "-----" [Bodde 91:87] ; "-----" [288-9] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:199]
4. • "-----
" [Nakamura 64:196] ; "-----
" [198] • See the [Bodde 91:85-6] citation, above; "-----
".
5. • Chinese officials weren't governed by formal laws; see section II-8.B and its sources. • "-----
" [Fairbank 76:121] • "-----
" [Qian 85:115] • "-----
" [Bond 91:58] • "-----
" [Vries 15:275] • "-----
" [Gupta 10:15]
6. • See the [Bodde 91:86-8] citation, below; "-----
".
7. • "-----
" [Qian 85:65-7] ; See also the [Qian 85:47] citation, below. • See the [Bodde 91:361] citation, above; "-----
" ; "-----
" [363]
8. • On the axiomatisation of physical sciences by Whites and not Chinese, see the [Qian 85:65-6] and [102] citations, above. ; "-----
" [47; see 40-59] • "-----
" [Huff 11:113-4] • "-----
" [Bekar 02:19-20]
9. • See the [Qian 85:65-6] citation, above, on the astronomical axiomatisation of Galileo, Kepler, and Newton. ; "-----
" [68-9] ; "-----
" [81-2]
10. • "-----
" [Townsend 33:115] • "-----
" [Bodde 91:86-8] ; Bodde reviews the evidence of traces of the concept of laws of nature in Chinese literature in [Bodde 91:328-44] and concludes: "-----
" [344] • See the [Qian 85:67] citation, above; "From our Sino-European comparison, it is clear...".
11. • "-----
" [Dawson 78:245]
12. • "-----
" [Bodde 91:97] ; "-----
" [99-101] ; "-----
" [121-2] ; See also the [Bodde 91:321-4] citation in the next section. • "-----
" [Nakamura 64:230]
13. • See the [Bodde 91:121-2] citation, above; and the [Bodde 91:321-4] citation in the next section. ; "-----
" [102-3] ; "-----
" [105-6]
14. • "-----
" [Bond 91:30-1]
➜ IV-5.B.:
1. • "-----
" [Landes 98:203] • "-----
" [Murray 03:237] • "-----
" [Qian 85:57] ; "-----
" [68] • "-----
" [Hannas 03:99-100] • "-----
" [Maddison 05:62]
2. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:188-9] • "-----" [Dawson 78:45] • "-----" [Bodde 91:179] • "-----" [Qian 85:71]
3. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:204-6] ; "-----" [209] ; "-----" [210] ; See also the [211-2] citation below, on China's rejection of Indian logical scrutiny in favor of the authority of traditional sacred books. • "-----" [Bodde 91:178] ; "-----" [181-2] • "-----" [Dawson 78:79] • "-----" [Duchesne 11b] • More on the strong tendency of Chinese writers to imitate/copy past sages in section IV-2.A and its sources.
4. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:208] • "-----" [Dawson 78:288]
5. • "-----" [Bekar 02:21] • "-----" [Huff 11:160] • "-----" [Dawson 78:34] ; "-----" [37] ; "-----" [149-50] • "-----" [Townsend 33:111]
6. • "-----" [Bodde 91:81-2] ; "-----" [321-4] ; More of this silliness on [136,260-3,346-7] • "-----" [Qian 85:68]
7. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:188-9] ; "-----" [191-3] ; "-----" [211-2] • "-----" [Qian 85:67] • See the [Hannas 03:104-5] citation in the notes of the last section. • "-----" [Smith 94:294-5]
8. • See the [Qian 85:65-6] citation, above. • "-----" [McClellan 06:130]
9. • See the [Bond 91:30-1] citation in the last section. • "-----" [Nisbett 03:196]
10. • "-----" [Bond 86:53-4]
11. • "-----" [Lynn 91]
➜ IV-6.B.:
1. • "-----" [Gies 94:164] • "-----" [Duchesne 14:65-6] ; "-----" [70-1] • "-----" [Bekar 02:13-4]
2. • See my review of Chinese diffused religions in the following sections (C-F). • Bodde reviews the vast extent of Chinese diffused religion, and the disorder and decline of institutional religions Buddhism and Taoism, in part due to government suppression, in [Bodde 91:148-58]; "-----" [153] • "-----" [Dawson 78:165-7]
3. • See sections II-8.C-D and their sources.
4. • "-----" [Townsend 33:150-1]
➜ IV-6.C.:
1. • Taoism includes lots of mystical and magic stuff. See [Fairbank 76:124-5] and [Dawson 78:102-3] • The growth of Chinese Buddhism, similarly as early Christianity, was largely based on claimed miracles and the promise of reincarnation. See [Dawson 78:118-9,167]. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:137] • "-----"
https://www.travelchinaguide.com/intro/religion/
• "-----" [Ng 17]
2. • "-----" [Nakamura 64:286-1] ; "-----" [293-4] • "-----" [Smith 94:294-5]
3. • "-----" [Fairbank 76:137] • "-----" [Dawson 78:164-5] • "-----" [Bodde 91:152]
4. • On the close connection with divinity the Chinese emperor, the "Son of Heaven", was believed to have, see section II-8.B and its sources. • "-----" [Dawson 78:56] ; "-----" [52-3] ; "-----" [168]
5. • "-----" [Dawson 78:155-6] ; On China's gods of wealth and the kitchen god who "made yearly reports on the conduct of the family to the Jade Emperor", see the [Dawson 78:164-5] citation, above.
6. • On the pervasive Chinese worship of ancestors, "the essential and universal religion of the Chinese", see [Dawson 78:153-5]. On their elaborate mourning rites with length of time, etc. prescribed according to one's relationship with the deceased, see [Dawson 78:151-3] and [Bodde 91:197-8]. There was a permanent obligation to perform rites at graves and shrines [Dawson 78:153-5]. It was even necessary to keep the dead informed of family goings-on: "-----" [Dawson 78:278] • "-----
" [Nakamura 64:235-6] • "-----" [Dawson 78:168] • "-----" [Bodde 91:152]
7. • "-----" [Dawson 78:37]
8. • "-----" [Smith 94:296-8]
9. • "-----" [Dawson 78:168] • "-----" [Bodde 91:318-20] ; See also [260-3].
10. • See the [Dawson 78:164-5] citation, above.
➜ IV-6.D.:
1. • On Chinese astronomy being astrology run by the government, see section II-8.C and its sources. • "-----" [Huff 11:80-2] ; ----- [100-3]. • "-----" [Qian 85:110] • "-----" [McClellan 06:131] • "-----"
http://www.smoe.org/arcana/astrol10.html
• For more detail on Chinese astronomy being devoted to astrological political purposes, see [Fairbank 57:65-70].
2. • See the [Huff 11:80-2] and [100-3] citations, above. • "-----" [Bodde 91:245] ; "-----" [323] • "-----" [Nakamura 64:282] • "-----" [Fairbank 57:39] ; "-----" [53]
3. • See the [Huff 11:80-2] citation, above. • "-----" [Dawson 78:142] • "-----"
http://contemporary_chinese_culture.academic.ru/195/divination_and_fortune-telling
• "-----" www.chinatownconnection.com/chinese-superstitions.htm
4. • Chinese Fortune Telling
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_fortune_telling
• "-----" www.chinatownconnection.com/chinese-superstitions.htm
• "-----" https://www.thoughtco.com/chinese-fortune-telling-687583
• Other articles:
Shanghai's best places for fortune telling and astrology
http://www.timeoutshanghai.com/features/Health__Wellness/38372/Shanghais-best-places-for-fortune-telling-and-astrology.html
All hocus pocus or the real deal? Superstitions and fortune telling in Hong Kong
http://yp.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/97239/all-hocus-pocus-or-real-deal-superstitions-and-fortune-telling-hong
5. • "-----" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_fortune_telling
6. • "-----" [Dawson 78:153]
• On the grave importance for Chinese of superstitiously selecting the 'right' time and site for burials, particluarly of royal family members, see [Huff 11:98-103].
• Feng Shui hocus-pocus remains prevalent in China today. Articles:
Feng Shui
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feng_shui
Chinese Superstitions and Real Estate in Calgary (Feng Shui)
http://bestcalgaryhomes.com/chinese-superstitions-real-estate-calgary
How to Have Good Luck
http://feng-shui.lovetoknow.com/how-have-good-luck
• "-----" http://blogs.transparent.com/chinese/very-superstitious/
• "-----" https://www.writtenchinese.com/chinese-superstitions-numbers-cultural-no-nos/
➜ IV-6.E.:
1. • "-----" [Huff 11:207] • "-----" What Is Traditional Chinese Medicine?, by Steven Novella.
https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/what-is-traditional-chinese-medicine/
• "-----" Traditional Chinese Medicine.
http://skepdic.com/tcm.html
2. • "-----" Traditional Chinese Medicine.
http://skepdic.com/tcm.html
• Tongue Diagnosis in Chinese Medicine.
https://www.sacredlotus.com/go/diagnosis-chinese-medicine/get/tongue-diagnosis-chinese-medicine
3. • "-----" [Bond 91:92]
4. • "-----" [Townsend 33:45] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:278] • Articles:
List of traditional Chinese medicines.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_traditional_Chinese_medicines
From tiger paws to bear testicles, the bizarre animal parts on sale in China's 'medicine markets' where the more endangered a species is, the more healing qualities it is believed to have.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3021541/From-crocodile-jaws-bear-testicles-bizarre-animal-parts-sale-China-s-medicine-markets-endangered-species-healing-qualities-believed-have.html
How "Traditional Chinese Medicine" Is Pushing Species to Extinction.
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/4/14/1508394/-How-Traditional-Chinese-Medicine-Is-Pushing-Species-to-Extinction
Traditional Chinese Medicine and Endangered Animals.
http://advocacy.britannica.com/blog/advocacy/2007/10/traditional-chinese-medicine-and-endangered-animals/
Traditional Chinese Medical Authorities Are Unable to Stop the Booming Trade in Rare Animal Parts.
http://time.com/4578166/traditional-chinese-medicine-tcm-conservation-animals-tiger-pangolin/
China defends use of wild animals in traditional medicine.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-endangered-idUSKCN0ZI0GB
Extinction By Traditional Chinese Medicine - An Environmental Disaster.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/08/08/extinction-by-traditional-chinese-medicine-an-environmental-disaster/#26fb36b35bd3
5. • "-----" What Is Traditional Chinese Medicine?, by Steven Novella.
https://sciencebasedmedicine.org/what-is-traditional-chinese-medicine/
• "-----" Traditional Chinese Medicine.
http://skepdic.com/tcm.html
• "-----" [Colquhoun 13] • Other scholarly articles:
Acupuncture: Nonsense with Needles. [Taub 93]
Acupuncture Is All Placebo and Here Is Why. [McGeeney 15]
More evidence to show that acupuncture is a ‘theatrical placebo’. [Ernst 14]
6. • "-----" [Bond 91:91-3] • "-----" [Townsend 33:148] • "-----" [Smith 94:196-7]
➜ IV-6.F.:
1. • "-----" [Smith 94:296] • "-----"
http://contemporary_chinese_culture.academic.ru/195/divination_and_fortune-telling
• Articles:
Chinese customs, superstitions and traditions.
http://us2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/aboutchina/custom/200411/20041100004548.shtml
Very Superstitious.
http://blogs.transparent.com/chinese/very-superstitious/
Superstitions for Good Luck.
http://feng-shui.lovetoknow.com/Superstitions_for_Good_Luck
Information About Chinese Superstitions.
http://www.taiwanese-secrets.com/chinese-superstitions.html
9 Superstitious Taboos in China
http://www.hanban.com/chinese-culture/chinese-taboo/superstitious-taboos-in-China.html
Chinese Superstitions.
www.chinatownconnection.com/chinese-superstitions.htm
Chinese Superstitions and Real Estate in Calgary
http://bestcalgaryhomes.com/chinese-superstitions-real-estate-calgary
Chinese Superstitions: Numbers and Other Cultural No-Nos
https://www.writtenchinese.com/chinese-superstitions-numbers-cultural-no-nos/
2. • Chinese Numerology; Number Eight
(Many examples of how Chinese seek the #8)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_Numerology#Eight
• "-----" http://www.china-mike.com/china-travel-tips/chinese-etiquette-tips/
• "-----" http://us2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/aboutchina/custom/200411/20041100004548.shtml
• "-----" http://blogs.transparent.com/chinese/very-superstitious/
3. • "-----" http://us2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/aboutchina/custom/200411/20041100004548.shtml
• "-----" http://blogs.transparent.com/chinese/very-superstitious/
4. • "-----" http://www.taiwanese-secrets.com/chinese-superstitions.html
• "-----" http://blogs.transparent.com/chinese/very-superstitious/
• "-----" www.chinatownconnection.com/chinese-superstitions.htm
• "-----" https://spoonuniversity.com/lifestyle/21-asian-food-superstitions-everyone-should-know
5. • "-----" http://feng-shui.lovetoknow.com/Superstitions_for_Good_Luck
• "-----" http://www.hanban.com/chinese-culture/chinese-taboo/superstitious-taboos-in-China.html
• "-----" www.chinatownconnection.com/chinese-superstitions.htm
• "-----" http://bestcalgaryhomes.com/chinese-superstitions-real-estate-calgary
6. • "-----" [Dawson 78:151-2] • "-----" [Ng 17]
• Joss paper: Ghost money burned for deceased
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joss_paper
• "-----" [Parfitt 12:348] • "-----" Taiwanese people have 'ghost money' to burn
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/editorial/taiwan-issues/2011/03/31/296663/p2/taiwanese-people.htm
7. • "-----" Chinese ‘witches’ band together after rural communities ostracise them
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2128393/witches-are-banding-together-after-rural-chinese-communities
• "-----" [Mace 18] • "-----" Zhu families: The Chinese villages where women are labelled witches and ostracised from society
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/zhu-families-chinese-villages-where-women-are-labelled-witches-ostracised-society-1654223
8. • "-----" [Smith 94:264] • "-----" [Ng 17] • "-----"
http://us2.mofcom.gov.cn/article/aboutchina/custom/200411/20041100004548.shtml
• "-----" http://www.taiwanese-secrets.com/chinese-superstitions.html
9. • "-----" [Bodde 91:276]
➜ IV-7.A.:
1. • On the Chinese being weaker at discrimination and expression of uncertainty, see the [Bond 86:53-4] citation in section IV-5.B.
➜ IV-7.B.:
1. • "-----" [Elvin 10:18-21] • "-----" [Louie 14] • "-----" Unlocking the World of Chinese Gambling
https://ggbmagazine.com/article/unlocking-the-world-of-chinese-gambling/
• "-----" 5 Odd Chinese Superstitions Which May Just Bring You Luck
http://www.les-croupiers.co.uk/5-odd-chinese-superstitions-which-may-just-bring-you-luck/
• "-----" Eight Fascinating Chinese Gambling Superstitions
https://vitalvegas.com/eight-fascinating-chinese-gambling-superstitions/
2. • "-----" [Elvin 10:18] • "-----" [Townsend 33:11] ; "-----" [14] ; "-----" [48] ; "-----" [58-9]
• "-----" Unlocking the World of Chinese Gambling.
https://ggbmagazine.com/article/unlocking-the-world-of-chinese-gambling/
3. • "-----" [Fong 07] ; "-----" [Fong 05] • "-----" [Louie 14]
4. • "-----" [Louie 14]
5. • "-----" China's secret gambling problem
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/6942975/Chinas-secret-gambling-problem.html
• "-----" The bets are on for gambling in China.
http://www.theworldofchinese.com/2013/11/the-bets-are-on-for-gambling-in-china/
• "-----" The Big Bet; Everyone is trying to cash in on China's gambling addiction.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/03/the-big-bet/
• "-----" [Bond 91:91]
➜ IV-7.C.:
1. • "-----" [Townsend 33:54] ; "-----" [78]
2. • See the [Townsend 33:54,78] citations, above.
3. • "-----" [Townsend 33:40] • On the filthy condition of Chinese streets and neighborhoods see Parfitt references in section II-5.B; "-----" [Parfitt 12:52]
4. • "-----" [Townsend 33:45]
5. • Parfitt experienced reckless driving and crashes in China unendingly: [Parfitt 12:114,154,178,185,236,281,316,375-7] ; "-----" [375-6] ; He also witnessed careless pedestrian walking: "-----" [154]
6. • In 2016, the U.S. with its mixed population had 37,461 car crash deaths (1); while China, with about 50% more motor-vehicle drivers (2), had seven times as many road accident deaths--260,000 (3).
1) List of motor vehicle deaths in U.S. by year
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_motor_vehicle_deaths_in_U.S._by_year
2) China Soon to Have Almost as Many Drivers as U.S. Has People
https://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2014/11/28/china-soon-to-have-almost-as-many-drivers-as-u-s-has-people/
3) WHO:260,000 die in China as a result of road accidents
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-05/24/content_25442984.htm
• According to this Wikipedia page, China's road fatality rate per 100K motor vehicles is 104.5; eight times higher than the U.S. (12.9) and over 15 times higher than most European nations.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_traffic-related_death_rate
7. • Urban Dictionary: Asian Driver
https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=asian%20driver
• Chinky Or Not Chinky: Are Asians Bad Drivers
https://www.yomyomf.com/chinky-or-not-chinky-are-asians-bad-drivers/
• There are of course many articles discussing the 'bad Asian driver stereotype', with comments generally concurring with this belief. Most of these articles however claim to refute the "myth" with data that Asians have high valid driver's license rates, low DUI rates, and low crash death rates. While statistics on "Whites" in the U.S. are always suspect, the gist of these stats for Asians seems clear. Are we then to toss out the evidence of the senses? No.
For one thing, there is no doubt that Chinese behave better in White nations than in their own, as discussed in section II-5.C. New immigrants especially are reluctant to violate the laws of their new country. The more careless nature of Chinese is counteracted by their more timid nature and a greater fear of confrontation with non-Chinese law enforcement and non-Chinese drivers on the road. Also, Chinese drivers likely spend a greater portion of their time on well known routes. On the other side, driving is more of a recreational activity to the more explorative and aggressive Whites, who go on more excursions, drive more in unfamiliar areas at odd times, drink more alcohol, and sometimes even engage in thrill-seeking. This is 'careless' behavior, though not for the same reasons as with the Chinese.
8. • Farm workers needlessly block both lanes of traffic- [Parfitt 12:76-7]; Maintenance workers needlessly create a hazard on a road which quickly causes a crash- [74-5]; Various oblivious creation traffic jams- [342].
9. • Many Taiwanese are reckless about burning religious-based fires all over and launching hundreds of lit lanterns and fireworks randomly into the air, causing random fires- [Parfitt 12:348-9].
10. • ----- "-----" [Parfitt 12:144-5] ; -----: "-----" [146-7] ; "-----" [181-2] ; "-----" [170]
11. • Parfitt mentions Chinese heavy smoking habits several times: "-----" [Parfitt 12:194-5]
12. • "-----" Smoke-free list extends to healthcare facilities.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/life/2009-12/11/content_9161633.htm
13. • "-----" [Smith 94:158] ; "-----" [169]
➜ IV-8.A.:
1. • "-----" [Bond 86:89-90] • "-----" [Vernon 82]
2. • World Memory Championships; Official World Rankings.
http://www.world-memory-statistics.com/worldrankings.php
3. • See section IV-5.B and its sources.
4. • 2017 Raytheon Mathcounts National Competition.
https://www.mathcounts.org/sites/default/files/u49/2017%20National%20Final%20Standings.pdf
• Putnam Competition Individual and Team Winners.
https://www.maa.org/programs/maa-awards/putnam-competition-individual-and-team-winners
• Past National Science Bowl Winners.
https://science.energy.gov/wdts/nsb/about/historical-information/past-national-science-bowl-winners/past-hs-winners/
5. • "-----" [Dandy 00] • "-----" [Bond 91:22-3] • On higher Asian visuo-spatial ability, see section IV-8.C and its sources. • SAT scores drop and racial gaps remain large.
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/03/sat-scores-drop-and-racial-gaps-remain-large
6. • "-----" Disparities in STEM Employment by Sex, Race,
and Hispanic Origin (2013).
https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-24.pdf
• "-----" https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21669595-asian-americans-are-united-states-most-successful-minority-they-are-complaining-ever
• See section IV-8.E and its sources.
7. • The Rise of Asians in Classical Music.
http://www.scena.org/lsm/sm9-5/ascension-Asiatiques-en.htm
• Chinese musicians hitting a high note in the West.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/world/americas/03iht-china.1.5125059.html
➜ IV-8.B.:
1. • "-----" [Lynn 06:86] ; "-----" [89-90] ; "-----" [Lynn 91] • "-----" [Dandy 00] • "-----" [Vernon 82] • This article gives "White" average scores on Critical Reading/Writing SAT Tests at 529/513, against "Asian-American" scores of 525/531, in 2015.
SAT scores drop and racial gaps remain large.
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/09/03/sat-scores-drop-and-racial-gaps-remain-large
• This paper gives the "White/Caucasian" average score on the LSAT Test at 152.75 against an "Asian" score of 152.63, in 2013-14.
LSAT Performance With Regional, Gender, and Racial/Ethnic Breakdowns; 2007-2008 Through 2013-2014
https://www.lsac.org/docs/default-source/research-(lsac-resources)/tr-14-02.pdf
2. • The average IQ of the ten studies of indigenous Chinese given in [Lynn 06:Table 10.1] is 104.7 (Whites being normed at 100), about the same as the general East Asian IQ average of 105 [86]. Lynn shows that this average is consistent with the findings of recent IQ studies of East Asian immigrants in the U.S. [89-91], despite some outdated studies giving lower scores. • On the Asian superiority in non-verbal skills, see the IQ and SAT data in the sources of the last section. On the Asian visuo-spatial superiority particularly, see the sources in the next section.
3. • "-----" [Moir 89:17] ; "-----" [57-8] ; "-----" [89] • "-----" [Baron 03:57-8] • "-----" [Halpern 07] • "-----"
Performance on SAT Verbal/Critical Reading and Writing Exams
https://www.humanitiesindicators.org/content/indicatordoc.aspx?i=23
➜ IV-8.C.:
1. • "-----" [Bond 86:85-6]
2. • See the citations in the previous section of [Lynn 06] and [Lynn 91]. • "-----" [Vernon 82] • "-----" [Bodde 91:108]
➜ IV-8.D.:
1. • See the [Treffert 89:305-6] citation, below.
2. • "-----" [Treffert 09] ; "-----" [Treffert 89:57-8] ; "-----" [83-4] ; "-----" [93] ; See the [197 and 206] citations, below. ; "-----" [206] ; "-----" [250] • "-----" [Hermelin 01:41] • "-----" [Marsa 16]
3. • "-----" [Treffert 09] ; "-----" [Treffert 89:197] ; "-----" [206] ; "-----" [260] • "-----" [Kaufman 14] • "-----" Giftedness and Autism: Savant Skill Fact Sheet
https://www.wisconsinmedicalsociety.org/_WMS/savant/pdf/resources/articles/Savant%20Skills%20Fact%20Sheet%20Revised%20-%20July%202013.pdf
4. • "-----" [Treffert 89:305-6] ; "-----" [53] ; "-----" [57-8] • "-----" [Craig 99a] ; "-----" [Craig 99b] ; "-----" [Craig 01]
5. • "-----" [Hermelin 01:64] • "-----" [Marsa 16]
6. • "-----" [Treffert 09] ; "-----" [Treffert 89:93] ; See the [250] citation, above. • See the [Hermelin 01:41] citation below, and the [Hermelin 01:64] citation, above.
7. • "-----" [Hermelin 01:41] ; "-----" [70] • "-----" [Kaufman 14]
8. • "-----" [Treffert 89:260] • "-----"
Research: Autistic Savants, by by Stephen M. Edelson, Ph.D.
https://www.autism.com/understanding_savants
9. • "-----" [Treffert 09] • See the [Treffert 89:83-4, 93] citations, above. • See the [Hermelin 01:111] citation, below.
10. • "-----" [Treffert 09] ; "-----" [Treffert 89:93] ; On specific cases of autistic savant mechanical and visuo-spatial abilities, see [122-30]; Of one savant: "-----" [129]; Of another savant: "-----" [130] • "-----" [O'riordan 04]
11. • On autistic savant sculpting, see [Treffert 89:155-9], along with the [305-6] citation, above.
12. • "-----" [Treffert 09] • See the source citations below, on how calendar calculators detect and apply rules/patterns of the data they memorize, without conscious awareness or formulation of these rules.
13. • "-----" [Treffert 09] ; Treffert discusses a mechanical savant who from a young age liked to take objects apart and assemble them, and make models and draw blueprints of things he had seen, such as airplanes and boats; "-----" [Treffert 89:122-3] ; Treffert discusses another mechanical savant who had very low IQ and severe verbal impairments: "-----" [122-3] ; A third, similar mechanical savant is discussed on pages [124-6].
14. • "-----" [Treffert 89:55] ; "-----" [71-2] ; "-----" [75-6] ; ----- [76] ; "-----" [93] • "-----" [Hermelin 01:103] ; "-----" [111] • "-----" The study then lays out the evidence that savants are, in fact, calculating based on rules. [Cowan 09] • "-----" [Heavy 12]
15. • "-----" [Treffert 89:109]
➜ IV-8.E.:
1. • "-----" [Townsend 33:13]
2. • See section IV-8.A and its sources, and the other sources in this section.
3. • "-----" Breaking through the Bamboo Ceiling, by Oguntoyinbo, Lekan.
https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-3351645291/breaking-through-the-bamboo-ceiling
4. • "-----" The model minority is losing patience (Oct 3, 2015)
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21669595-asian-americans-are-united-states-most-successful-minority-they-are-complaining-ever
5. • "-----" So, Obama helped to 'fix this problem' by appointing a bunch of Asian judges on account of their race.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bamboo_ceiling
6. • "-----" If Asian-Americans are so smart, how come they have no power or influence? (2011), by Jan C. Ting.
https://whyy.org/articles/if-asian-americans-are-so-smart-how-come-they-have-no-power-or-influence/
7. • "-----" Training executives to think globally (2011), by Anne Fisher.
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20111118/BLOGS05/311189996
; "-----" Is there a 'bamboo ceiling' at U.S. companies (2011), by Anne Fisher.
https://web.archive.org/web/20120212000635/http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2011/10/07/asian-americans-promotion-us-companies/
• "-----" Cracking the Bamboo Ceiling (2014), by Liza Mundy.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/11/cracking-the-bamboo-ceiling/380800/
• "-----" Breaking Through the Bamboo Ceiling (2011), by Sylvia Ann Hewlett.
https://hbr.org/2011/08/breaking-through-the-bamboo-ce
8. • "-----" Piercing the 'Bamboo Ceiling' (2005), by Anne Fisher.
http://money.cnn.com/2005/08/08/news/economy/annie/fortune_annie080805/index.htm
• "-----" How Asian Americans Can Break Through The Bamboo Ceiling (2016), by Liyan Chen.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/liyanchen/2016/01/20/how-asian-americans-can-break-through-the-bamboo-ceiling/
• "-----" The model minority is losing patience (Oct 3, 2015)
https://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21669595-asian-americans-are-united-states-most-successful-minority-they-are-complaining-ever
• See the Liza Mundy citation, above.
➜ V-1.C.:
1. • "-----" [Landes 98:26] ; See the [21] citation in the next section. • See the [Duchesne 11a:159] citation, below.
2. • "-----" [Mann 86:78] • "-----" [Landes 98:19] • "-----" [Goldstein 09:9-10] • See the [Wenke 80:542-3] citation, below.
3. • "-----" [White 62:42] • "-----" [Mann 86:78] • "-----" [Wenke 80:545] • "-----" [McClellan 06:178-9] • "-----" [Derry 60:23] • "-----" [Landes 98:41-2] • "-----" [Goldstein 09:10]
4. • See the [Mann 86:78] citation, above. • "-----" [Wenke 80:542-3] • "-----" [Goldstein 09:10]
5. • See the [Wenke 80:305,516] citation, below. • "-----" [Goldstein 09:10-1] • On the light scratch plow working on the gravelly soils of the Mediterranean, see the [McClellan 06:178-9], [Landes 98:41-2], and [Wenke 80:542-3] citations, above.
6. • "-----" [Wenke 80:305] ; "-----" [516] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:162]
7. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:161] • "-----" [Vries 13:180] • "-----" [Goldstein 09:10-1] ; "-----" [11]
8. • "-----" [Mann 86:78]
9. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:159]
10. • "-----" [Goldstein 09:11]
11. • "-----" [Lin 08:11] • "-----" [Goldstein 09:9-11]
12. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:161] • "-----" [Elvin 0x:2] • "-----" [Goldstein 09:11]
13. • "-----" [Vries 13:181] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:160] • "-----" [Ferguson 11:26]
14. • "-----" [Vries 13:178-9]
➜ V-1.D.:
1. • "-----" [Stover 76:86] • "-----" [Jones 87:226] • "-----" [Landes 98:21] ; "-----" [23] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:162-3] ; "-----" [152] • "-----" [Deming 10:114] • "-----" [McClellan 06:119] • "-----" [Goldstein 09:11] • "-----" [Chen 90:5-6]
2. • "-----" [Jones 87:212] • See the [Landes 98:23] citation, above.
3. • "-----" [Wenke 80:523; see 523-9] • "-----" [Stover 76:37] • Shang dynasty.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shang_dynasty
4. • Zhou dynasty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zhou_dynasty
Eastern Zhou Period
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eastern_Zhou_Period
Spring and Autumn period
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spring_and_Autumn_period
Warring States period
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warring_States_period
5. • Hundred Schools of Thought
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Schools_of_Thought
➜ V-1.E.:
1. • "-----" [Lin 08:11]
2. • "-----" [White 62:43-4] ; "-----" [78] • "-----" [Landes 98:19]
3. • "-----" [Goldstein 09:11]
4. • "-----" [Clark 07a:184-6] • "-----" [Gies 94:85]
➜ V-1.F.:
1. • "-----" [Duchesne 11c:380] ; "-----" [Duchesne 11a:252] ; "-----" [313] ; "-----" [459] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:20-1] • "-----" [Qian 85:47] • "-----" [Deming 10:175]
2. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:462] • "-----" [Peterson 74]
• There is a lot of evidence that in the classical Greco-Roman world blonds were much more prevalent than they are there in modern times. This does not necessarily mean that these people were equivalents of modern Nordics.
What Race Were the Greeks and Romans?
The evidence is clear — but often ignored
http://www.unz.com/article/what-race-were-the-greeks-and-romans/
Like a Greek God.
https://www.theapricity.com/earlson/hfkg/greek.htm
Nordic Hellas.
http://www.armahellas.com/?p=120
Pigmentation of the Early Roman Emperors
https://www.theapricity.com/earlson/history/emperors.htm
3. • "-----" [Frank 16] ; "-----" [Frank 16] ; "-----" [Frank 16] ; "-----" [Frank 16] ; "-----" [Frank 16]
• Historian Nilsson reviews extreme efforts by Roman state to increase birth rate of citizens, especially in upper classes [Nilsson 21:373-4], and describes how the old noble families died out. He explains how it became difficult to recruit for the army, particularly its elite corps, from the stock of original citizens [374-5]. He reviews the demise and replacement of Rome's vigorous founders: "-----" [374] ; "-----
" [375-6] ; "-----" [376-7] ; "-----" [378] • "-----" [Duff 28:191] ; "-----" [200-2]
• More citations of historians of a similar nature can be read here:
From Slave to Emperor - Famous Historians on the Racial Change Leading to the Fall of the Classical Roman Civilization.
http://www.solargeneral.org/wp-content/uploads/library/from-slave-to-emperor-the-racial-shift-in-roman-society.pdf
The Race Change in Western Europe.
http://www.askelm.com/people/peo011.htm
• Roman writers on the problem of miscegenation:
Classical Roman Writers of Race-Mixing in Rome.
http://solargeneral.org/wp-content/uploads/library/classical-roman-writers-on-race-mixing-in-rome.pdf
• The aliens who mixed with the classical Greeks and Romans were largely "Caucasian" or "Caucasoid", if one uses the broad definition of these terms that often includes Turks, North Africans, Near Easterners, southwest Asians, etc. Many of them died in the wake of the Roman Empire's fall, when Italy's urban population collapsed.
4. • See the [Mokyr 90:20-1] citation, above. • "-----" [Cipolla 80:168]
5. • "-----" [Derry 60:23] • "-----" Cura Annonae
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cura_Annonae
• "-----" How important was wheat in feeding the Roman Empire? By Caroline Stone.
http://www.schools1.cic.ames.cam.ac.uk/pdfs/Food%20at%20Pompeii%20-%20Wheat.pdf
• "-----" The Roman Empire and the Grain Fleets: Contracting out Public Services in Antiquity
https://apebhconference.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/charles_ryan1.pdf
➜ V-1.G.:
1. • See the sources in the previous section on the dispersion and erosion of the Roman Empire's founding population.
2. • "-----" [Rempel 98] • "-----" [Durant 44:194]
3. • "-----" [Rempel 98] • "-----" [Andrews 14] • "-----" [Jongman 08] ; See [Jongman 06] for more detail on this material. • "-----" Economic Reasons for the Fall of Rome, by N.S. Gill.
https://www.thoughtco.com/economic-reasons-for-fall-of-rome-118357
• "-----" Poor Relief in Ancient Rome (1971), by Henry Hazlitt.
https://fee.org/articles/poor-relief-in-ancient-rome/
• "-----" The Roman Empire Disintegrates.
http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/ch24.htm
4. • "-----" Economic Reasons for the Fall of Rome, by N.S. Gill.
https://www.thoughtco.com/economic-reasons-for-fall-of-rome-118357
5. • "-----" [Rempel 98] • See the "Economic Reasons for the Fall of Rome" citation, above. • "-----" Fall of the Roman Empire
http://www.rome.info/history/empire/fall/
6. • "-----" [Rempel 98] • "-----" Poor Relief in Ancient Rome (1971), by Henry Hazlitt.
https://fee.org/articles/poor-relief-in-ancient-rome/
• "-----" The Slow-Motion Financial Suicide of the Roman Empire (2015), by Lawrence W. Reed, Marc Hyden.
https://fee.org/articles/the-slow-motion-financial-suicide-of-the-roman-empire/
7. • "-----" [Andrews 14] • "-----" [Rempel 98] • "-----" The Slow-Motion Financial Suicide of the Roman Empire (2015), by Lawrence W. Reed, Marc Hyden. • "-----" The Roman Empire Disintegrates.
http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/ch24.htm
8. • "-----" [Rempel 98] • "-----" [Frank 16] • "-----" [Gibbon 76:chapter 15]
9. • "-----" [Rempel 98] • "-----" [Futrell 09:14] • "-----" [Shaffer 10:78]
10. • "-----" [Gibbon 76:chapter 36] • "-----" [Frank 16]
• "-----" Rome’s Barbarian Mercenaries (2007), by David Frye.
http://www.historynet.com/romes-barbarian-mercenaries.htm
• "-----" The Roman Empire Disintegrates.
http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/ch24.htm
11. • "-----" [Gibbon 81a:chapter 39] ; -----: "-----" [Gibbon 81b:432] • "-----" [Chamberlain 11:323] • "-----"
Vandals and Huns – the Empire from 410 to 450 CE.
http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/ch26.htm
12. • The fury of Judeo-Christians in destroying "the most splendid and beautiful monuments of Grecian architecture" etc. of the Roman Empire is reviewed by Gibbon in the The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. For example: "-----" [Gibbon 76: chapter 28] ; "-----" [Gibbon 81a] ; More on Christian destructions in this article, under "The "Dark Ages"":
http://aryannordicalpinealiens.blogspot.com/2008/10/were-ancient-romans-nordic.html
• See the [Chamberlain 11:323] citation, above.
• "-----" Theodosius, Persecutions and Disunity.
http://www.fsmitha.com/h1/rome23.htm
➜ V-1.H.:
1. • "-----" [McClellan 06:182]
2. • "-----" [Jones 87:13] • "-----" [Gies 94:41]
3. • "-----" [Gies 94:40] ; "-----" [80-1] • "-----" [Deming 10:115]
4. • "-----" [White 62:78]
5. • "-----" [Landes 98:41] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:32] • "-----" [Gies 94:44-5] • "-----" [McClellan 06:178] • "-----" [Deming 10:170] • "-----" [White 62:43-4] • "-----" [Andersen 13]
6. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:35-8] • "-----" [Deming 10:171] • "-----" [Gies 94:45-6] • See the [Jones 87:48-9] citation, below.
7. • "-----" [White 62:44] ; "-----" [54-6;159] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:32-3]
8. • "-----" [Landes 98:41] • "-----" [McClellan 06:178] • Lynn White in [White 62:69-76] reviews the development of the three-field crop rotation system, which increased production, provided oats for horse feed and protein-rich legumes for people. It began at around 800 in Germany, but its diffusion throughout Europe took several centuries, largely because of the increased land (and pooling of land) requirements: "-----" [73-4] ; "-----" [75-6]
9. • See the [White 62:69-76], [White 62:78], and [White 62:44] citations, above; and the [Gies 94:44-5] citation, above. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:32] • "-----" [Jones 87:48-9]
➜ V-1.I.:
1. • "-----" [Jones 87:52-3] • "-----" [Gies 94:107] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:143]
2. • "-----" [Gies 94:47-8] ; "-----" [113] • "-----" [Jones 87:52-3] • "-----" [Deming 10:115] • "-----" [Landes 98:42]
3. • See the sources in the previous section on the open fields and three-field crop rotation systems. • "-----" [Gies 94:111] • "-----" [Landes 98:41]
4. • See the [White 62:69-76] citation in the previous section. • "-----" [McClellan 06:179] • "-----" [Deming 10:171]
5. • "-----" [Deming 10:114-5] • "-----" A warming medieval climate supports a revolution in agriculture.
https://depositsmag.com/2017/07/18/a-warming-medieval-climate-supports-a-revolution-in-agriculture/
➜ V-2.A.:
1. • ----- [Murray 03:198] • "-----" [Gies 94:86] • Longer lists of alleged ancient Chinese inventions and technology can be found in [Mokyr 90:209-18] and [McClellan 06:123-37].
2. • "-----" [Haas 56:36-7] • "-----" [Pacey 90:7] • "-----" [Didier 09:73-6] • "-----" [Peng 95] • "-----" [Shaughnessy 89] • "-----" [McClellan 06:133]
3. • "-----" [Stover 76:34-6] • "-----" [Jixu 06:18] ; "-----" [35-6] • "-----" [Didier 09:71] ; See the [Didier 09:71-3] citation, below.
4. • See the [Stover 76:34-6] and [Jixu 06:18,35-6] citations, above. • "-----" [Jixu 06:29-31] • "-----" [Bauer 94] • "-----" [Hayes 04]
5. • See the [Jixu 06:29-31] and [Bauer 94] citations, above. ; "-----" [Jixu 02] ; "-----" [Jixu 03] ; "-----" [Jixu 05] • "-----" [Tsung-i 91] • "-----" [Wei 05a] • "-----" [Wei 05b] • "-----" [Chang 88:3-4] • "-----" [Ostmoe 95:2]
6. • See the sources on the correspondences between early Indo-European and Old Chinese words, above. • "-----" [Didier 09:71-3] • "-----" [Bodde 91:32-3]
7. • See the [Didier 09:73-6] and [Stover 76:34-6] citations, above. • "-----" [Stover 76:82] • "-----" [Didier 09:65-70] • "-----" [Wan 11] • "-----" [Shaughnessy 89] • "-----" [Barbieri-Low 00:17] ; "-----" [48] ; "-----" [73] • "-----" [Snow 02:41-2]
➜ V-2.B.:
1. • Hundred Schools of Thought
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hundred_Schools_of_Thought
• China's classical philophers have been almost slavishly deferred to throughout Chinese history (at least until the Communist takeover); see section IV-5.B and its sources. Chinese literature is loaded with often-unattributed quotations (copy-pastes) of these past writers; see section IV-2.A and its sources.
2. • "-----" [Qian 85:24] ; "-----" [50-1] ; "-----"- Sinophile Needham quoted in [Qian 85:31] ; "-----" [59-60] ; "-----" [81-2] • "-----" [Bodde 91:137] ; "-----" [168-9] ; "-----" [182] ; "-----" [344]
3. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:220-3] • "-----" [Clark 07a:142-4]
• "-----" [Vries 10:12-14] • For more on China's late imperial decline, see section II-8.F and its sources.
4. • "-----" [Qian 85:63-4] • "-----" [Elvin 73:179-80] ; "-----" [193-4]
5. • "-----" [McClellan 06:133-4] • "-----" [Clark 07a:143-4] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:220]
6. • See section V-2.G.8 and its sources.
7. • "-----" [Dawson 78:230]
8. • "-----" [Dawson 78:228]
9. • "-----" [Dawson 78:88] • "-----" [37] • "-----" [Bodde 91:214] • "-----" [Chen 12:56] • On China's civil service examinations being based on rote memory of literary classics, see section IV-5.B and its sources.
10. • Derk Bodde reviewed the decline of sports in ancient China in [Bodde 91:292-8]; -----.
11. • See section IV-1.B and its sources.
12. • "-----" [Bodde 91:277-8] ; "-----" [289]
➜ V-2.C.:
1. • "-----" [Gies 94:107] • "-----" [Deming 10:114-5]
2. • "-----" [Deming 10:114-5] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:193-4] ; "-----" [197-8] • Gimpel discusses early development of shareholding companies for mill ownership in 12th to 14th century France in [Gimpel 76:20-2]. ; "-----" [102] • "-----" [Zanden 09a:31]
3. • "-----" [Huff 11:150-2] • "-----" [Gies 94:227-9] • "-----" [McClellan 06:188-9] ; "-----" [191] • Unlike Chinese schools, European universities had sufficient independence from the state to seek objective truths; see section II-8.C and its sources. ; "-----" [Duchesne 11a:276-7] • Though Europe's early scholars were largely Judeo-Christian, they believed that in studying nature's laws they were studying God's laws; see section IV-6.B and its sources. ; "-----" [Gies 94:164]
4. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:43-4]
5. • "-----" [Gies 94:107] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:221-2]
6. • "-----" [Gies 94:186] • "-----" [McClellan 06:179]
7. • "-----" [Cipolla 78:39-40] • On the European invention of eyeglasses, see section V-2.G.5 and its sources. • On the European invention of mechanical clocks, see section V-2.G.3 and its sources. • On the European invention of the first effective, heavy cannon, see section V-2.G.6 and its sources.
8. • "-----" [Gies 94:235] ; "-----" [237-8] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:222-3] • "-----" [White 62:128-9] • "-----" [Comin 10] • "-----" [Zanden 08:22-3] • "-----" [Landes 98:89] ; "-----" [98]
➜ V-2.E.:
1. • "-----" [White 62:28]
2. • "-----" [Jones 87:57-8] • See the [Mokyr 03:22] citation, below. • "-----" ----- [Cipolla 80:180] • "-----" [Pacey 90:52]
3. • "-----" [McClellan 06:180-1] • "-----" [White 62:128-9] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:34-5] • For more on Europe's much greater development of the cam, see the [Gimpel 76:13-15] citation, below. • "-----" [Basalla 88:147; see 146-9] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:180-1] • On medieval European advances in power machinery and mechanics, see section V-2.G.2 and its sources.
4. • "-----" [Landes 98:48-50] • On European advances in clock-making, see section V-2.G.3 and its sources.
5. • On medieval European advances in compass-making and navigation, see sections V-2.G.5,8 and their sources. • On China's primitive knowledge of magnetism and electricity compared to Europe's, see section V-3.D and its sources. • "-----" [Mokyr 03:20-1]
6. • "-----" [McClellan 06:204] • "-----" [Landes 98:51-2] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:179-81] • "-----" [Huff 11:306-7] • On Europe's vastly higher book production and literacy rates than China from the late medieval period on, see section V-3.G and its sources. • "-----" [Cipolla 80:180] • On medieval European advances in the printing press, see section V-2.G.4 and its sources.
7. • The Chinese apparently made the first "guns", but they were too primitive to be effective weapons. European made the first effective cannon and hand guns; see section V-2.G.6 and its sources. • "-----" [Cipolla 80:180] • "-----" [Landes 06:19]
8. • The European Age of Discovery and mastery of the oceans since the mid-15th century is well known. On medieval European advances in ship-building and navigation, see section V-2.G.8 and its sources.
9. • A review of Chinese decline was given in section V-2.B; see particularly its source citations on China's decline in technological innovation. • "-----" [Landes 98:55] • "-----" [Bodde 91:362] • "-----" [Gimpel 76:13-15] • "-----" [White 62:104] • "-----" [Mokyr 03:22]
10. • On medieval European advances in eyeglasses-making, see section V-2.G.5 and its sources. • On the Chinese lack of interest in the telescope and microscope, see section IV-1.A and its sources. • "-----" [Qian 85:59-60] • "-----" [Huff 11:97-8; see 110-1]
➜ V-2.F.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 01:415-6] ; "-----" [Vries 13:311] ; "-----" [Vries 03:49-50] • "-----" [Elman 05:xxxi-ii]
2. • "-----" http://www.silk-road.com/artl/silkhistory.shtml
• "-----" [Vries 15:371]
3. • See section V-1.C and its sources.
4. • An example of this is Chinese manufacture of bronze-iron composite cannon barrels, based on European design: "-----"
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_gunpowder
5. • "-----" [Vries 15:369] ; "-----" [Vries 10:12] • Wikipedia reviews Europe's mastering of the secrets of porcelain production in the early 18th century: Porcelain; European porcelain.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porcelain#European_porcelain
• In metallurgy, Europe had since medieval times led in metal craftsmanship (e.g. machine, instrument, clock, and gun making), but you'll occasionally hear of some metal-mixing trick the Chinese knew; see the bronze-iron composite cannon barrels example, above. However, in the early- to mid-18th century, Europe forged a clear lead with the developments of coke smelting of iron and high quality crucible steel; see [Mokyr 90:93-5] and [Derry 60:140-7]. • "-----" [Vries 15:265] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:220] • ----- [Vries 15:309] • "-----" [Landes 98:191] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:221] • "-----" [Vries 15:369-70] • Comparing agricultural technology is of course difficult because of highly varying geological and environmental conditions, but Europe surpassed China in this department as well: • "-----" [Mokyr 90:222] • "-----"
[Vries 01:413-4] ; "-----" [Vries 03:31-2]
➜ V-2.G.1.:
1. • "-----" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stained_glass#Origins
2. • On these and other medieval European architectural advances, see [Gies 94:130-44], [Gimpel 76:121-6], and [Deming 10:120-3].
3. • "-----" [Gies 94:271]
4. • "-----" [Jones 87:55] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:39]
5. • "-----" [Townsend 33:40-1]
6. • See the [Townsend 33:40-1] citation, above. • "-----" [Dawson 78:61] ; "-----" [67]
➜ V-2.G.2.:
1. • See section V-2.E and its sources.
2. • "-----" [Jones 87:54] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:34-5] • "-----" [Landes 98:45-6] • "-----" [Basalla 88:147] • "-----" [Gies 94:114] ; "-----" [265] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:222]
3. • See the [Mokyr 90:34-5] citation, above. • "-----" [Gimpel 76:13-15] • Lynn White reviews early European development of the compound crank and connecting rod during the early 15th century in [White 62:112-4]. ; "-----" [White 62:114-5] ; "-----" [129]
4. • Lynn White reviews early European development of the flywheel in the 14th and early 15th centuries in [White 62:115-6].
5. • "-----" [Bodde 91:140] • "-----" [Elvin 0x:9] • "-----" [228]
6. • "-----" [Gies 94:115]
7. • "-----" [Cipolla 80:173-4] ; "-----" [180] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:44-5] • "-----" [Gies 94:117] • More detailed discussions of the advantages of medieval European-type windmills in [Derry 60:254-8] and [Mokyr 90:45-6]. On their economic value, see [Gimpel 76:25-7].
➜ V-2.G.3.:
1. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:49] • On Europe's original invention of the clock likely being at between 1277 to 1300, see [Gimpel 76:153-4] • "-----" [Gies 94:211-2] • "-----" [Landes 98:48] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:175]
2. • "-----" [Cipolla 80:182] • "-----" [White 62:124-6]
3. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:50] • On Whites' brilliant inventions of the stackfreed and fusee in the fifteenth century to moderate the force exerted by an unwinding spring in a watch, see [White 62:126-8]. • "-----" [Gies 94:273]
4. • On the revolutionary effects of the mechanical clock on European society, see the [Landes 98:48-50] citation in section V-2.E.
5. • See the [Duchesne 11a:175] citation, above. • "-----" [Landes 98:49-50] • The main shortcoming of water clocks is of course that you can't carry one around with you.
6. • See the [Landes 98:49-50] citation, above. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:220] • "-----" [Clark 07a:143-4] • "-----" [Landes 98:336]
➜ V-2.G.4.:
1. • "-----" [McClellan 06:204] • "-----" [Pacey 90:56] • "-----" [Duchesne 06:82-3]
2. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:49] • "-----" [Jones 87:60-1] ; "-----" [61-2] • "-----" [Gies 94:244-5] • Details of Europe's improvements in printing, including oil-bound inks, the screw-press, the tympan frame, engraving, and punching the matrix, are given in [Derry 60:235-9].
3. • See the [Gies 94:244-5] citation, above. • "-----" [Zanden 11]
4. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:180] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:221]
5. • See the [Jones 87:60-1] and [Mokyr 90:49] citations, above. • On Europe's printing press being a mass production machine that stimulated a communications revolution, see section V-2.E and its sources.
➜ V-2.G.5.:
1. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:70-1] • "-----" [Derry 60:153-5] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:174]
2. • "-----" [Gies 94:227] • "-----" [Landes 98:47]
3. • See the [Mokyr 90:70-1] citation, above.
4. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:47] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:175] • "-----" [Gies 94:157] ; "-----" [222-3] • "-----" [Gimpel 76:195]
• "-----" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_compass
5. • See the [Mokyr 90:70-1] and [Derry 60:153-5] citations, above. • "-----" [Derry 60:205-6]
6. • "-----" [Landes 98:47] ; "-----" [204] • On Whites' exploration of the outer and inner worlds with telescopes, microscopes, etc., see section IV-1.A and its sources.
➜ V-2.G.6.:
1. • "-----" [Bryant 08:163] ; "-----" [164] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:221] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:180] ; "-----" [223] ; "-----" [Cipolla 80:224-5] • "-----" [Landes 98:53-4] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:212-3] • Nonsensical claims have been made that China had a superior military post-1500 due to having successes against small, outnumbered Asian countries and against small, outnumbered European expeditionary forces fighting on the opposite side of the world. For refutation, see [Vries 15:305-6] and [Vries 17]. ; "-----" [Vries 15:310]
2. • See Wikipedia's review of early Chinese firearms:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_gunpowder#Hand_cannon
3. • "-----" [McClellan 06:193-4] • "-----" [White 62:99-100] • "-----" [Gies 94:208] ; "-----" [248-9] • European cannon technology culminated late in the fifteenth century as the "Classic Gun". Wikipedia's review: "-----" Development of the Classic Gun.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_gunpowder#Development_of_the_Classic_Gun
4. • "-----" [Gies 94:247-8] • "-----" [Derry 60:148]
5. • "-----" [White 62:100-1] • "-----" [Gies 94:247]
6. • See the [Gies 94:247-8], [Derry 60:148] and Wikipedia Development of the Classic Gun citations, above.
7. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:221] • "-----" [Bryant 08:163] • "-----" [Landes 98:340]
8. • See the [Cipolla 80:224-5] citation, above. • "-----" [Pacey 90:63-4] • "-----" [Landes 98:98]
9. • "-----" [Vries 15:302] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:213]
➜ V-2.G.7.:
1. • "-----" [Derry 60:33-5] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:63-4]
2. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:220] • "-----" [Clark 07a:143-4] • "-----" [Vries 15:257]
➜ V-2.G.8.:
1. • "-----" [Gies 94:275-8] ; "-----" [157] • "-----" [Jones 87:59] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:176-7] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:46] ; "-----" [219 (note 5)]
2. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:47] • "-----" [Cipolla 80:175] ; "-----" [177] • "-----
" [McClellan 06:201] • "-----" [Gies 94:223-5] ; "-----" [278-9] • "-----" [Qian 85:73] • For more on European improvements in the compass, see section V-2.G.5 and its sources.
3. • "-----" [Mokyr 90:220] • "-----" [Pacey 90:55] • "-----" [Landes 98:96-7] • "-----" [Clark 07a:143]
4. • The evidence shows that the size of Zheng He's famous ships are greatly exaggerated: "-----" [Duchesne 12:78-9] ; Duchesne also explains that Zheng He's famous voyages to east Africa never really discovered or explored any place, in [Duchesne 12:79-81].
➜ V-2.H.:
1. • "-----" [Mokyr 16:35-6] • "-----" [Mokyr 07b:10-1] ; "-----" [14-5] ; "-----" [Mokyr 09:44-5] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:198-9] • See the citations below on the profuse dissemination of scientific knowledge inspired by the Enlightenment.
2. • "-----" [Mokyr 09:46] ; "-----" [48] ; "-----" [50-1] ; "-----" [53-4] ; "-----" [Mokyr 02a:72-3] ; More detail on the explosion of scientific and technical information during Europe's Enlightenment in [Mokyr 02a:65-70] ; "-----" [Mokyr 05a:290] ; "-----" [295-6] ; "-----" [298] ; "-----" [308] • "-----" [Vries 13:224-5]
3. • "-----" [Derry 60:42] • "-----" [Mokyr 02a:44-6] • "-----" [Bekar 02:5-6] ; "-----" [10-1] • "-----" [Duchesne 05:3] • "-----" [Vries 13:313] • Basalla discusses the interaction between science and technology in various fields in [Basalla 88:92-102].
4. • "-----" [Mokyr 07c:6] ; "-----" [Mokyr 09:42-3] ; "-----" [Mokyr 02a:59-60] ; "-----" [Mokyr 05a:323-6] • "-----" [Pacey 90:94] ; "-----" [95] ; "-----" [98-9] ; "-----" [120]
5. • This is evident in the previous source citations in this section. • "-----" [Mokyr 00:50]
6. • On Europe's technological advances that drove the Industrial Revolution, see section V-4.B.1 and its sources.
7. • On China's paltry scientific record compared to Europe's, see section V-3.A-D and its sources. • "-----" [Pacey 90:97] • "-----" [Mokyr 90:222-3] • "-----" [Elvin 0x:8] • "-----" [Bekar 02:19]
8. • "-----" [Mokyr 06:27] ; "-----" [31] • "-----" [Duchesne 11b] • "-----" [Bodde 91:103]
➜ V-2.J.:
Note: My principal source here is William Hannas's The Writing on the Wall; How Asian Orthography Curbs Creativity (2003). Hannas's more recent book, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization (2013), evidently reiterates that China's shenanigans are ongoing. Review citations:
• "-----" Review by Arturo G. Munoz. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-59-no-4/pdfs/Munoz-Chinese-Industrial-Espionage.pdf
• "-----" Review by Francis C. Domingo.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/274897132_Review_of_Chinese_industrial_espionage_technology_acquisition_and_military_modernization
1. • "-----" [Hannas 03:54-5]
2. • See the [Hannas 03:54-5] citation, above; and the [Dibb 15] citation, below. • "-----" [U.S.-China 14]
3. • "-----" [Hannas 03:3-4] ; "-----" [37] ; "-----" [40-1] ; "-----" [88-91] ; "-----" [93-4]
4. • "-----" [Hannas 03:89-90]
5. • "-----" [Hannas 03:37-9] • "-----" [Jaffer 17]
• "-----" China spying 'biggest US threat' (15 Nov 2007)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7097296.stm
6. • "-----" Preview: The Great Brain Robbery (Jan15 2016)
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/preview-the-great-brain-robbery/
7. • "-----" [Hannas 03:41] ; Hannas details China's massive, state-directed program to copy the world's technology, led by the Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (ISTIC), in [Hannas 03:41-3] ; "-----" [49] ; "-----" [57-9] ; "-----" [93] • See the nefarious tactics of the Chinese listed in the [Cox 99] and [U.S.-China 14] citations, below.
8. • "-----" [Hout 10] • "-----" [Jaffer 17]
9. • "-----" [Hout 10] • "-----" [Xing 11] • "-----" [Koopman 08:Abstract]
10. • See the [Hannas 03:37-9,40-1,54-5] citations, above. • "-----" [Cox 99] • "-----" [U.S.-China 14]
• "-----" Panel: Chinese Spies Stealing U.S. Secrets (AP- Nov 19, 2009)
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/panel-chinese-spies-stealing-us-secrets/
11. • "-----" [Dibb 15] • "-----" [Heginbotham 15] • "-----" [Mizokami 17] • "-----" [Osborn 17]
➜ V-3.A.:
1. • See section IV-1.A and its sources.
2. • Though Europe's early scholars were largely Judeo-Christian, they believed that in studying nature's laws they were studying God's laws; see section IV-6.B and its sources. Unlike Chinese schools, European universities had sufficient independence from the state to seek objective truths; see section II-8.C and its sources.
3. • See section V-2.C and its sources.
4. • See section IV-5 and its sources.
5. • On China's persistent belief in the mystical "Five Elements/Phases" (Wood, Fire, Earth, Metal, and Water) and "yin-yang" as a substitute for real science, see section IV-5.A and its sources. On how this quackery was likewise integrated with traditional Chinese medicine, see section IV-6.E and its sources.
• On Whites' development of the scientific method and the Chinese lack of it, see section IV-5.B and its sources.
6. • See section V-2.H and its sources.
➜ V-3.C.:
1. • "-----" [Qian 85:67] ; "-----" [80-1] • "-----" [Huff 11:265-6] ; "-----" [293-4]
2. • See section IV-1 and its sources.
3. • See section IV-5 and its sources.
4. • See section IV-5.B and its sources. • On China's inferior dissemination of scientific knowledge, see section V-2.H and its sources.
5. • On Chinese science that declined or was lost over time, see section V-2.B and its sources. • "-----" [Bekar 02:19] • "-----" [Qian 85:59-60] ; "-----" [64] ; In comparison, Qian cites Needham on Europe's run of major mathematical advances: "-----" [66] ; "-----" [81-2]
6. • On China's imperial schools being mostly preparation for civil service exams, see section II-8.C and its sources.
7. • See section IV-5.B and its sources.
8. • "-----" [Bekar 02:19] • "-----" [Qian 85:83] • On the astrological character of Chinese astronomy and calendars, see section IV-6.D and its sources.
9. • "-----" [Huff 11:74] • "-----" [90] ; See the [Huff 11:90-1] citation, below. ; "-----" [95-6] ; "-----" [105-6]
10. • On China's lack of interest in the telescope, microscope, and other scientific instruments given to them by Europeans in the 17th and 18th centuries, see sections IV-1.A and its sources. • "-----" [Huff 11:90-1] ; "-----" [97-8]
11. • Only Tu Youyou (Physiology/Medicine 2015) won the award working in China. Tsung-Dao Lee and Chen Ning Yang (Physics 1957), Yuan Lee (Chemistry 1986), Daniel Chee Tsui (Physics 1998), and Charles Kao (Physics 2009) were Chinese-American immigrants; and Samuel Ting (Physics 1976), Steven Chu (Physics 1997), and Roger Y. Tsien (Chemistry 2008) were born in the United States.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Chinese_Nobel_laureates
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_in_Physics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_in_Physiology_or_Medicine
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Nobel_laureates_in_Chemistry
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tsung-Dao_Lee
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chen-Ning_Yang
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1986/lee-bio.html
➜ V-3.D.:
1. • "-----" [Qian 85:48] • "-----" [Cohen 94:437-8]
2. • Zhu Xi's statement (~1200) about investigating "all things under heaven" was about cultivating personal character, not about discovering laws of nature, and that is how subsequent Chinese regarded it. See [Qian 85:117-9].
3. • "-----" [Qian 85:58] ; Qian dispatches other lame attempts to show that the Chinese had mastered the principle of buoyancy in [51-8], including an old folk tale about "Cao Chong weighing an elephant".
4. • In his Science and Civilisation in China Vol 3, sinophile Needham breathlessly spouts: "-----" [77]
"-----" [107 (p.44 in Colin Ronan's shortened version)] To which Qian replies: "-----" [Qian 85:88]
5. • This nonsense is refuted by Wen-yuan Qian in [Qian 85:53,118-9,131-9]. • On China's silly 'correlative' thinking, see section IV-5 and its sources.
6. • "-----" [Qian 85:72]
7. • "-----" [Huff 11:232-3] See [209-33] for a review of Whites' development of the scientific principles including atmospheric pressure pertaining to the steam engine.
8. • "-----" [Bekar 02:20] • For details on Whites' development of magnetism and electricity, see [Huff 11:234-52]. ; "-----" [295]
➜ V-3.E.:
1. • See section II-8.F and its sources.
2. • On Europe's representative, power-sharing institutions, and rights, and China's lack thereof, see section II-8.A-D and its sources.
; On the many subsystems of law that Whites created, see the [Zanden 09a:47-8,65-6] and [Zanden 08:17-8] citations in section II-8-A (on how White rulers were more constrained by law). • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:483-4]
➜ V-3.F.:
1. • See the previous section (E) and its sources.
2. • "-----" [Vries 15:422] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:249]
3. • "-----" [Vries 13:318] • "-----" [Vries 15:416-8]
4. • See the [Vries 13:318] citation, above. • On Whites' greatly superior currency and coinage, see section V-3.J and its sources. • "-----" [Vries 15:418-9] • "-----
" [Mokyr 02a:58-9]
5. • See the next section (G) and its sources.
6. • "-----" [Vries 13:403] ; "-----" [Vries 15:219] • On the sound currency of Europe, particularly Britain, see section V-3.J and its sources.
7. • On how since medieval times Europe has provided much more relief to its poor than has China, even as a portion of GDP, see section II-8.F and its sources.
8. • "-----" [Vries 15:141] ; "-----" [420]
9. • See section V-3.I-K and its sources.
10. • "-----" [Vries 13:406] • Chinese communism, an extension of Chinese autocracy (section II-8.D), was of course copied from Jews. Behind Communism.
http://www.jrbooksonline.com/PDF_Books/Behind%20Communism.pdf
➜ V-3.G.:
1. • On how the invention of Gutenberg's printing press created a communications revolution in Europe including an explosion in book production, see section V-2.E and its sources. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:88-90] ; "-----" [Zanden 09a:188-9] • "-----" [Duchesne 11b] • "-----" [Huff 11:313]
2. • On China's imperial schools being mostly preparation for civil service exams, see section II-8.C and its sources. On China's civil service examinations being based on rote memory of literary classics, see section IV-5.B and its sources. • "-----" [Vries 15:273]
3. • Unlike Chinese schools, European universities had sufficient independence from the state to seek objective truths; see section II-8.C and its sources. • On the early progress of European universities, see section V-2.C and its sources. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:63] • "-----" [Deming 10:141-2] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:185]
4. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:181] • "-----" [Vries 13:315]
5. • "-----" [Vries 13:223-4] • "-----" [Duchesne 11b] • "-----" [Huff 11:306-7]
6. • See the [Huff 11:306-7] citation, above.
7. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:129-30] • "-----" [Huff 11:303] ; "-----" [304] ; "-----" [Huff 11:317] • "-----" [Clark 07a:265-6] • ----- [Vries 13:222; Table 28] ; "-----" [223]
8. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:196]
• "-----" http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/518/Germany-HISTORY-BACKGROUND.html
• "-----" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Germany#Prussian_era
9. • "-----" [Huff 11:317] • "-----" [Chaudhary 12:1] • "-----
" [Fairbank 06:261]
10. • "-----
" [Zanden 09a:200] • "-----
" [Bodde 91:222-3] ; "-----
" [225] ; "-----
" [228-30] • "-----
" [Mokyr 07c:12-3] ; "-----
" [Mokyr 90:222-3] • "-----
" [Vries 13:223-4]
11. • See section V-2.H-I and its sources. • "-----
" [Mokyr 02a:52] ; "-----" [61] ; "-----" [Mokyr 09:53-4]
➜ V-3.H.:
1. • On the relative weakness of despotic states, particularly China, see section II-8.F and its sources.
2. • See section II-8.E and its sources. • "-----" [Vries 03:37] • "-----
" [Sng 14:5-6]
3. • "-----" [Vries 03:29-30] ; "-----" [Vries 06:17] ; "-----" [Vries 15:234]
4. • "-----" [Vries 13:405] • "-----" [Vries 15:273] • "-----" [Vries 15:272] ; "-----" [Vries 15:274-5] • As China's civil service examinations were based on rote memory of Confucian literary classics and not on practical subjects, its officials were often poorly prepared. See section IV-5.B and its sources. ; "-----" [Townsend 33:111] • On the wide range of powers (and responsibilities) possessed by Chinese officials, see section II-8.B and its sources.
5. • See the [Duchesne 11a:249] citation in section V-3.F. • On the arbitrary powers of Chinese officials, see section II-8.B and its sources. • On the prevalence of nepotism in China, see section II-7.C and its sources. • On the Chinese expectation of reciprocity for any services rendered, including business favors, see section II-5.A and its sources. • On the necessity of giving gifts/bribes for official permission to conduct various business in China, see section II-8.E and its sources.
6. • On China's lack of rights, see sections II-8.A,D and their sources. • See the [Vries 03:29-30] citation, above.
7. • On China's lack of a standard unit of weight in the nineteenth century, see the [Vries 15:260-1] citation in section V-3.J. • On China's lack of consistency in measures in general in the late nineteenth century, see [Smith 94:chapter VI; The Disregard of Accuracy]. • On China's very weak statistical basis, see the [Vries 15:418-9] citation in section V-3.F.
8. • On China's late imperial decline in infrastructure, see section II-8.F and its sources. • On China's inferior transportation infrastructure to Europe, see section V-3.F and its sources.
➜ V-3.I.:
1. • See section V-3.E-H on White institutions that promoted business success, lacked by China. • See section V-2.C and its sources on Europe's early development of commercial and banking systems. • "-----" [Vries 15:329-30] ; "-----" [351] ; "-----" [430-1] • "-----" [Duchesne 05]
2. • "-----" [Mokyr 07a] ; "-----" [Mokyr 90:79] ; "-----" [Mokyr 02b:26-7]
3. • "-----" [Mokyr 06:20] ; "-----" [Mokyr 09:65] • See the [Vries 15:430-1] citation, above. ; "-----" [Vries 15:435]
4. • "-----
" [Bryant 06:433]
5. • See the [Vries 15:351,430-1] citations, above. ; "-----" [Vries 03:29] • On the Chinese government taking control of major industries, restricting economic activity including international trade, and exploiting businesses, see section II-8.C and its sources. • On Chinese businessmen's lack of rights, see section II-8.A and its sources. • On White economic innovations that China lacked, see the next section (J) and its sources. • "-----" [Chen 12:48]
➜ V-3.J.:
1. • See section V-2.C and its sources on Europe's early development of commercial and banking systems. • "-----" [Gies 94:169] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:249] • "-----" [Vries 15:219] ; "-----" [Vries 13:318]
2. • "-----" [Vries 15:131] ; "-----" [204] ; Vries gives details of the sound monetary systems in 18-19th century Europe, particularly Britain, in [243-50]. • White-minted coinage was in fact preferred in China: "-----" [Vries 15:261] ; "-----" [265]
3. • On paper currency and face-value coins being only sporadically used in China because of rampant overprinting and counterfeiting, see section II-6.A and its sources. • "-----" [Vries 15:258] ; "-----" [260-1] ; "-----" [263] • "-----" [Polachek 92:104-5]
4. • "-----" [Vries 15:140] ; "-----" [142] ; "-----" [204]
5. • "-----" [Vries 13:431-2] • "-----" [Zanden 09a:4] ; "-----" [22-4] ; "-----" [28] ; "-----" [29] ; "-----" [31]
6. • "-----" [Vries 13:340-1] ; "-----" [431-2]
7. • See section II-2 and its sources.
8. • "-----" [Vries 03:29-30] • On the prevelance of nepotism among Chinese, see section II-7.C and its sources. On the Chinese expectation of reciprocity for any services rendered, including business favors, see section II-5.A and its sources. On the necessity of giving gifts/bribes for official permission to conduct various business in China, see section II-8.E and its sources.
9. • "-----" [Vries 10:15-6] ; "-----" [Vries 03:28] ; "-----" [33] • "-----" [Vries 13:341]
10. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:28] ; "-----
" [117] • See the [Vries 13:340-1] citation, above; and the [Vries 10:15] citation, below.
11. • "-----" [Vries 03:31-2] ; "-----" [Vries 10:15] ; "-----
" [Vries 13:202-3]
12. • See the [Vries 10:15] citation, above. ; "-----" [Vries 10:15] ; "-----" [Vries 03:28] ; "-----" [31] • "-----" [Bryant 06:428-9]
13. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:152] • "-----" [Vries 03:33]
➜ V-3.K.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 06:25] ; "-----" [26-7]
2. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:278-82] • "-----" [Gunnarsson 08:7-8] • "-----" [Gupta 10:3-4]
; "-----" [12] • "-----" [Broadberry 05:Abstract] ; "-----" [28-32]
3. • "-----" [Zanden 08:22-3] ; "-----" [Zanden 09a:201-2]
4. • "-----" [Vries 13:299-300] ; "-----" [301-2] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:145]
5. • "-----" [Vries 15:251] ; "-----" [265] ; "-----" [368] ; "-----" [373-4+] ; "-----" [380]
6. • See the [Vries 13:340-1,431-2] citations in the previous section (J), in which China's simpler economy is contrasted with Western Europe's capitalist economy. • See the previous section (J) and its sources on how most Chinese manufacturing was done in households.
7. • "-----" [Vries 13:403] ; "-----" [Vries 15:369] ; "-----" [370] ; "-----" [371] ; "-----" [372] ; "-----" [Vries 10:7] • "-----" [De Vries 10:20]
8. • "-----" [Broadberry 17:Abstract] ; "-----" [24-7] ; "-----" [30-3] ; "-----" [33-4] • "-----" [Vries 16a:18]
9. • "-----" [Vries 15:96-9].
10. • In [Clark 07a:chap16-7], Clarke explains that efficient world markets and communication/ transport ensured that China and India had equal access to loans/capital and technology as White nations "since the nineteenth-century improvements in communication and trade". Along with this, China and India had huge advantages in both lower wages and lower regulations of labor, and yet nevertheless Britain and other White nations continued to outcompete them, because they had far higher labor productivity. They also had more capital, but this is because "[i]n a world where capital flowed easily between economies, capital itself responded to differences in country efficiency levels". The same superior White labor productivity was evident in the operation of railroads. ; "-----" [Clark 07a:345-351]
➜ V-3.L.:
1. • See Murray's Human Accomplishment, particularly [Murray 03:113].
2. • See [Murray 03:84,250-1].
3. • See [Murray 03:260].
➜ V-3.M.:
1. • "-----" [Gies 94:274] • "-----" Key Innovations and Artists of the Italian Renaissance
http://www.robinurton.com/history/Renaissance/early_ren.htm
• "-----" Who invented oil paint?
https://eclecticlight.co/2015/02/10/who-invented-oil-paint/"
2. • "-----" [Murray 03:215]
3. • "-----" [Bodde 91:287]
4. • "-----" [Duchesne 11c:383] • "-----" [Murray 03:220-2] • "-----" [Dawson 78:245]
5. • "-----" [Murray 03:218-9] • "-----" [Dawson 78:248]
6. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:248]
7. • "-----" [Murray 03:217-8] • "-----" [Duchesne 11b] • "-----" Tradition and Change in the Performance of Chinese Music, Volume 2; pg. 3
➜ V-4.A.1.:
1. • See section V-2.F and its sources on how China's last manufacturing advantages disappeared in the early-mid 18th century as Europeans discovered China's 'trade secrets' or developed alternatives, forging ahead in areas such as ceramics, textiles, metallurgy, and agriculture.
2. • See section V-3.K and its sources.
3. • On Whites' superior education, see section V-3.G and its sources. • On Whites' superior science, see section V-3.A-D and its sources. • On Whites' superior labor productivity and GDP per capita, see section V-3.K and its sources.
➜ V-4.A.2.:
1. • On the Chinese government restricting international trade, see section II-8.C and its sources. This was a reason they scrapped their ocean-going fleet (section V-2.G.8).
2. • See section V-4.E.5 and its sources.
3. • "-----" [Vries 15:251-2] ; "-----" [Vries 01:415]
4. • See section II-6.A and its sources.
5. • "-----" [Vries 15:265] ; "-----" [261] • "-----" [Polachek 92:104-5]
6. • "-----" [Vries 15:366-8] ; "-----" [Vries 06:9-10] ; "-----" [13-4] ; "-----" [15-6] ; "-----" [17] ; "-----" [Vries 15:251-2]
➜ V-4.A.3.:
1. • On how White businessmen controlled international trade and global bullion/specie flows, thus optimizing their business and making arbitrage profits by exchanging silver/gold, see section V-3.K and its sources. • "-----" [Vries 15:368-9] • "-----" [Vries 10:7] • See the citations of [Vries 06:13-4,15-6,17] and [Vries 15:251-2] in the notes of the previous section (2) on China's shortage of and demand for silver currency.
2. • On how European governments promoted industry and trade while China stifled it, see section V-3.I and its sources. • On Europe's brilliant economic innovations and development, see section V-3.J and its sources. • On Europe's superior ships that spanned the globe, see section V-2.G.8 and its sources. • On Europe's superior navies that took control of the oceans, see section V-2.G.6 and its sources.
➜ V-4.B.1.:
1. • "-----
" [Bryant 06:433] ; "-----" [434] • See the [Vries 13:299-300] and [Duchesne 11a:145] citations in section V-3.K, on how Whites' superior industry has enabled them to develop and/or purchase raw materials overseas, transport them home, create value-added products, and then finally sell them on the world market at lower prices than competitors. • "-----" [Vries 13:299-300] ; "-----" [301-2] ; "-----" [Vries 13:305-6] ; "-----" Herefollows a long series of lists of White inventions of 1700-1850 that drove the Industrial Revolution; inventions in 1) power, 2) metallurgy and machine tools, 3) industrial chemicals
, 4) mining, 5) transportation and communication
, 6) textiles, and 7) agriculture. [Vries 13:308-10] ; "-----" [Vries 01:435-6] ; See also the [Vries 03:21-2] citation in the next section (2).
2. • "-----" [Landes 98:121]
3. • "-----" [Vries 10:18-9] ; "-----" [Vries 13:303-4]
4. • See section V-4.B.3 and its sources, particluarly the [Vries 13:246-7,254-6] citations, on how Spain, Portugal, and the Islamic world failed to industrialize and become prosperous despite getting the supposed "windfalls" of precious metals and slaves from America and Africa, while Switzerland did so despite lacking any colonies. ; "-----" [Vries 13:248] • "-----" [Mokyr 03:18]
• "-----" http://history-switzerland.geschichte-schweiz.ch/industrialization-switzerland.html
➜ V-4.B.2.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 13:304-5] ; "-----" [Vries 01:429] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:145]
2. • See the [Zanden 09a:256] and [Vries 01:433] citations, below.
3. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:145] • Despite the United States' slave labor, cotton grown by the dirt poor masses of China (China's own cotton) and India was likely produced more cheaply. Britain could afford to buy and import cotton from the United States only due to the superior production and transportation methods employed. See the next section (3) and its sources, particularly [Vries 01:430].
4. • "-----" [Zanden 09a:256]
5. • "-----" [Vries 01:433] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:141-2]
6. • "-----" [Vries 01:433-4] • "-----" [Vries 03:21-2] ; "-----" [Duchesne 13:300-1] ; Duchesne reviews the evidence against claims that various Western European nations were facing a food/agricultural crisis in the 18th and 19th centuries, in [Duchesne 11a:124-137]. ; "-----" [134-5]
7. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:143-4] • "-----" [Vries 13:301]
8. • "-----" [Bryant 06:434] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:86]
9. See the [Vries 01:429] citation, above.
➜ V-4.B.3.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 13:246-7] ; "-----" [252] ; "-----" [253] ; "-----" [254-6]
2. • "-----" [Vries 13:249-52]
3. • "-----" [Vries 13:257-8]
4. • "-----" [Vries 13:258-62]
5. • "-----" [Vries 01:430]
6. • "-----" [Vries 01:432] ; "-----" [Vries 15:389-90] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:145]
➜ V-4.B.4.:
1. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:156-7] • "-----" [Vries 01:431]
2. • See the [Vries 13:347-8] citation, below; and the [Duchesne 11a:155-6] and [Vries 15:403-5] citations in the next section.
3. • "-----" [Vries 13:422]
4. • "-----" [Vries 13:347-8] ; See the [Vries 15:403-5] citation in the next section (5) for details of China's lack of development of Manchuria's rich resources.
➜ V-4.B.5.:
1. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:150 (note20)] ; "-----" [153-4]
2. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:155-6] ; "-----" [156]
3. • See the [Duchesne 11a:155-6] citation, above.
4. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:155] • On Outer China's resources, see the [Vries 13:347-8] citation in the previous section (4).
5. • "-----" [Vries 15:403-5] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:156]
➜ V-4.C.1.:
1. • "-----" [Clark 10:8-9] • "-----" [Vries 10:17] • "-----" [Kelly 14:4] • See section V-2.F and its sources on how China's last manufacturing advantages disappeared in the early-mid 18th century as Europeans discovered China's 'trade secrets' or developed alternatives, forging ahead in areas such as ceramics, textiles, metallurgy, and agriculture. • More on Europe's advanced industrial technology in section V-5.B.1 and its sources. • See the sources below on the extensive technological contributions of continental Europe.
2. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:148-9] • See the [Vries 10:17] citation, above. ; "-----" [Vries 03:21] • "-----" [Bryant 06:433]
3. • "-----" [Mokyr 02b:7-8] ; "-----" [Mokyr 09:99] ; "-----" [106] ; "-----" [107-8] • "-----" [Vries 13:168] ; "-----" [Vries 01:444]
4. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:149]
5. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:149-50] ; "-----" [150] ; "-----" [151] • "-----" [Mokyr 03:18] ; "-----" [Mokyr 09:102]
• "-----" http://history-switzerland.geschichte-schweiz.ch/industrialization-switzerland.html
➜ V-4.C.2.:
1. • "-----" [Mokyr 09:101-2] ; "-----" [103]
2. • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:148 (note 17)] • "-----" [Vries 12:13] • More on China's lack of development of its coal resources in the next section (3).
3. • "-----" [Clark 10:6-7] ; See the [Clark 07b:23-4] citation, below.
4. • See the [Mokyr 09:101-2] citation, above. • "-----" [Clark 07b:23-4] • "-----" [Duchesne 11a:150]
5. • See the [Duchesne 11a:149] citation in the previous section (1).
6. • "-----" [Mokyr 09:103-4] • "-----" [Clark 07b:24-7]
➜ V-4.C.3.:
1. • China ranks third globally in verified coal reserves with 114 billion tonnes, while the UK ranks twentieth with 3 billion tonnes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coal_by_country
• "-----" [Bryant 06:433]
2. • "-----" [Vries 15:403-5]
3. • "-----" [Vries 13:166-8]
4. • See the [Vries 13:166-8] citation, above. • On the sorry state of Chinese mining, see section V-2.G.7 and its sources. • "-----" [Vries 15:257] • On China's deteriorating infrastructure in the 19th century, see section II-8.F and its sources.
5. • "-----" [Vries 15:405]
➜ V-4.D.1.:
1. • See section V-4.D.2 and its sources, below.
2. • "-----" [Kelly 14:4-5]
3. • See section V-4.D.3 and its sources, below.
4. • See section V-4.D.2 and its sources, below.
5. • See section V-4.D.3 and its sources, below.
6. • "-----" [Vries 13:209] ; "-----" [211] ; "-----" [212] ; "-----
" [213-4] ; Vries reviews regions that previously had high wages but declined industrially, including Holland, Northern Italy, and Spanish Amercia, in [Vries 13:207-8]; "-----" [212] • Clark reviews how limited are the conditions under which high wages might tend to induce innovation: "-----" He explains why the one example given by Allen from Britain's industry that even begins to satisfy the conditions —a cotton-spinning jenny supposedly not economical in France with its supposedly cheap labor— is highly dubious. [Clark 10:5-6] • Several flaws in Allen's argument are reviewed in [Kelly 14:3-4], e.g.: "-----"
➜ V-4.D.2.:
1. • "-----" [Mokyr 09:106-13]
2. • See the [Mokyr 09:106-13] citation, above; and the [Kelly 14:16-7] citation, below. • On the extensive contributions of continental Europeans to the Industrial Revolution, see section V-4.C.1 and its sources.
3. • "-----" [Kelly 14:3] ; "-----
" [7-9] ; "-----" [16-7] ; See the comparisons of the productivity and wages of British and French workers in the [Kelly 14:17-20] citation, below. ; Kelly et al review Britain's superior agricultural productivity and food distribution in [24-5], and Britain's superior apprenticeship system in [25-7]; "-----" • "-----" [Clark 10:7-8]
4. • "-----" [Kelly 14:17-20]
➜ V-4.D.3.:
1. • On Britain being innovative in a wide variety of technologies, many having nothing to do with coal or mechanization, see section V-4.C.1 and its sources. • "-----" [Kelly 14:3] • See the sources below in this section, on innovations that were not labor-saving and that took place in relatively low-wage areas.
2. • "-----" [Kelly 14:4]
3. • "-----" [Kelly 14:4]
4. • "-----" [Mokyr 07a:9-10] • "-----" [Vries 13:211] • "-----" [Basalla 88:71] • On Whites' explorative/recreational motive for experimentation and invention, see section IV-2.A-B and its sources.
5. • See the [Kelly 14:4] citation ("It is telling that in Cornwall..."), above; and the [Vries 13:208-10] citation, below.
6. • "-----" [Vries 13:208-10]
➜ V-4.E.1.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 15:189] ; "-----" [190] • "-----" [Bryant 06:425]
2. • "-----" [Vries 13:404-5] ; "-----" [407] ; "-----" [Vries 15:235-7]
3. • See sections V-4.E.3-4, below.
➜ V-4.E.2.:
1. • "-----" [Vries 15:236-40] • "-----" [Miron 05:3] • "-----" [Gelber 06:3-4] • See the [Polachek 92:103,104-5] citation, below.
2. • See the [Vries 15:236-40] citation, above.
3. • See the [Gelber 06:3-4] citation, above.
4. • See the [Gelber 06:3-4] citation, above. • "-----" [Chen 12:58] • "-----" [Townsend 33:118]
5. • See the [Vries 15:236-40] citation, above; "-----" • See the [Polachek 92:104-5] and [Vries 15:253,258-61] citations, below, on the premium value of White-minted specie.
6. • "-----" [Polachek 92:103] ; "-----" [104-5] • "-----" [Vries 15:253] ; "-----" [258-61] • For more on China's sorry currency, see section II-6.A and its sources. • On the poor shape of China's metal mining, see section V-2.G.7 and its sources.
7. • "-----" [Vries 15:251-2]
➜ V-4.E.3.:
1. • "-----" [Miron 05:2] • "-----" (Source: Isabel Hilton, The Guardian, September 11, 2011)
http://factsanddetails.com/china/cat11/sub74/item139.html
• "-----" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opium
• "-----" [Gelber 06:2-3]
2. • "-----" [Gelber 06:2] • "-----" [Polachek 92:105-6] ; "-----" [109-10] ; "-----" [122] • "-----" [Vries 13:404] • "-----" [Miron 05:3-4] • "-----" [Cone 14] • That the internal distribution of opium was run entirely by Chinese is evident from the facts that White traders were restricted to Canton and China had few immigrants.
3. • See the Isabel Hilton and [Gelber 06:2] citations, above. • "-----" [Gelber 06:9] • -----: "-----" [Townsend 33:232-4] ; See the additional [Townsend 33] citations in this section, below.
4. • "-----" [Townsend 33:264-5]
5. • -----: "-----" [Townsend 33:236] ; "-----" [251-3] ; "-----" [253] ; "-----" [262-3] ; "-----" [266] • "-----" [Parfitt 12:134]
6. • See [Townsend 33:236,251-3,262-3] citations, above. • "-----" [Townsend 33:256]
7. • Examples of the the Chinese policy of blatant lies are given repeatedly in [Townsend 33:chapter VIII: Opium]; see citations, above.
➜ V-4.E.4.:
1. • See the [Polachek 92:105-6,122] citations in the previous section (3). • "-----" [Townsend 33:258-60]
2. • "-----" [Gelber 06:4]
3. • "-----" [Miron 05:3-4] • "-----" [Polachek 92:113-4] • "-----" [Lazich 06:220-2]
4. • "-----" [Townsend 33:267]
5. • "-----
" [Miron 05:Abstract]
6. • Articles:
China's new opium wars: Battling addiction in Beijing (2016).
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/05/china-opium-wars-battling-addiction-beijing-160516141819379.html
The other China boom: Drugs (2013).
https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/101east/2013/12/other-china-boom-201312308497562811.html
China's synthetic drugs problem expanding – government (2017).
https://www.rappler.com/world/regions/asia-pacific/165351-china-drugs-problem-expanding-government
China-US Cooperation and the New Opium War (2017).
https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/china-us-cooperation-and-the-new-opium-war/
Despite a Crackdown, Use of Illegal Drugs in China Continues Unabated (2015).
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/world/despite-a-crackdown-use-of-illegal-drugs-in-china-continues-unabated.html
➜ V-4.E.5.:
1. • "-----" [Gelber 06:1] ; "-----" [5-6] ; "-----" [7-8] • "-----" [Townsend 33:260-2] • "-----" [Cohen 10:6] • "-----" [Polachek 92:102]
2. • See the [Gelber 06:5-6] citation, above.
3. • See the sources above on the causes of the wars. • "-----" [Cohen 10:3-4]
• "-----" The Canton System of Trade, by Ralph Heymsfeld.
http://www.thepeacefulsea.com/canton-system.html
• "-----" The “Inner Kowtow Controversy” During the Amherst Embassy to China, 1816–1817.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592296.2016.1238691
• "-----" England and China: The Opium Wars, 1839-60, by Philip V. Allingham.
http://www.victorianweb.org/history/empire/opiumwars/opiumwars1.html
• "-----" [Townsend 33:258] • "-----" [Cohen 10]
4. • See the [Gelber 06:5-6] and [Cohen 10:3-4] citations, above.
• "-----" https://www.britannica.com/event/Canton-system
• "-----" [Cone 14]
5. • See the [Lazich 06:220-2] citation in the previous section (4), and the [Gelber 06:7-8] citation, above. • "-----" [Miron 05:5] ; "-----" [5-6] • "-----" [Townsend 33:257] • "-----" [Cohen 10:8-9]
6. • See the [Miron 05:Abstract] citation in the previous section (4).
---------------------------------------------------
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➣Ferguson 11: Civilization; The West and the Rest (2011), by Niall Ferguson.
➣Fong 05: The Vulnerable Faces of Pathological Gambling (2005), by Timothy W. Fong.
➣Fong 07: Asian-Americans, Addictions, and Barriers to Treatment (2007), by Timothy Fong and John Tsuang.
➣Frank 16: Race mixture in the Roman Empire: American Historical Review; Volume 21 (1916), by Tenney Frank.
➣Futrell 09: The Roman Games: Historical Sources in Translation (2009), by Alison Futrell.
➣Gelber 06: China as “Victim”? The Opium War That Wasn’t (2006), by Harry Gelber.
➣Gibbon 76: The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; Volume 1 (1776), by Edward Gibbon.
➣Gibbon 81a: The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; Volume 2 (1781), by Edward Gibbon.
➣Gibbon 81b: The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; Volume 3 (1781), by Edward Gibbon.
➣Gies 94: Cathedral, Forge, and Waterwheel; Technology and Invention in the Middle Ages (1994) by Frances and Joseph Gies.
➣Gimpel 76: The Medieval Machine; The Industrial Revolution of the Middle Ages (1976), by Jean Gimpel.
➣Goldstein 09: Why Europe; The Rise of the West in World History, 1500-1850 (2009), by Jack Goldstein.
➣Gunnarsson 08: China in the Global Economy: Failure and Success (2008), by Christer Gunnarsson and Jonas Ljungberg.
➣Gupta 10: Europe in an Asian Mirror: The Great Divergence (2010), by Bishnupriya Gupta.
➣Gutchess 06: Cultural differences in neural function associated with object processing (2006), by Angela Gutchess et al.
➣Haas 56: The Destiny of the Mind; East and West (1956), by William Haas.
➣Halpern 07: The Science of Sex Differences in Science and Mathematics (2007), by Diane Halpern, et al.
➣Hannas 03: The Writing on the Wall; How Asian Orthography Curbs Creativity (2003), by William C. Hannas.
➣Hayes 04: On the Presence of Non-Chinese at Anyang (2004), by Kim Hayes.
➣Heavy 12: The structure of savant calendrical knowledge (2012), by Lisa Heavy, et al.
➣Heginbotham 15: China's Military Modernization; Eric Heginbotham and Michael Chase in Conversation (2015).
➣Hermelin 01: Bright Splinters of the Mind: A Personal Story of Research with Autistic Savants (2001), by Beate Hermelin.
➣Hout 10: China vs the World: Whose Technology Is It? (2010), by Thomas Hout and Ghemawat.
➣Huff 11: Intellectual Curiosity and the Scientific Revolution; A Global Perspective (2011), by Toby Huff.
➣Jaffer 17: Finally, US appears ready to battle China's rampant IP theft (8/22/2017), by Jamil Jaffer.
➣Jixu 02: Correspondences of Basic Words Between Old Chinese and Proto-Indo-European (2002), by Zhou Jixu.
➣Jixu 03: Correspondences of Cultural Words between Old Chinese and Proto-Indo-European (2003), by Zhou Jixu.
➣Jixu 05: Old Chinese "tees" and Proto-Indo-European "deus": Similarity in Religious Ideas and a Common Source in Linguistics (2005), by Zhou Jixu.
➣Jixu 06: The Rise of Agricultural Civilization in China: The Disparity between Archeological Discovery and the Documentary Record and Its Explanation (2006), by Zhou Jixu.
➣Jones 87: The European Miracle; Environments, economies, and geopolitics in the history of Europe and Asia (1987), by E.L. Jones.
➣Jongman 06: Gibbon Was Right: The Decline and Fall of the German Economy (2006), by Willem Jongman.
➣Jongman 08: Jongman on Poverty in the Roman World (2008), by Willem Jongman.
➣Kanazawa 06: No, It Ain’t Gonna Be Like That (2006), by Satoshi Kanazawa.
➣Kaufman 14: Where do Savant Skills Come From? (2014), by Scott Barry Kaufman.
➣Kelly 14: Precocious albion; A new interpretation of the British Industrial revolution (2014), by Morgan Kelly, Joel Mokyr, and Cormac Grada.
➣Kitayama 03: Perceiving an object and its context in different cultures; A cultural look at new look (2003), by Shinobu Kitayama.
➣Koopman 08: How Much of China’s Exports is Really Made in China? (2008), by Robert Koopman and Zhi Wang.
➣Landes 98: The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1998), by David Landes.
➣Landes 06: Why Europe and the West? Why Not China? (2006), by David Landes.
➣Lazich 06: American Missionaries and the Opium Trade in Nineteenth-Century China (2006), by Michael Lazich.
➣Lin 08: Needham Puzzle, Weber Question and China’s Miracle: Long Term Performance since the Sung Dynasty (2008), by Justin Yifu Lin.
➣Louie 14: Is gambling addiction in Asian American community rooted in culture? (2014), by Sam Louie.
➣Lynn 91: Race differences in intelligence: A global perspective; in Mankind Quarterly (1991), by Richard Lynn.
➣Lynn 06: Race differences in intelligence: A global perspective (2006), by Richard Lynn.
➣Mace 18: Population structured by witchcraft beliefs (2018), by Ruth Mace, et al.
➣Maddison 05: Growth and Interaction in the World Economy; The Roots of Modernity (2005), by Angus Maddison.
➣Mann 86: The Sources of Social Power; Vol. 1 (1986), by Michael Mann.
➣Marsa 16: Extraordinary minds: The link between savantism and autism (2016), by Linda Marsa.
➣Masuda 01: Attending Holistically Versus Analytically: Comparing the Context Sensitivity of Japanese and Americans (2001), by Takahiko Masuda et al.
➣Masuda 06: Culture and Change Blindness (2006), by Takahiko Masuda et al.
➣McClellan 06: Science and Technology in World History; An introduction (2006), by James McClellan and Harold Dorn.
➣McGeeney 15: Acupuncture Is All Placebo and Here Is Why (2015), by Brian E. McGeeney, MD.
➣McKone 10: Asia has the global advantage: Race and visual attention (2010), by Elinor McKone.
➣Miron 05: The Opium Wars, Opium Legalization, and Opium Consumption in China (2005), by Jeffrey Miron and Chris Feige.
➣Mizokami 17: China's Military Power Nears "Parity" With the West, Report Says (Feb 16, 2017), by Kyle Mizokami.
➣Mo 04: Lessons from the History of Imperial China (2004), by Pak Hung Mo, Mark Elvin, et al.
➣Moir 89: Brain Sex: The Real Difference Between Men and Women (1989), by Anne Moir and David Jessel.
➣Mokyr 90: The Lever of Riches; Technological Creativity and Economic Progress (1990), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 00: King Kong and Cold Fusion: Counterfactual analysis and the History of Technology (2000), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 02a: The Gifts of Athena; Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (2002), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 02b: The Enduring Riddle of the European Miracle: The Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution (2002), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 03: Why Was the Industrial Revolution a European Phenomenon? (2003), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 05a: The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth (2005), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 05b: Mobility, Creativity, and Technological Development (2005), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 06: The great synergy; The European Enlightenment as a factor in modern economic growth (2006), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 07a: Knowledge, Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution: Reflections on Gifts of Athena (2007), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 07b: The Market for Ideas and the Origins of Economic Growth in Eighteenth Century Europe (2007), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 07c: The European Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and Modern Economic growth (2007), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 09: The Enlightened Economy; An Economic History of Britain 1700-1850 (2009), by Joel Mokyr.
➣Mokyr 16: Institutions and economic history; a critique of professor McCloskey (2016), by Joel Mokyr and Avner Greif.
➣Murray 03: Human Accomplishment: The Pursuit of Excellence in the Arts and Sciences (2003), by Charles Murray.
➣Nakamura 64: Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (1964), by Hajimi Nakamura.
➣Ng 17: Hong Kong’s Taoist funerals: the superstition, symbolism and how to stop your soul being dragged into the coffin (2017), by Heidi Ng.
➣Ni 03: High Corruption Income as a Source of Distortion and Stagnation: Some Evidence from Ming and Qing China (2003), by Shawn Ni and Pham Hoang Van.
➣Ni 05: High Corruption Income in Ming and Qing China (2005), by Shawn Ni and Pham Hoang Van.
➣Nilsson 21: The Race Problem of the Roman Empire (1921), by Martin Nilsson.
➣Nisbett 03: The Geography Of Thought; How Asians and Westerners Think Differently (2003), by Richard Nisbett.
➣O'riordan 04: Superior Visual Search in Adults with Autism (2004), by Michelle O'riordan.
➣Osborn 17: World War III Deathmatch: China vs. America's Military (2017), by Kris Osborn.
➣Ostmoe 95: A Germanic-Tai Linguistic Puzzle (1995), by Arne Østmoe.
➣Pacey 90: Technology in World Civilization; A Thousand-Year History (1990), by Arnold Pacey.
➣Parfitt 12: Why China Will Never Rule the World; Travels in the Two Chinas (2012), by Troy Parfitt.
➣Park 97: Corruption in Eighteenth-Century China (1997), by Nancy Park.
➣Peng 95: New Research on the Origin of Cowries Used in Ancient China (1995), by Ke Peng and Yanshi Zhu.
➣Penyeh 98: Tradition and Change in the Performance of Chinese Music; Vol 2 (1998), by Tsao Penyeh.
➣Peterson 74: The Greek Face (Journal of Indo-European Studies; Vol 2, #4; 1974), by R. Peterson.
➣Polachek 92: The Inner Opium War (1992), by James M. Polachek.
➣Qian 85: The Great Inertia; Scientific Stagnation in Traditional China (1985), by Wen-yuan Qian.
➣Rempel 98: Why Rome Fell (1998), by Prof. Gerhard Rempel.
http://web.archive.org/web/20051218144105/http://mars.acnet.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/wc1/lectures/14romefell.html
➣Rozin 16: Right: Left:: East: West. Evidence that individuals from East Asian and South Asian cultures emphasize right hemisphere functions in comparison to Euro-American cultures (2016), by Paul Rozin et al.
➣Shaffer 10: Profiting in Economic Storms: A Historic Guide To Surviving Depression... (2010), by Daniel Shaffer.
➣Shaughnessy 89: Western Cultural Innovations in China (1989), by Edward Shaughnessy.
➣Smith 94: Chinese characteristics (1894), by Arthur Smith.
➣Sng 14: Size and Dynastic Decline: The Principal-Agent Problem in Late Imperial China 1700-1850 (2014), by Tuan-Hwee Sng.
➣Snow 02: The Spider’s Web; Goddesses of Light and Loom: Evidence for the Indo-European Origin of Two Ancient Chinese Deities (2002), By Justine Snow.
➣Stover 76: China: An Anthropological Perspective (1976), by Leon Stover and Takeko Stover.
➣Taub 93: Acupuncture: Nonsense with Needles (1993), by Arthur Taub.
➣Townsend 33: Ways that are Dark; The Truth About China (1933), by Ralph Townsend.
➣Treffert 89: Extraordinary People: Understanding Savant Syndrome (1989), by Darrold Treffert.
➣Treffert 09: Savant Syndrome: An Extraordinary Condition; A Synopsis: Past, Present, Future (2009), by Darold Treffert.
➣U.S.-China 14: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to Congress; Section 2: China's Military Modernization (2014).
➣Tsung-i 91: Questions on the Origins of Writing Raised by the Silk Road (1991), by Jao Tsung-i.
➣Vernon 82: The Abilities and Achievements of Orientals in North America (1982), by PA Vernon.
➣Vries 01: Are Coal and Colonies Really Crucial? Kenneth Pomeranz and the Great Divergence (2001), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 03: Via Peking back to Manchester. Britain, the Industrial Revolution and China (2003), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 06: Orientalism Inverted; or Good Reasons not to ReOrient the Economic History of the Early Modern World (2006), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 10: California School and Beyond; How to Study Great Divergence (2010), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 12: Challenges, (Non-)Responses, and Politics: A Review of Prasannan Parthasarathi, "Why Europe Grew Rich..." (2012), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 13: Escaping Poverty; The origins of Modern Economic Growth (2013), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 15: State, Economy and the Great Divergence (2015), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 16a: What we do and do not know about the Great Divergence at the beginning of 2016 (2016), by Peer Vries.
➣Vries 17: A review of Tonio Andrade, The Gunpowder Age (2017), by Peer Vries.
➣Wan 11: Early Development of Bronze Metallurgy in Eastern Eurasia (2011), by Xiang Wan.
➣Wei 05a: Dao and De; An Inquiry into the Linguistic Origins of Some Terms in Chinese Philosophy and Morality (2005), by Julie Lee Wei.
➣Wei 05b: Counting and Knotting; Correspondences between Old Chinese and Indo-European (2005), by Julie Lee Wei.
➣Wenke 80: Patterns in Prehistory (1980), by Robert Wenke.
➣White 62: Medieval Technology and Social Change (1962), by Lynn White.
➣Xing 11: China’s High-tech Exports: Myth and Reality (2011), by Yuqing Xing.
➣Yang 84: The Ugly Chinaman (1984), speech by Bo Yang.
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/html/icb.topic702814/Bo_Yang.html
➣Zanden 08: The road to the Industrial Revolution: Hypotheses and conjectures about the medieval origins of the ‘European Miracle (2008), by Jan Luiten van Zanden.
➣Zanden 09a: The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution; The European Economy in a Global Perspective (2009), by Jan Luiten van Zanden.
➣Zanden 11: Before the Great Divergence: The modernity of China at the onset of the industrial revolution (2011), by Jan Luiten van Zanden.
